

MANIMEKHALAI

IN ITS

HISTORICAL SETTING

BY

RAO BAHADUR

S. KRISHNASWAMI AYYANGAR, M.A., HONV. PH.D.,

LONDON


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Madras University Special Lectures.

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S. KRISHNASWAMI AYYANGAR, M.A., HONV. PH.D.,

Professor of Indian History and Archaeology, University of Madras.

Reader, Calcutta University, Honorary Correspondent of the

Archaeological Department of the Government of India.

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INScribed
WITH A FATHER'S AFFECTION
TO
THE MEMORY OF
JAYALAKSHMI
WHO DIED
ON HER FOURTH BIRTH DAY
2ND JANUARY, 1928.

PREFACE

THE study of *Maṇimēkhalai* presented in the following pages was intended to be delivered as the ninth of my courses of special lectures at the Madras University in the last term of the academic year 1925-26, but was held over as some points required further study. The course was ultimately delivered in March and April of the current year rather later than usual in the academic year to suit the exigencies of other University fixtures. This classic and its twin, the *Śilappadhikāram*, formed part of my study in connection with the investigations on the age of the Tamil Śāṅgam, which was undertaken at the instance of the late Mr. L. C. Innes, a retired Judge of the Madras High Court and an ex-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Madras, in the early years of the century. The first fruit of this study was published as the *Augustan Age of Tamil Literature*, the first constructive effort on my part to solve this problem on which a few remarks and criticisms were made, in a paper on the *Age of Kamban* written by the esteemed scholar above mentioned, in the pages of the *Asiatic Quarterly* for the year 1898. The *Augustan Age of Tamil Literature* contains matter taken both from the *Śilappadhikāram* and *Maṇimēkhalai*. This naturally led to a considerable amount of criticism as to how far these two works, distinct from the various collections generally known as the Śāṅgam collections, could be regarded as Śāṅgam works, directly or indirectly. The late Mr. V. Venkayya, Epigraphist to the Government of India, was willing to admit that the age of the Śāṅgam was the

second century A.D., but was in doubt whether these two works could be regarded as belonging to that collection. Mr. K. V. Subramania Aiyar of the Department of Epigraphy, took a similar line and wished to draw a distinction between the Śāngam works as such, and these romantic poems. The matter, therefore, required further investigation, and I have had to reconsider the whole question both from the point of view of the Śāngam works themselves, of which two or three important collections had become accessible to me, some in print and some in manuscript. My further study of this subject was incorporated in a course of lectures delivered before the University, constituting the second of the Series, *Beginnings of South Indian History*, which was published in book form in 1918.

In the course of work ranging over a score of years on this particular classic, books XXVII, XXIX and XXX remained but little used as a specific item of investigation for lack of leisure for the subsidiary studies that that investigation would have involved. In the course of a controversy, however, as to the actual date of the Śāngam in which my late esteemed friend, Mr. L. D. Swanikannu Pillai had joined issue on astronomical grounds based on poem 11 of the *Paripādal*, a newly published Śāngam work, the suggestion that the philosophical systems of the *Maṇimēkhalai* may be usefully studied was made by Professor Jacobi of Bonn in a letter that he wrote to me in May 1922. I took up the question then and have been at work at intervals when current University work permitted. My first idea was to get a translation of these chapters made for publication in the *Indian Antiquary* with a view to stimulate discussion on the question. My friend, Professor C. S. Srinivasachari of the Pachaiyappa's College, undertook to study the chapters and make a

translation of them, and brought his manuscript to be annotated and published in the *Indian Antiquary* by me. Notwithstanding the trouble that he took not only by himself alone, but even with the assistance of one or two other scholars (the late Mr. Kanakasundaram Pillai and another), it struck me that that kind of translation would not serve the purpose which I had in mind. I had therefore to let the matter lie over till I could attempt it myself with adequate preparation in the subsidiary studies as a necessary pre-requisite. I took up the question and have been at it continuously for the last three years more or less, amidst other work. The result is published in the following lectures.

The lectures themselves constitute the first part of the work. Then there is a slightly abridged translation of the whole of the classic so as to give an idea, of the narrative and the setting, to the reader unacquainted with Tamil. In translating this part, I have had it before me all the time to give the reader as much of an idea of the poem as a translation could at all give. I have omitted no material point and even attempted to keep the tone of the original to the best of my ability. The three books, XXVII, XXIX and XXX dealing respectively with 'the Heretical Systems', 'Buddhist Logic', and 'the Teachings of Buddhism' are translated literally, so that apart from the use I have made of it, the translation may be helpful to those who may not be able to go to the original itself. I hope the translation will prove to be of value for this purpose.

In the course of this work, I took advantage of the progress of my studies to submit three tentative papers (1) on 'the Buddhism of Mañimēkhalai' to a collection of Buddhist Studies in course of publication by my friend, Dr. B. C. Law of Calcutta; (2) another paper 'A

Buddhist School at Kānchi' was presented to the Fourth Oriental Conference held in Allahabad in November last, and is in course of publication in the proceedings of the Conference; (3) and the last 'A Tamil Treatise on Buddhist Logic' to the Vasanta Silver Jubilee Volume in honour of Principal A. B. Dhruva of the Benares University by his friends and admirers, and the work is expected to be published soon in Ahmadabad.

In the course of the work Pandit M. Raghava Aiyangar of University Tamil Lexicon Office did me the favour to assist by putting book XXIX of the poem in prose order at my request with a view to facilitating the work of translation. I found, however, that the version was not of as much value as I had anticipated, as the difficulty of understanding it lay not so much in the Tamil as in a knowledge of the technicalities of Indian Logic as such. But the good Pandit's work was of some assistance and I acknowledge it with pleasure. Since the matter was put in final form, my friend, Mr. T. C. Srinivasa Aiyangar, B.A., B.L., M.L.C., Secretary, Tamil Śāngam, Madura, drew my attention to a brochure by Pandit Tirunarayana Aiyangar of the Tamil Śāngam. It is an exposition of the technical terms of logic with a view to elucidating book XXIX of Maṇimēkhalai. It is a very useful piece of work and enabled me to make a correction or two. I need hardly add that this attempt of mine would have been impossible but for the labours of Pandit Mahamahopadhyaya V. Svaminatha Aiyar whose excellent edition of the work leaves little to be desired. His notes on books XXVII and XXX were of the greatest value and go only to enhance his character for wisdom when he deliberately omitted to annotate book XXIX. His previous work was of undoubted advantage to me even in translating book XXIX.

Before concluding, I must acknowledge my obligation to my venerable friend, Professor H. Jacobi of Bonn. His suggestion that the philosophical systems may throw light upon the chronology of the poem supplied the stimulus for my taking up this work, although exigencies of other work prevented my doing it as soon as I might, under more favourable circumstances, have done. He seems to have gone to work on the subject himself on the basis of the abridged account given in Mr. Kanakasabhai Pillai's *Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years ago*, and sent me a proof copy of a paper he contributed to a 'Festschrift' in honour of the late Dr. E. Hultzsch. He must be given credit for the independent discovery of the similarity of the Buddhist logic of Mañimēkhalai to the Nyāyapravēśa of Dignāga. I received the proof after I had delivered my lectures and before I sent him my manuscript for criticism.

When the lectures had been delivered, I sent copy of my lectures and translation of the relevant chapters for his criticism which he had the great kindness to send me freely and fully, for which I am specially grateful to him. It is matter for great regret to me that we cannot bring ourselves to agree in regard to the main thesis of the relation between book XXIX of the Mañimēkhalai and the treatises of Dignāga on Logic. I have re-considered the position on the basis of his criticism and I regret very much indeed that I am not able to see eye to eye with him on this particular point. This examination of the learned Professor's critical remarks is appended to my lectures. None the less, I feel deeply indebted to him for the time and trouble that he bestowed upon a careful study of the manuscript and giving me the benefit of his views thereon in a letter concluding with 'it is my sincere opinion that by making accessible to scholars

at large the contents of the "Maṇimēkhalai", specially by a faithful translation of the chapters bearing on Indian Philosophy and Buddhism, you are entitled to the gratitude and admiration of all who take an interest in Indian culture and the history of South India'. It is to be hoped that the work will serve the purpose so well indicated by the Professor, and I seek no more reward than that for the labour that I have been able to bestow upon it.

I acknowledge with pleasure my obligations to the Publishers, Messrs. Luzac and Co., Oriental and Foreign Book-sellers, London, and to the Diocesan Press, Madras, the Printers, for the careful printing and excellent get-up of the work. Mr. A. V. Venkatarama Aiyar, M.A., L.T., Curator, Madras Records, read the final proof; and Mr. R. Gopalam, M.A., of the Connemara Library prepared the index at a time when I was badly in need of assistance owing to inconveniences and ill health. I acknowledge with gratitude the valuable and timely assistance they gave me on this as on other occasions. The Madras School Book and Literature Society, on the motion of their President, the Rev. Canon Sell, have resolved to bear a part of the expenses of publication of this work. I acknowledge this assistance with pleasure and gratitude.

S. KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR.

VIJAYADASAMI, OCTOBER 6TH, 1927,
MARINE VILLA, MADRAS UNIVERSITY.

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ERRATA

Page	Line	Error	Correction
1	3	for Vajaiyāpti	read Vajayapati
10	20	criticising	criticising
14	9	The	The
18	*. 2	xxviii p. 172	xxviii. 1. 172
19	6	Śangan	Śangam
22	17	Set	Sect
24	16	is	are
30	4	,	:
38	3	Rudran Kagnan	Rudran Kagnan
39	23	achievements	achievement
"	30	Pajaiyan	Pajaiyan,
41	26	field	field
45	30	Tirupāsur	Tirupāsūr
50	28	the first two	the first two, <i>Tvetra Kānda</i> ,
"	31	(books 13 to 16)	(books 15 and 16).
62	34	Indian Philosophy	Indian Philosophy,
85	3 inset	in theoretical	in the theoretical
88	2	already explained	already been explained
109	14	of	to
112	27	and accompanied	and, accompanied
114	16	vast	vaster
110	12	and seeing	and, seeing
130	26	in a manner	in the manner
133	23	Then	" Then
134	7	day	day "
147	14	unforl	<i>strike out</i>
155	25	and entering	and, entering
176	2	women	woman
178	2	had fallen	had befallen
189	3	fortification	fortifications
210	16	is a eternal	is eternal.
211	5	Āsraya-siddham	Āsraya-siddham
"	17	Uapiyika-	Uāpāyika-
213	1	Up-	Ush-
214	29	make	makes
215	8	contradictory	contrary

N.B. -- It is matter for regret that a certain number of errors in diacritical marks escaped correction in proof. They are not included in the errata as being too obvious.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the following lectures I have attempted to consider first of all the question what the position of Maṇimē-khalai is among the Tamil classics generally and how far the general judgment of the Tamil literary public that it is one among the five great classics is justifiable on grounds of literary merit and general classical excellence. As such, it was necessary to consider whether it could be regarded a Śāṅgam work, and if so, in what particular sense of the term, whether as a work which was presented to the Śāṅgam and which received the Śāṅgam *inprimatur*, or whether it should be taken to be merely a literary work of classic excellence, as often-times the expression is used in that sense in later Tamil literature. The investigation and enquiry into Tamil literary tradition leads to the conclusion that it is a work of classic excellence in Tamil literature and may be regarded as a Śāṅgam work in that sense. We have no information that it was ever presented to the Śāṅgam, although, according to Tamil tradition, the author was one of the Śāṅgam 49, and, being so close to the age of the Śāṅgam itself, it may be spoken of appropriately as a Śāṅgam work, though not presented to the Śāṅgam.

This position receives additional support in the contents of the two works, which constitute a twin Epic, namely, *Silappadhikāram-Maṇimēkhalai*. The subject-matter of the two is one continuous story, and describes what befell a householder and his wife of the city of Puhār, and, as a consequence, the renunciation

of the daughter of the hero of her life as the first courtesan of the Chola capital. The author of the one is described to us as the brother of the contemporary Chēra ruler, Śenguttuvan, a Śāngam celebrity, and the author of the other is similarly introduced to us as a personal and admiring friend of the Chēra sovereign and his ascetic younger brother. Other details of a contemporary character introduced in the story, all of them, are referable to incidents which find mention in relation to various rulers of the Tamil land in the Śāngam classics. Thus the mere external circumstances and the few details that we possess of the life and life-time of the authors, as well as the Tamil tradition that the author of the *Maṇimēkhalai* himself was one of the Śāngam 49, all alike seem to tend to the conclusion that the work was a product of the age which may be generally described as the age of the Śāngam, that is, the age of Śenguttuvan Chēra as the dominant ruler of South India.

Tamil early adopted a system of grammar, and so far as literary productions in the language go, follow the prevalent system of grammar and rhetoric. As such these works do not lend themselves exactly to that kind of investigation of a linguistic and philological character which could be more appropriately adopted in regard to works where the language is more flexible and has not attained to the classic fixity of an accepted system of grammar. But it still lends itself to a certain amount of investigation as a work of literature, and such an investigation clearly reveals the intimate connection between the *Silappadhikāram* and the *Maṇimēkhalai* itself as literary works, products of a single age, a single tradition, and of a very similar atmosphere. If comparisons are made of these with genuine Śāngam classics themselves, the similarity is no less pronounced, apart

from the similarity of historical matter and of geographical surroundings. Thus from the point of view of literary criticism, we have good reason for regarding these as classics of Tamil, which may be treated as of the same literary character as Śāngam works.

The historical and geographical details which can be gathered round a character like Śenguṭṭuvan Chēra, and just a few others who happen to figure in these romantic poems, when carefully collected and collaborated, tell the same tale of contemporaneity between the works themselves and between the two works and other Śāngam works so-called. Specific instances of historical incidents are dealt with in full detail in the lectures themselves. We need hardly do more here than merely to point out that the four capitals of Puhār, Madura, Vanji, and Kānchi occur in the poem. Their condition and the rulers that held sway over them are described incidentally in the course of the story, and these admit of definite treatment in comparison with the condition of these capitals, as we find them described in the Śāngam works. One point which clinches the matter and provides a definite test of the age is that throughout the story as narrated in these two works, Kānchi remained a viceroyalty under the authority of the Cholas, who, under Karikāla, are credited uniformly by Tamil tradition with having civilized this land and brought it into the pale of Tamil civilization. Without going into too much detail here, it may be said that the country round Kānchi which became peculiarly the territory of the Pallavas, remained under Chola rule, and a Chola, a prince of the blood very often, held the viceroyalty. The one remarkable change for which we have evidence in the Śāngam works is the placing of this viceroyalty in the hands of a Tondamān chief by name Iḷar-Tirayan.

This took place in the last period of the age of the Śāngam from the evidence of the Śāngam literature itself. In the classics with which we are concerned, there is no evidence of our having reached the stage when Kānchi was under the rule of Tonḍamān-Īlam-Tirayan ; nor have we any vestige of evidence that would justify the assumption that the Tonḍamān chief had ruled and passed away. Other historical details can be recited in number. It is hardly necessary to take up those details here, which are discussed elsewhere in the course of this work and in other works of ours. The conclusion to which we are, therefore, irresistibly driven is that we are in an age when the Śāngam activity had not yet ceased, and this view is in full accord with all the evidence available regarding the Śāngam and its age in the vast mass of literature in which that evidence lies scattered.

Our main purpose in this thesis has been to consider what light the philosophical systems and the religious condition of the country as described in the Maṇimēkhalai throw upon this important question of the age of the work itself and of the Śāngam literature generally. It is with a view to this that the examination was actually suggested by Professor Jacobi and was taken up by ourselves. The chapters bearing upon the questions are three, namely, books XXVII, XXIX and XXX. Book XXVII discusses the heretical systems from the point of view of orthodox Buddhism. Maṇimēkhalai discusses, with orthodox professors of the various schools, the tenets of their particular systems on the basis of their authoritative works with a view to learn what exactly they might have to teach. She begins with a discussion of the *Prasāngas* applicable generally as instruments of knowledge, and, under the general group-

ing Vaidikavāda, five separate systems are described, all acknowledging the authority of the Veda. The first statement of importance contained in this particular part has relation to *pramāṇas* as applied to the *Vaidika* system. Three authorities are mentioned, Vēdavyāsa, Jaimini and Kṛtakoṭi. Of these, the first is said to have formulated ten *pramāṇas*, of which the second rejected four and accepted only six. The third one, however, seems to have accepted eight and rejected only two of the ten. After a detailed discussion of the *pramāṇas* and what they are, the discussion winds up with the conclusion that the *pramāṇas* current at the time are six, and they applied alike to the six systems commonly recognized as such. The six *pramāṇas* as given are, Pratyaksha, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, and Abhāva. The six systems held as orthodox are Lōkāyatam, Bauddham, Sāṅkyam, Naiyāyikam, Vaiśēshikam, Mīmāṃsam, with the respective authors, Bṛhaspati, Jina, Kapila, Akshapāda, Kāpāda, and Jaimini. In this recital of six, the omission of Jainism is interesting, but may be understood as being due to its not following the *Vaidika pramāṇas*. While Nyāya and Vaiśēshika are both of them mentioned, Yoga is not mentioned along with Sāṅkya. Bauddham is mentioned as a religion to which these *pramāṇas* were applicable, and that is in accordance with the opinion that the Bauddhas from Buddha onwards to Vasubandhu adopted the system of Akshapāda, and perhaps other teachers of the *Pramāṇa Vāda* likewise. Mīmāṃsa is mentioned as one Śāstra ascribed to Jaimini, not as two as in later times and in orthodox parlance it had come to be recognized. This leaves out the Brahma Kāṇḍa of Vyāsa. Apart from this general system of *pramāṇas*, others from whom she attempted to learn their tenets were Śaivavādi, Brahmavādi,

Vaiṣṇavavādi and Vēda Vādi. At the end of the book, in summing up the totality of the systems she attempted to learn she includes these first five as one. The next following two, the teaching of the Ājivaka and that of the Nirgrantha she apparently counts as one. The chapter winds up with the statement that thus she had learnt from their respective teachers the five systems, and Maṇimēkhalai herself repeats the statement later when she mentions it to Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ that she had learnt the five systems according to their authoritative texts from those who had specially studied them, in book XXIX. This kind of a reference to the five heretical systems makes it clear that at that time there was a fixed notion that six were regarded as the prevalent systems to which from the point of view of the Buddhists five were heretical. Including the orthodox Buddhist system, it made up six, and therefore, we are justified in regarding the six systems as those referred to as current by Maṇimēkhalai herself in an earlier place. The points of importance for our investigation in this chapter are that the six accepted *Vaidika pramāṇas* applied even to Buddhism, that Buddhism regarded itself as within the fold of *Vaidika pramāṇas*, such as Jainism was not. The Mīmāṃsā is regarded as a single system as yet, while the Yoga system had not been known, at any rate had not become a recognized system in this part of the country. The later recognition that two *pramāṇas* were alone valid by the Buddhists, namely, *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*, had not yet been adopted exclusively as a cardinal doctrine of Buddhism.

Passing on to chapter xxix, we are here introduced to a system of Buddhist logic where the teaching of the Buddhists assumes more definite shape and is in the course of the full definition to which it attained under Dignāgā-

chârya. Here the author puts the Buddhist teaching of logic in the mouth of Aṣṭavaṇa Aḍigaḷ, introduced as a Buddhist saint of the highest reputation in the Tamil country at the time. The chapter begins with saying that the highest authority for the system is Jinendra, the Buddha, and that the *pramāṇyas* are actually only two, Pratyaksha and Anumāna. After defining these two, a general statement is put in that all the other *pramāṇyas* are capable of inclusion in Anumāna. Then we are led to the five *avayavas* or organs of syllogism, Pratigñā (proposition), (2) Hētu (reason), (3) Drishṭānta or Udāharāṇa (example), (4) Upanaya (application) and (5) Nigamana (conclusion). After having defined and illustrated the first three, the last two are passed over as being capable of inclusion in Drishṭānta. Then follows a further discussion that these three could be valid and invalid, and the sub-division of each one of them is given with illustrations. Thus we are taken through a regular course of logic, the purpose of the cultivation of which is stated to be, at the end of the chapter, that by means of the validity of reasoning and its invalidity, one may understand that which is truth from that which is other than truth. In the details that are given of the whole discussion and in the general trend of the discussion itself, the Mañimēkhalai seems to us to follow the prevalent teaching of logic current in Kānchī at the time. From Kānchī however, there hailed a logician of great reputation, known by the name of Dignāga, who wrote, according to Chinese authority, a number of treatises on the subject, and thereby had become the authoritative teacher of the system. Some of his works have been continuously in use as text-books in China, and from a somewhat later period, in Tibet. They were apparently in use in India as well, but had long since

gone out of use. Within the last twenty years some of these have been recovered by various scholars, Chinese, Tibetan, Indian and European of various nationalities. The best known works of this Dignāga are *Pramāṇa-samucchaya* and *Nyāyaprabhāṣā*. These are sometimes criticized in commentaries by Brahmanical commentators as well as Jain, and, needless to say, quoted with approval and elaborated by Buddhist commentators. The two works quoted above constitute the final authoritative texts of this author on the subject, of which the *Nyāyaprabhāṣā* seems from the information available to us at present, the fuller. For our purpose the similarity between this work of Dignāga and chapter xxix of the *Mañimūkhala* runs through all details, and even the examples happen to be the same. This is nothing surprising as, in the treatment of technical subjects like this, examples are chosen for their peculiar aptness and all teachers accept them generally for purposes of illustration. Having regard to the great reputation that Dignāga has achieved as a logician, it may seem a natural inference that a poet like the author of the *Mañimūkhala* should have borrowed the teaching from a treatise like the *Nyāyaprabhāṣā*. Notwithstanding the closeness of similarity, there are a few points in which the *Mañimūkhala* treatment of the subject seems to mark a transition from, it may be, the *Naiyāyikas* to the teaching of Dignāga himself, particularly so in the two points to which attention had been drawn, namely, in the statement that the *pramāṇas* are only two, others being capable of inclusion in the second, *Anumāna*; the reference is obviously made to the other four *pramāṇas* out of the six already referred to as current at the time and applicable to the six systems in book XXVII. We have no right to interpret the other *pramāṇas* there as any other than the four of the six, to

which the work made explicit reference in book XXVII, whereas Dignāga seems to have no such qualms, and actually deals with the four *pramāṇas* of the Naiyāyikas, retains the first two, and rejects the other two, after examination, positively. Similarly in the discussion of the *avayavas*, the Mañimēkhalai seems to mark a transition. It mentions the five *avayavas*, accepts the three, and does not consider the other two as they are capable of inclusion in the third. There is nothing like the rejection of these as invalid as in the case of Dignāga. Then there is a third point. Dignāga solemnly lays himself out to consider the Svārtha and Parārtha form of syllogism, that is, syllogistic ratiocination with a view to convincing oneself, and with a view to convincing others. After a serious discussion, he comes to the conclusion that the latter being included in the former, it is superfluous to treat of it separately. To the Mañimēkhalai, it does not seem necessary to discuss the latter at all. In regard to the *Pakṣa-ābhāsas* discussed, the Nyāyapraṇēśa is supposed to make a new classification and describes nine which are found described almost in the same terms in the Mañimēkhalai itself.

Here comes in a discussion which may seem alien to the course of this argument, but which, as will be noticed, has an important and vital bearing on the question itself. Who is the author of the Nyāyapraṇēśa? The text of the Nyāyapraṇēśa not having been available, there were two clearly divided schools of thought, one of them regarding the Nyāyapraṇēśa, both in the Tibetan and Chinese version as well as the now available Sanskrit version, is the work of Dignāga; another school, basing itself chiefly on an examination of the Chinese originals, regards it as the work of Dignāga's immediate disciple Śaukarasvāmin. Without going into the arguments

which will be found elsewhere, we may state it here that although Buddhist tradition had known of Śankarasvāmin as the disciple of Dignāga, no authority bearing on Buddhist literature has mentioned a work, Nyāyapravēśa ascribing it to Śankarasvāmin as the author. It is now clear that the Nyāyapravēśa was ascribed to Sankarasvāmin very early in China, and that the work had been constantly in use there. There is no mention, however, of Nyāyapravēśa as the work of Śankarasvāmin anywhere in the works of Hiuen T'sang among treatises on logic which were being studied by students at the schools and Universities in India. I'tsing who gives a complete list does not mention the Nyāyapravēśa as the work of a Śankarasvāmin, but seems to mention it, not perhaps exactly in the same form, as the work of Dignāga himself. So the work may well have to be regarded as the work of Dignāga, which his disciple Śankarasvāmin perhaps taught and his teaching spread into China, and gave him the reputation of being the author of the work. But whether the Nyāyapravēśa is the work of Dignāga himself, as we prefer to take it, or whether it should turn out to be the work of Śankarasvāmin, actually his disciple, it does not materially affect our question, as the difference of time could be hardly a generation. The real question is whether the Nyāyapravēśa is copied in the Mañimēkhalai or, as we take it, whether the Mañimēkhalai marks a transition between the Naiyāyikas and the Nyāyapravēśa of Dignāga. In the latter alternative, the date of the work could be much earlier than A.D. 400; and in the former alternative it must be held decisively to be a work of the fifth century at the earliest. We have good reason for regarding Mañimēkhalai as a work anterior to Dignāga, and we shall see that it is in a way supported by what the

work has to say actually of Buddhism in the following book.

In book XXX the author of the *Mañimékhala* lays himself out to give the actual teaching of the Buddha according to the *Piṭakas* ', and gives a clear but succinct statement of the main Buddhist theory of the ' Four Truths ', ' the twelve *Nidānas* ', and the means of getting to the correct knowledge, which ultimately would put an end to ' Being '. There is here none of the features that the later schools of Buddhism indicate, so that we cannot exactly label the Buddhism contained in book XXX as of this school or that precisely. It may be said, however, to be of the *Sthaviravāda* and of the *Sautrāntika* school of Buddhism, which seems to be the form in vogue in this part of the country, and coming in for much criticism later. This position is, to some extent, supported by the expression used in the text itself elsewhere that it is the ' Path of the *Piṭakas* of the Great One '. Even in this abridged form, it is not without points that indicate a transition similar to those indicated in book XXIX. There is nothing that may be regarded as referring to any form of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, particularly the *Śūnyavāda* as formulated by *Nāgārjuna*. One way of interpreting this silence would be that *Nagarjuna*'s teaching as such of the *Śūnyavāda* had not yet travelled to the *Tamil* country to be mentioned in connection with the orthodox teaching of Buddhism or to be condemned as unorthodox. This is to some extent confirmed by the fact that in referring to the soul, the reference in book XXX seems clearly to be to the individual soul, not to the universal Soul, which seems to be a development of the so-called *Sātyasiddhi* school which came a little later. These points support the view to which we were led in our study of the previous books,

and thus make the work clearly one of a date anterior to Dignāga, and not posterior.

This general position to which we have been led by our own study of the philosophical systems, though at variance with the views to which Professor Jacobi has arrived on the same material, cannot by itself be held decisive of the age of the Tamil classic. This question has to be settled actually on other grounds, of which we have indicated the general position in some detail already. Kānchī is referred to as under the rule of the Cholas yet, and the person actually mentioned as holding rule at the time was the younger brother of the Chola ruler for the time being. Against this vicerealty an invasion was undertaken by the united armies of the Chēras and the Pāṇḍyas which left the Chēra capital Vanji impelled by earth hunger and nothing else, and attacked the vicerealty. The united armies were defeated by the princely viceroy of the Cholas who presented to the elder brother, the monarch, as spoils of war, the umbrellas that he captured on the field of battle. This specific historical incident which is described with all the precision of a historical statement in the work must decide the question along with the other historical matter, to which we have already adverted. No princely viceroy of the Chola was possible in Kānchī after A.D. 300, from which period we have a continuous succession of Pallava rulers holding sway in the region. Once the Pallavas had established their position in Kānchī, their neighbours in the west and the north had become others than the Chēras. From comparatively early times, certainly during the fifth century, the immediate neighbours to the west were the Gangas, and a little farther to the west by north were the Kadambas, over both of whom the Pallavas claimed suzerainty

readily recognized by the other parties. This position is not reflected in the *Mañimēkhalai* or *Śilappadhikāram*. Whereas that which we find actually and definitely stated is very much more a reflection of what is derivable from purely Śāngam literature so-called. This general position together with the specific datum of the contemporaneity of the authors to Śēnguṭṭuvan Chēra must have the decisive force. Other grounds leading to a similar conclusion will be found in our other works:—The *Augustan Age of Tamil Literature* (Ancient India, chapter xiv), *The Beginnings of South Indian History* and *The Contributions of South India to Indian Culture*. The age of the Śāngam must be anterior to that of the Pallavas, and the age of the *Mañimēkhalai* and *Śilappadhikāram*, if not actually referable as the works of the Śāngam as such, certainly is referable to the period in the course of the activity of the Śāngam.

SUPPLEMENT¹

(By Prof. H. Jacobi to his article for the Hultzsch Jubilee number of the 'Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik.')

I HAD induced Professor Krishnaswami Aiyangar some years ago to undertake the full and correct translation of those portions of the *Maṇimēkhalai* which dealt with Indian philosophical systems, so that it may serve as a basis to fix the age of that work with greater probability. As I heard nothing further about this project it seemed to me that its execution was postponed to an indefinite future. Thereupon I thought that I ought not to delay the publication of what I had got up about the age of this work from out of the translation by Kanakasabhai. The result is the above contribution to the Jubilee number intended for Hultzsch.² When my contribution was ready for the press, Professor Krishnaswami Aiyangar wrote to me that he had translated the chapters of the *Maṇimēkhalai* relating to the philosophy and on April 10, 1926, I received a type-written copy of his translation of the Chapters 27 and 29. In the light of these more correct reproduction of the original many of the obscurities of Kanakasabhai's translation were cleared up, to mention which in detail here would be to digress. Nevertheless I may here set down briefly the most important of the chief points of my

¹ I am obliged to Mr. R. Gopalan, M.A., Sub-Librarian, Coimbatore Public Library and Mr. S. T. Krishnasacharyar, B.A., B.L., High Court Vakil, for the translation of this Supplement.

² 'Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik.' : Band 5 Hft 3 of the Deutsch Morgenländische Gesellschaft (Leipzig).

earlier deduction—the acquaintance of the author of *Mañimêkhalai* with Dignāga's philosophy. First of all I can assert with satisfaction that I have correctly interpreted the confusing and distorted passages dealing with perception and the condition for the conclusiveness of an argument, and have referred to the respective theories of Dignāga. The definition of *Pratyaksha* reads in the new translation;—'name (*nama*), class (*jati*), quality (*guna*), and action (*kriya*) are excluded from this, viz. perception, as they are obtainable from inference (*anumāna*). That corresponds as I have indicated above to Dignāga's doctrine. The passage on the three conditions of conclusive reason reads (in chapter 29) 'the reason (*hetu*) is of three kinds:—(1) 'being attributive of the subject; (2) becoming attributable to a similar subject, and (3) becoming not attributable to the opposite, ———. Thereupon follows the definition of *Sapaksha* and *Vipaksha* (similar subject and the opposite). This passage of the *brairūpya* of the *līnga* forms the basis of Dignāga's system of logic, whereby the logic of the Nyāya system shows itself far superior and as is well known has acquired considerable influence over the further development of Indian logic. There is thus no doubt that the author of *Mañimêkhalai* knew of Dignāga's doctrine of cognizance and logic. But we can now go an important step further beyond the earlier established facts. For in those portions of the 29th chapter of the *Mañimêkhalai* which Kanakasabhai has not translated, the Buddhistic system of logic is expounded, and is quite in strict agreement with the contents of the *Nyāyappravêśa* as it is known to us through an analysis of the Chinese translation of that work by Sadajiro Sugiura,¹ and the

¹ Hindu Logic as preserved in China, Japan, Philadelphia, 1900, chapter iv.

Tibetan translation by Satischandra Vidyābhūshana.¹ The Sanskrit original has been already under print for some time for the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, but has not come out till now. As Mironow² shows it is the original of the Tibetan translation which Vidyābhūshana has analysed. The agreement of the theories of logic in the 29th chapter of the *Mañimākhalaī* with that of the *Nyāyapravēśa* rises to almost complete similarity in the passage on the 'fallacious *pakṣa*, *hētu*, and *dṛṣṭānta*. There are found the same nine *pakṣābhāsas*, fourteen *hētuvāhātāsas* and ten *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* in the same arrangement and almost through the same series³ in the *Mañimākhalaī* as in the *Nyāyapravēśa*. Even the examples instanced for the purposes of explanation agree in most cases in both. It is thus established without any doubt that the author of the *Mañimākhalaī* has made use of the *Nyāyapravēśa* in a most evident manner.

The author of the *Nyāyapravēśa* is, according to the Chinese tradition which Sugjura follows, Śankarasvāmin, a pupil of Dignāga, but according to the Tibetan tradition, which does not know Śankarasvāmin at all, it is Dignāga, hence Vidyābhūshana also names him as the author. But that is an error as M. Tubianski⁴ has shown. Dignāga is the author of the *Nyāyadvāra* (preserved in the Chinese translation), a small and very terse work. Śankarasvāmin has stated in an extremely clear way the system of logic contained therein, in the *Nyāyapravēśa*, probably with some embellishments.⁵ Owing

¹ *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1939, pp. 39 ff.

² See Garbe-Pestschitte, p. 38 ff.

³ Thus the 3 and 4 *pakṣābhāsas* are transposed.

⁴ *Bulletin de l'Académie de l'U.R.S.S.*, 1926, p. 975 ff.

⁵ Sugjura l. c. p. 61 says that Dignāga treats only of five *pakṣābhāsas*, to these Śankara added the 4 latter.

to the excellence of its exposition the Nyāyapravēśa has become manifestly the most popular compendium of Buddhistic logic.¹ The Jain Haribhadra also has written a commentary thereto and the author of the Mañimēkhalai has made it the basis of his exposition of Buddhist logic. The latter fact is, under the present circumstances, of importance in reference to chronology, as thereby the upper limit of the composition of the Mañimēkhalai is shifted at least one generation lower down and certainly well in the sixth century after Christ.

But it is another question whether the age of Śāngam literature is thereby fixed. For as Krishnaswami Ayyangar declares, though indeed the author of the Mañimēkhalai belongs to the Śāngam Academy his poem is not of the works recognized by them. The decision of the savants of Tamil literature is incumbent on what can be gathered from these traditions.

NOTE

Since the book had been almost completely printed, I had the benefit of reading through Professor Tucci's article 'Is Nyāyapravēśa by Dignāga' in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for January 1928. In this article the Professor takes up the question as in the article of Tubianski, and gives it as his opinion decisively that the work Nyāyapravēśa is the work of Śānkara-svāmin, and that the work of Dignāga nearest akin to it is a work called Nyāyamukha, as several of the quotations criticised by Kumāṛila and Pārthasarathī Miśra as from Dignāga are found in the work Nyāyamukha. What is more, the professor points out that the work of Dignāga actually contains only five *Paśśasāhitas* quoted in this order :—

- (1) Suvachana Viruddham.
- (2) Āgama Viruddham.
- (3) Lōka Viruddham.
- (4) Pratyaksha Viruddham.
- (5) Anumāna Viruddham.

¹ Cf. Suguna I. c. p. 36 ff.

In the Nyāyapravēśā, on the contrary, four more are added namely :—

- (6) Aprasiddha Viśēṣhanam.
- (7) Aprasiddha Viśēṣyam.
- (8) Aprasiddha Ubhayam.
- (9) Prasiddha Sambandham.

These four are criticized by Chinese commentators like Shen-t'ai, as being superfluous additions. In regard to the last of these there is also found an error that the *śāstra* actually referred to must be *Aprasiddha-Sambandham* and not *Prasiddha-Sambandham* as it is given. It is very interesting to note here that the Mañimēkhalai gives these Pakṣa-ābhāsas as *Aprasiddha-Sambandham* in the correct form. The Mañimēkhalai gives all the nine Pakṣa-ābhāsas in this order:—

- (1) Pratyakṣa Viruddham.
- (2) Anumāna Viruddham.
- (3) Suvachana Viruddham.
- (4) Lōka Viruddham.
- (5) Āgama Viruddham.
- (6) Aprasiddha Viśēṣhanam.
- (7) Aprasiddha Viśēṣyam.
- (8) Aprasiddha Ubhayam.
- (9) Aprasiddha Sambandham.

The other commentator Kwei-chi similarly comments :— ' Dignāga established only these five *Ābhāsas*, and Śankarasvāmin added the other four,' meaning the first five and the next four respectively.

In regard to the argument of Vidusēkhara Baṭṭāchārya that Śankarasvāmin's name is not mentioned by Hiuen T'sang, Professor Tucci does not regard the objection decisive on the following grounds :—

(1) That Hiuen T'sang translated the work under the name of Śankarasvāmin.

(2) That both the commentators Kwei-chi and Shen-t'ai received all their information about this work on logic from the great Chinese traveller and nobody else, so that the information that they give is to be regarded as that for which the authority of the great traveller could be taken for granted.

MANIMĒKHALAI: THE POEM

MANIMĒKHALAI as a poem is included among the five great *kāvya*s of Tamil literature, the other four being Chintāmaṇi, Śilappadhikāram, Vaḷaiyāṭṭi and Kuṇḍalākēṣi. As a *perumkāppiyam* (Sans. : *Mahākāvya*) it must satisfy certain requirements. It must treat of the life story of a hero preferably, or a heroine, fully and this involves the necessity of beginning with the parentage and birth of the hero or the heroine, and tracing his or her life through all the stages to the threshold of the life hereafter. It must, therefore, subserve the four *puruṣkārta*s or ends of existence, *Araṁ*, *Poruḷ*, *Inbam*, *Vīḍu*, or *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma*, *Mōksha*. Therefore it is to be a self-contained work, a heroic poem dealing with the life of the hero in its entirety. The first question that would arise, therefore, is whether the poem Manimēkhalai answers to this description of a *perumkāppiyam*. The answer to this question, on the face of it, is that it does not, although it may be possible perhaps also to say that it actually does. It may be said to answer to the description of a *perumkāppiyam* inasmuch as the story begins practically with the beginning of the life of Manimēkhalai, not without hints and allusions to her birth and early life. It takes her through all the incidents of her worldly life till she attains to the ripeness of entering the Buddhist cloister as a nun. This last step puts an end, in orthodox Buddhist belief as also to a great extent in the Hindu, to her earthly life.

Interpreted in this manner, it can be regarded that the work is a complete picture of the life of the heroine, and therefore answers to the description of a great *kāvya*.

It may, however, be objected that very many of the incidents of her early life are passed over with brief hints and allusions, that her parentage cannot be said in any manner to be treated in this work, and as such it falls short of the requirements of a *kāvya*. This objection finds some justification in the work being known not Maṇimēkhalai uniformly. It is described as Maṇimēkhalaituravu in the prologue to the poem. Besides this, the work is said to be referred to in the commentary of Nilakēśi, as Maṇimēkhalaituravu also. If so the subject may be described as 'the renunciation of Maṇimēkhalai', and therefore the subject of the poem would be only that part of Maṇimēkhalai's life which refers to her renunciation of worldly life. The learned Editor of the work states that he called it Maṇimēkhalai for the reason that the name has been found to be used generally in that form. It therefore cannot be said that the position that by itself it is not a *mahākāvya* has not some tenable argument to support it in itself. This position finds further support in the Śilappadhikāram, which, in its concluding portion, states that the story of Maṇimēkhalai completes the subject matter of the poem Śilappadhikāram. This position is taken up by the commentator of the latter Aḍiyārkkunallār. He lays it down that a *kāppiyam* must subserve the four main ends of life, and propounds the question that the Śilappadhikāram stops with the first three and does not appear to treat separately of the fourth. He gives a number of references in the course of the work to the renunciation of Maṇimēkhalai and concludes that having learnt that Maṇimēkhalai had renounced life, the author of the Śilappadhikāram,

Ṇṅgō-Aḍigaḷ, set this at the end of his own work, and wished to treat the complete work as a *mahākāvya* treating of the four objects of life. When he communicated his resolution to Śāttan, his friend, Śāttan told him in reply that he had already composed a work on Maṇimēkhalai making her renunciation *the* subject, and illustrative of the two main objects of life, *Dharma* and *Mōksha*. Ṇṅgō wished that the two should find vogue in the world as one *kāvya*. Notwithstanding this, these are regarded as two because two authors composed them.

This position of the commentator finds support in the prologue to the Maṇimēkhalai which in lines 95 and 96 states that the author Śāttan read the thirty poems composing Maṇimēkhalai, and Ṇṅgō-Aḍigaḷ listened to the work with great kindness. The prologue to the Śīlappadhikāram likewise refers in lines 10 and 11 that when the hunters came and reported what they saw to Ṇṅgō, Śāttan took up the tale, and described the whole of the story, as it took place, having heard it in certain, at any rate, of its divisions from the Goddess Madhurāpati, when he was lying asleep in the hall of *Velliyaṁḍalam* on that night when the Goddess appeared to Kaṇṇaki and told her why things happened as they did. Further down in the prologue to this Śīlappadhikāram, as the jewel *Śīlambū* was what brought about the tragedy, to illustrate, that to those that erred in administration, righteousness will prove the cause of death, that to women of chastity, the praise of the discerning good people is the reward, and that the consequences of one's action will inevitably take effect on him 'might well be written by us'. Śāttan said in reply that, as the work related to incidents in which the three kings of the Tamil land were parties, Ṇṅgō himself might

compose the work. Iṅgō agreed and recited the work, which, in his turn, Śātan heard with appreciation. These details and the contemporaneity of the authors are so far in evidence in the prologues and the epilogues only. We shall return to this question later. All that is to our purpose at present is that the two works are here regarded as constituting one great *kāvya*, though they are the work of two separate authors; they were treated as two works though constituting a single *mahākāvya*.

The scope of the work and its character alike show great affinity to the Śilappadhikāram. Though the two form a heroic poem, there is something of the dramatic element running through them, and the narrative is incomplete unless the two could be taken together. Maṇimēkhalai itself begins actually with Maṇimēkhalai having already attained to the charms of maidenhood and being the object of affection to the Chola prince, the heir-apparent of the reigning Chola monarch. The subject matter of the whole poem therefore is the efforts of the prince to gain possession of her, the resistance that she offered in withstanding this temptation and her consistent effort through all suffering to hold on to her own resolution, the attaining by her to the ripeness of mind required for accepting the teachings of the Buddha and her renunciation; these are the incidents that receive treatment in the poem. The poem opens with the great celebration of the festival to Indra. Maṇimēkhalai's mother Mādhavi had already renounced life, and sends the daughter to fetch flowers for service; the prince follows her to the garden; Maṇimēkhalai is spirited away to the Island of Maṇipallavam where she learnt her past life from a miraculous Buddha-seat. She returned therefrom again to Kāvēri-

paṭṭinam; the prince still continues to prosecute his love notwithstanding advice against it. He falls by the sword of a celestial being, the form of whose wife Maṇimēkhalai had assumed. Maṇimēkhalai is thrown into prison, from which she gets released. She passes successfully through all the schemes of the queen to bring about her death. She learns the teachings of the various systems, and ultimately the orthodox teaching of the Buddha from Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ at Kāncī. Such being the subject matter of the poem, it is clear that it could not be regarded altogether as a mere narrative poem of a historical character dealing with the life of the individual heroine concerned, with anything like a biographical aim. It is a poem first and foremost, and treats of the subject, whatever be its character, in the manner of an epic poem and no more. The subject is one intimately connected with religion and that introduces its own element of the un-historical in it, such as the occurrence of miracles of various kinds. It would therefore, on the face of it, be very difficult to treat the work as at all of a historical character. Historical characters however are introduced, and, notwithstanding the somewhat miraculous character of several of the incidents and characters brought upon the stage, there is still the possibility of a background of history to it.

The subject-matter of the works is of a varied character. The actual subject itself is the life of a young wealthy merchant of Kāvēripaṭṭinam. He was born of a great caravan (mahāsārthavāha) merchant, and, as yet a young man, was married to the daughter of another merchant of similar dignity. The husband and the wife, Kōvalan and Kappaki, set up separately with the active assistance of the parents of both to lead the life

of householders in the city. Kōvalan fell in love with a dancing woman by name Mādhavi, a ravishingly charming beauty. He was so infatuated with her as even to neglect his comely and chaste wife, and spent away not only all his property but even the jewels of his wife. At the conclusion of the great Indra festival at Puhār (Kāvēripaṭṭinam), he went out along with Mādhavi to spend the day in enjoyment on the seashore. In the course of his stay there, he discovered, at least he thought he had discovered, that Mādhavi was not perhaps quite as sincerely attached to him as he thought she was. Somewhat estranged in feeling, he went home, and found his wife more than usually solicitous to please him as she observed that he was somewhat troubled in mind. In a moment of contrition, he explained his position to his wife and regretted that he had not the means to set up as merchant again and recover his lost wealth as he intended to do in a distant place like Madura. Nothing daunted by her previous sacrifices in this direction, she offered the only valuable jewel yet left with her, that is, the anklet, for him to make use of for that purpose. They left the city unknown the next morning, early enough not to be discovered, and set forward on their journey to Madura. Having entered the city, Kōvalan left his wife in charge of a shepherdess outside the fort and went into the bazaar of the city to sell the jewel. The queen having lost a similar jewel some time before, the goldsmith who was responsible for the theft and to whom by chance Kōvalan offered this for sale, reported that he had discovered the thief with the jewel in possession. The infatuated Pāṇḍyan king ordered the recovery of the jewel from the culprit after decapitating the thief as a punishment. The virtuous wife got so indignant at this perpetration

of injustice that she brought about the destruction of the city by fire and passed across the frontier into the Chēra country before putting an end to herself. There the husband was shown to her and the two together were taken to the world of gods. Hearing of all this, and, on the advice of his councillors, the Chēra ruler of the country set up an image of the chaste wife in a temple which he consecrated to the goddess of Chastity. Having heard of this calamity, Mādhavi who was whole-hearted and sincere in her affection for Kōvalan renounced life in contrition for her own contribution to the tragedy, and became a Buddhist novice. She had a child by Kōvalan, a girl of great beauty. She had just reached the age of maidenhood and was so extraordinarily charming that the Chola prince of Puhār, the heir-apparent, set his heart upon her. The work *Maṇimēkhalai* takes up the tale from here and deals with the life-history of *Maṇimēkhalai* to the stage of her early renunciation. It will thus be seen that the story of the *Śilappadhikāram* really leads up to the story of *Maṇimēkhalai*, and is from the point of view of epic propriety hardly complete in itself. Similarly the story of *Maṇimēkhalai* would be incomplete without the introduction that is contained in the story of *Śilappadhikāram* for strict epic requirements.

It will be seen from the above *rèsumè* that the story is laid in the three capitals of Tamil India, Puhār, Madura and Vanji, and the hero and the heroine are taken in the course of the story to all the three capitals. *Maṇimēkhalai* is taken in addition to Kānchī in the course of progress of her life towards renunciation. There is, therefore, much scope for the author, if he cared for it, to throw in a volume of detail, geographical, historical and social in the course of his treatment of

the story. The main purpose of the author, however, so far as Maṇimēkhalai is concerned, and, to some considerable extent the Śilappadhikāram as well, is the exaltation of Buddhism as a religion; Maṇimēkhalai is professedly so, and the Śilappadhikāram assumes a more general attitude and contributes to this end only indirectly. The conscious purpose being the exaltation of religion and the characters put on the stage being only the means therefor, the poet has still the latitude for treating the subject in such a manner as to admit of a variety of detail otherwise than of a religious or poetical character. If, therefore, it is possible to collect together details of a character that could throw light upon the condition of the country, what could these details lead up to? The author in dealing with a particular subject can deal with it so as to give us an idea of the subject and its setting at the time that the incidents of the story are believed to have taken place; or it may be that he takes up the story and deals with it so as to draw a picture—indirect though it be, of times contemporary with himself; or to trace an entirely imaginary picture which has no reality of existence whatsoever. What he actually does really depends upon his own sweet will and pleasure to some extent. At the same time, a careful study may give us some notion of what exactly the author was about in his treatment of the subject. In order to decide what kind of treatment it is that the author gives, it would be just as well if we could know something of the author and the character of his work.

The author of Maṇimēkhalai is stated to be Sāttan, 'the grain merchant of Madura'. He was a native of Madura and was a grain merchant by profession. He is stated to have been on friendly terms with the Chēra

ruler Senguṭṭuvan,¹ and on closer terms of appreciative intimacy with his younger brother, Iṅgū as he is known, who had renounced life, and was a resident of one of the *vihāras* at the east gate of Vanji, his brother's capital. The story is that the two princes, the reigning Chēra Senguṭṭuvan and his younger brother, were both seated in the assembled court of their father. A physiognomist who was there, looking at the younger of the two, predicted that he had in his face marks of 'a ruler of men'. The prince got angry that that prediction should have been made, and to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding he took a vow of renouncing life, and did so forthwith, so that there may be no misunderstanding of his position, and that no damage may be done to the legitimate claims of his elder brother.² That was the ascetic prince who wrote the Śilappadhikāram in the circumstances already detailed above. His friend, and the friend of his elder brother, the ruling monarch, Śāttan, was the author of the other poem. The two works are so connected that one may believe the facts embodied in the prologues to the two poems that they were contemporaries, and the works were written with a design that they should together constitute one complete epic poem. To confirm this, the author of the Śilappadhikāram brings in references to this Śāttan in the body of his work, thus putting it beyond doubt that Śāttan, the author of *Maṇimēkhalai* was contemporary with himself and his elder brother. The position therefore is actually as it is stated in the prologue to the Śilappadhikāram that the authors were contemporaries and the story is to treat of the contemporary rulers of the three kingdoms of the south. This enables us to

¹ Śilappadhikāram, xxv, 64-65.

² *Ibid.*, xxx, 170-183, and xxix, *Introd.*: prose passage and references within.

give the real character to the works themselves. We shall have to revert to this subject later.

The name of Iṅgō, the author of the Silappadhikāram does not figure elsewhere and in other connections. But we have reference to Śāttan. The latter's name figures among the traditional forty-nine of the Third Tamil Śāngam. A verse contribution of his is included in the so-called Tiruvaḷḷuvamālai said to have been composed in praise of the Kuṟaḷ of Tiruvaḷḷuvar. Śāttan actually quotes the Kuṟaḷ and even textually incorporates one Kuṟaḷ, in his work. This fact would certainly prove that he knew the Kuṟaḷ and admired it. But that need not make him a contemporary of the author of the Kuṟaḷ from that fact alone. There is only one poem ascribed to Śāttan included in the Sangam works so-called. That is the only other poem that we know of as the work of Śāttan if that Śāttan was the author of Maṇimēkhalai. Śāttan is remembered in Tamil literary tradition as an uncompromising critic, among the members of the Sangam. In criticising others' works, he used, it appears, to strike his head with his iron style whenever he found faults of composition in the works presented to the Śāngam for approval. As a result of repeated blows his head came to be habitually suppurated, and hence the nickname given to him ' Śāttan of the suppurated head '. His position among Tamil poets therefore is that of an eminent critic whose criticism was of unquestionable value and commanded the respectful acceptance of his contemporaries.

His work, the only one of importance, Maṇimēkhalai is, as has been said above, a Buddhist work. As such one would naturally expect it was generally Buddhists alone that would regard it as of importance. From literary tradition that has come down to us, it cannot be

said that it was exclusively so. Tamil works bearing on literary criticism sometimes quote from the work. Tradition has preserved two verses of commendation from such different people as Ambikāpati, son of the great poet Kamban, and Śivaprakāśasvāmi, Saiva Maṭādhīpati. This is an indication that the work is really a work of merit and the approval of the discerning Tamil public that it is so is in evidence in its inclusion among the five great *kāvya*s of Tamil. Is it then a Sangam work?

Śāngam works strictly so-called, are works presented to the Śāngam and approved by them. Later the expression came to mean no more than that the works so described were of a sufficiently classical character that, had they the chance, they would have met with the approval of the Śāngam. There is nothing in the work itself, nor is there any tradition that this work of Sāttan was presented to the Śāngam at all. The non-existence of a tradition like that may not necessarily mean that it was not so presented, but on the evidence accessible to us, we are not in a position to state that it was so presented and received the approval of the Śāngam. None the less, it would be correct to describe it as a Śāngam work for the reason that it was a work that was produced in the age when the Śāngam output was perhaps the highest, and that it is undoubtedly so in point of quality and eminence such as it is. On the fact of it therefore, and from the circumstances of its composition, we have to regard it as a Śāngam work, at least in the secondary sense of the term. This position can be supported by an examination of its literary character in comparison with other works actually described as Śāngam works. It is possible to collect together linguistic and grammatical details from which to prove for it an age different from that of the

Silappadhikāram as had been attempted more than once recently. With a great poet such minutiae will perhaps lead to illusory inferences. The general literary cast, similarity of ideas and thoughts on connected subjects and such other elements that go to make up the general literary character would perhaps be more certain evidence of contemporaneity, and such could be adduced in favour of the position that the Maṇimēkhalai is a work of the Śāngam age. Its literary affinity to the Śilappadhikāram could be placed beyond doubt as one could find easily numbers of passages where the same ideas are expressed in almost identical terms. The similarity is so great that, unless we can postulate that the one copied from the other deliberately no other explanation is possible than that the two works were produced in the same literary atmosphere. One has only to read through the excellent edition of our eminent Pandit Mahāmahopādhyaya V. Swaminatha Aiyar to see how closely the works are to each other in point of literary character. Linguistic details notwithstanding, Maṇimēkhalai may be taken to be of the same age as the Silappadhikāram, and that the two belong undoubtedly to the age of the Śāngam whatever that be.

II

MAṆIMĒKHALAI : HOW FAR HISTORICAL IN CHARACTER ?

Maṇimēkhalai, as was already remarked, is a poem first and foremost; whatever subject is actually brought into it is therefore treated poetically. That must be carefully borne in mind in examining it for any purpose that one may have in view. As an epic poem it sets before itself the didactic purpose of enforcing the

superiority of Buddhism as a religion both as conducive to good conduct in this life and happiness in the life hereafter. The fact that it is primarily a poetical work, and the feature that its object is the exaltation of Buddhism, neither of them, *prima facie* holds out promise of anything historical being found in the work. Nevertheless the poem could contain, and does contain, much that may be considered historical provided the material is used on principles of sound criticism. To complicate matters still further the poet indulges his fancy in the introduction of the supernatural in the poem as well he might in poetry of this character. This undoubtedly adds to the difficulty, but can hardly be held to invalidate the use of such historical material as may be found in it. The introduction of the miraculous and the supernatural is an essential part of works on Buddhism even of a professedly historical character. Poetical use of the miraculous does not make it any more efficacious in transforming the historical into the fabulous. The actual difficulty is to discriminate judiciously what is historical from that which is unhistorical in the whole work.

The scene of the poem is laid in the Tamíl land, and, by design or because the actual subject forced it on him, the author has to deal with the Chola and the Chêra country and the town of Kānchi in the course of the poem. The companion work leaves out Kānchi and takes instead Madura and the Pāṇḍyan country. Why should the poets do this? As was already indicated, the poets do this either because they took up a subject which is of a historical character and the incidents connected with the subject have reference to these places, or because whatever be the character of the subject, they bring in these places with a design to say

something regarding them and their rulers by way of compliment. As a matter of fact, the two possible motives seem to be combined in the actual works, if the passages of the prologues already referred to are to be relied on at all as indicating correctly the scope of the poem. The two works Śīlappadhikāram and Maṇimēkhalai were composed with a view to their constituting a single epic, though forming two works. Apart from the prologue, so much is indicated in the concluding passage of the Śīlappadhikāram itself. We have no reason to hold the view that the prologues were composed so late in point of time that they cease to be authority on the work itself. A prologue to a poem in Tamil could be composed by one of the following:— the author's teacher, the author's fellow disciple, the author's pupil, or his commentator. It is the last one that could be far removed in point of time. All the other three would be, at least can be regarded, contemporaries. The question therefore for us is whether we have any valid reason for regarding the prologue to the Maṇimēkhalai, or the Śīlappadhikāram for the matter of that, was composed by the commentator. Maṇimēkhalai does not appear to have had a commentary except our venerable Mahāmahopādhyaya Pandit Swaminatha Aiyar's; and surely he did not compose its prologue. In regard to the Śīlappadhikāram, we have two commentators, and neither of the commentators seems to have composed the prologue in question. Even granting for the sake of argument, that these might have composed it, the matter contained therein would still have to be considered as embodying orthodox tradition coming down in unbroken succession. When the matter of the prologues gets confirmed by references in the body of the poems themselves, we have no alternative

but to accept that the prologues were of contemporary composition, at any rate not far removed from contemporary times. That Śāttan and Iṅgō, the two authors, were contemporaries can be proved by reference to Śāttan in the Śīlappadhikāram, not in the prologue or the epilogue, but in the body of the work itself.¹

There is one other feature peculiar to these works which must be allowed great weight in this discussion. The authors of the poems are not shown to us as later writers using it may be a historical subject, relating to the rulers of the three far-famed kingdoms of the Tamil land. They are brought into relation to the three rulers whose deeds are described in the poems themselves. The author of the Śīlappadhikāram, was no other than the younger brother of the Chēra ruler, Śenguttuvan who built the temple to the goddess of chastity and consecrated it. The grain merchant Śāttan, who is the author of the other poem was a friend of this self-same ruler and of his saintly younger brother. This feature of the authors of the poems introduces a further complication which makes the understanding of the poems in their historical drift very difficult. The difficulty consists in this, if they are contemporaries and actually wrote of contemporary incidents, how could they introduce so much of the supernatural in the poems? And what is perhaps more, how are we to interpret the introduction of the supernatural that occurs in the poems?

The miraculous and the supernatural form an integral part of any narrative or even regular but indigenous history connected with Buddhism. No present occurrence and not a Buddhist character is

¹ Sk. XXV, ll. 64-66 and ll. 100-106.

satisfactorily explained, according to them, unless it be by actual reference to that which had taken place in a previous existence. So much so that the identical incidents, almost in identical form and details, are brought in usually to expound occurrences even of a natural character. One has only to compare what is regarded as the actual teaching of the Buddha himself to appreciate this position. Many of the so-called Jātaka stories are based on this understanding, and if the Buddha could be regarded as being autobiographical in these stories, it is not difficult to understand that a writer who attempts to describe any particular period would naturally indulge in similar fancies. If so, it will not be difficult to separate that which may be regarded as actual from that which is purely ideal.

The scene of the story is laid, as was already stated, in Tamil India. An authoritative Tamil tradition again takes it that the story detailed in the poems has reference to things that took place actually. This need not necessarily be interpreted to mean that the incidents took place in the manner that the poet has described them. It is open to the poets to weave a web of fancy and raise an ideal picture round the actual incident. The commentator Aḍiyārkunallār, discussing the sub-divisions of the work Śilappadhikāram, makes some apt remarks in regard to this particular point. He refers to the bigger divisions being named *kāṇḍam* and the smaller divisions *kālai*. The Śilappadhikāram actually consists of three *kāṇḍams* relating respectively to Puhār, Madura and Vanji. Each one of these *kāṇḍams* is divided into books, the total number of which for the work is thirty. The commentator discusses the point that these smaller sub-divisions should be called *kālai*, which is only

another form of *kadai*. He notes that what is called *kadai* in Tamil is regarded on authority as fiction; but states that these works are better described as *nūḍakavāḍḍi-p-piṇam*, or epic poems of a dramatic character. He further describes that the work under discussion, *Śilappadhikāram*, has the features of a drama, and has for its hero a real man, and describes, poetically without doubt, that which actually took place. In other words *Śilappadhikāram* gives an idealized description of the actual occurrences in the life of the hero. The division of *Maṇimēkhalai* into parts also takes the same name. There is a variant name for this, which is *paṭṭu*. The latter would simply mean poem, each canto or book constituting by itself a poem. The other name is *kadai* as in the *Śilappadhikāram* and deals with one of the incidents in the series that constituted the life of the heroine dealt with in the poem. Hence the opinion of Tamil literary men seems to be that the two poems deal with incidents of a historical character, but, like Shakespeare's historical dramas, thrown into a somewhat idealized form satisfying the demands of epic composition. It is on this basis that we shall have to examine the work, whether our purpose be literary criticism or history.

A connected question with this would naturally be, in the circumstances, whether the authors actually tried to project on the canvas of their poetry the features of their own times as they saw them around themselves, or those features which they imagined were the features that actually existed, according to their understanding of it, in the time of the hero or the heroine. These alternative possibilities would arise if the poems deal with subjects that had actually lived and passed away into history. These two poems take their subjects

from contemporary life, as was already pointed out in connection with the life of the authors. The matter is therefore to some extent simplified for us in the fact that the authors have chosen for their poetical treatment subjects contemporary with themselves. Therefore whatever of historical, geographical and social features that we may discern in the poem and which we may find it possible to extricate from the encumbrances of poetical idealizing, must necessarily have reference to the times of the authors themselves. To that extent we are here face to face with pictures of history, idealized though they be.

Maṇimēkhalai begins with the great festival to Indra in Puhār. Throughout the whole work Puhār is spoken of as the Chola capital and even where its destruction by the sea is referred to, no other capital of the Cholas finds mention. Puhār, therefore, may be taken to have been the habitual capital of the Cholas in the course of the story. The ruler of the kingdom was one who is described variously as Neḍumudi Kiḷḷi or Māvaṇ Kiḷḷi or Vel-vēr Kiḷḷi or even Kaḷar Kiḷḷi. He married in the family of the Mahābalis or the Bāpas,¹ and his queen's name is given as Śīrti. He had a younger brother by name Iḷam Kiḷḷi who was ruling over Kānchī at the time when Maṇimēkhalai arrived in the city. That would mean that Kānchī was a viceroyalty of the Cholas, and was at the time being governed by a royal prince. In other words, it was of sufficient importance to be regarded as a palatine viceroyalty. This Iḷam Kiḷḷi, the viceroy of Kānchī, won for his elder brother Māvaṇ Kiḷḷi a victory against the allied Chēra and Pāṇḍya at a place called Kāriyāru.²

¹ xix, ll. 50-55.

² xix, ll. 120-126 and xxviii, p. 172.

In discussing the circumstances under which Puhār, at least a part of it, was destroyed by the sea, we are given the information that seems actually to be a reference to the birth of Tonḍaimān Iḷaṅ-Tiraiyan, who, as ruler of Kāñchī, became a very important figure in the age of the Śāngam. The Chola ruler for the time being entered into a liaison with a Nāga princess, namely, Pili-vaḷai, the daughter of Vaḷai Vapan, ruler of Nāga Nāḍu. She stayed with him for about a month, and went away from him without any intimation. When she had become mother of a son, she sent the baby from Maṇipallavam through a sea-going merchant Kambaḷa Setty, whose ship touched the island on its way. When he had arrived within sight of the shore, he suffered shipwreck, and, in the resulting confusion, lost sight of the baby. He took it, therefore, that the baby had died in the accident and so reported the matter to the king in the discharge of his responsibility to him. The king was so upset in his search for the baby that he did not issue the instructions for carrying out the arrangements for the celebration of the annual festival to Indra. On account of this remissness, the goddess Maṇimēkhalai brought about the destruction of Puhār by the sea. So much of the story is under reference in Maṇimēkhalai itself. It agrees so far with the details given of the birth of Tonḍamān Iḷaṅ-Tiraiyan in other Śāngam Poems that it is ordinarily taken to refer to the birth of that chief. The baby was obviously alive and had been subsequently brought to the king. Recognizing by the mark, previously agreed upon, which was no more than a sprig of the creeper *tonḍai* (Indian Caper, *Cephalandra Indica*) tied to the ankle he apparently brought him up as a prince, and in course of time he grew up to be a ruler of Kāñchī. This identification rests merely upon the probability of

the case and not upon the certainty of a knowledge of established identity. But so many of the details connected with the first story are in agreement with the other that it is very probable that they refer to the same incident, the birth of Tondamān Ilam-Tiraiyan. We shall revert to the importance of this particular point later.

So far as there are references to the Pāṇḍyan kingdom in this work, Maḍura was all through the capital and is referred to as *Dakshina* Maḍura, and the contemporary ruler is referred to as 'Seḷḷiyan of the beautiful car'. The alternative capital of the Pāṇḍyas, Koṟkai, is also referred to. Beyond that there is not much that is said about Maḍura unless it be that the existence of a temple of the 'goddess of Learning' is considered of sufficient importance for the purpose. Coming to the third capital, Vanji, of the Chēras, there is much more said of it, than of the Pāṇḍyan country or of its capital. It is in reference, as under the rule of Śenguttuvan at the time, and Śenguttuvan's extensive dominions and of his invasion of northern India are also referred to. The other details connected with his war across the Ganges and his enemies are also specifically mentioned here as in other works.¹ In speaking of the battle of Kāriyāru referred to before, Vanji is stated to be the place wherefrom the invasion started. There is an elaborate description of the town of Kānchī where Maṇimēkhalai ultimately attained to the enlightenment required as a preliminary to her final renunciation. It is said that, at the time of her arrival, Kānchī had been suffering from a very severe famine, and she was actually directed to go there for the purpose of relieving

¹ *ixvi*, ll. 77-90.

the distress. It is in that connection that Kānchi is said to have been under the rule of Iṭaṅ Kiṭṭi who built for Maṅimēkhalai a new *viṭāra* with a *chaitya* and appurtenances necessary for it. So during the period to which the story of Maṅimēkhalai may be said to refer, Kānchi was still a Chola viceroyalty, and the viceroy at the time was a younger brother of the reigning Chola. There are other matters which may be regarded as of a historical character, though they are not exactly of the form of definite details of geography or history.

Communication from place to place seems to have been comparatively free and easy. When Puhār suffered destruction by the sea, people could move out, some to Vanji, some to Kānchi. Pilgrimages between distant places such as the extreme north and the extreme south, seem to have been fair and frequent. Commercial activity seems to have been great and protection to people offered by the authorities for the time being efficient. Trade was carried on over land and over sea, regular caravans seem to have gone the one way, and fleets of ships over the sea periodically. Navigation was not altogether free from danger due to wind and weather, as well as other circumstances such as being stranded on the shores of islands inhabited by savages. Notwithstanding the danger, there seems to have been regular communication between lands across the seas. The island of Śāvaham finds mention, and it is described as a kingdom of considerable importance, although the ruler, a Buddhist is described with all the romantic embellishments of a prospective Buddha. Invasions could be readily undertaken as far north as the Himalayas, and the specific statement that the Ganges had to be crossed by means of boats and that wars were actually carried on

on the northern banks of it cannot be dismissed altogether, as figments of the imagination. Whether the actual war as described took place or no, they had ideas that such were feasible.

One other feature must be referred to here. The religious condition of Puhār, of which we get a fairly full description, was what was to be expected of a flourishing Hindu capital. It is not merely a question of confusion of languages but even confusion of religions. Temples to the gods of the Hindu pantheon, *vāḍāras* set apart for the votaries of Buddhism, and garden retreats for the saintly among the Jains lay side by side, at any rate not far apart of each other. They sometimes formed part of the city but were generally located just outside the inner city and the fortress. Votaries of other religions lived side by side and taught, unmolested by others. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other set had the superiority in one or other of the branches of religious learning. Mañimēkhalai found enough to learn of Buddhism in the initial stages at Puhār, but she could gain real insight into the heretical systems only at Vanji. She could get the most orthodox and the authoritative teaching in Buddhism only from a particular teacher, and he happened to be at Kānchī at the time. He was in Puhār before, so that these religious teachers were allowed to teach what they believed, unmolested in the one royal capital as in the other viceregal capital or elsewhere as they actually liked. Being a Buddhist work it throws into prominent relief the condition of Buddhism and Buddhist shrines. But there are references scattered through the work to other shrines and to the votaries of other religions that enable us to infer that not only Buddhism, but Jainism and all the different forms of Hinduism extending from the extreme theism of the

Saiva or Vaishṇava to the complete atheism of the Lokāyata or the Bhūtavādi flourished alike. Learning was highly respected, and learned men of all persuasions alike were treated with respect whatever their ultimate convictions.

There is one feature that is referred to here which also finds reference in the *Silappadhikāram*, a festival to Indra celebrated with great *éclat* in the city of Puhār. A festival to Indra seems to be more or less a common festival and celebrated all over India. But that which was celebrated in Puhār had a peculiar significance. There is nothing otherwise to indicate that it was a festival peculiar to this particular city. That festival lasted for twenty-eight days in the month of *Chaitra* (April-May) and came to a close, as near as possible on the full moon day. The celebration in Puhār was of such a character that the heaven of Indra itself was vacated by the Gods coming down to witness the festival in Puhār. This festival was ordained at the special request of one of the ancient Cholas and hence the peculiar importance of it in Puhār. It is the forgetting of the annual celebration of this festival that was directly responsible for the destruction, partial or complete, of Puhār in the course of the story of *Maṇimēkhalai*.

Having said so much about what may be considered historical details in the work, it is now necessary to consider the supernatural elements introduced in the poem. What are the elements themselves? How are they used in the poem? Can we regard the human features of the poem as historical notwithstanding the fact that they are mixed up with the supernatural? These are features which must be investigated before we can proceed to use the historical material contained in the work. The first general remark that could be made in regard to this

subject is that the author takes care to introduce the supernatural element only where it comes in appropriately in accordance with the accepted traditions of India, perhaps the more peculiar Buddhist thought. The characters and the main incidents where the supernatural occurs in the course of the poem may be broadly stated as these; the goddess Mañimēkhala undoubtedly shows supernatural features of character, Mañimēkhalai herself ripens into the possession of supernormal powers such as, being able to fly in the air, to be independent of hunger, and to be unaffected by physical pain to which she had been subjected at one stage. Vidyādharas and Vidyādharis are introduced with all the supernatural embellishments to which Hindu tradition always gave them credit, Buddhist holy men are described with powers superhuman which is included in the ordinary Buddhist notions of the attainment of what they called *iddhi*, which in the language of Hindu thought would be described as the *siddhis* or extraordinary powers. There is also introduced a speaking statue, gods and goddesses speaking from their images, a supernatural never-exhausting bowl, a supernatural Buddha-seat which let one into the secrets of one's past existence. Of these elements most of them were really believed in and cannot be said even now not to be believed in by Indians as a whole, Buddhists and Hindus. They are of the nature of current convictions regarding the existence of the supernatural and of their intervention in human affairs. But the point for note is that the poet never allows the supernatural element play in human character proper. The two exceptions to this would be Mañimēkhalai herself who is described as a human character and Aputra, in whose character supernatural features are found. But the extraordinary powers that Mañimēkhalai acquires

are, according to Buddhists, attainable by all human beings with sufficient preparation, if they should attain to the requisite degree of ripening. But there is the point to be noted still that Mañimēkhalai is a character, though human in form and features to begin with, so far idealized as a ripe subject for the reception of the teaching of the Buddha that she attains normally to the possession of these extraordinary powers. This is brought out even more clearly in the case of the other character, Āputra who is again treated more or less as one who would ultimately ripen into a Bōdhisattva. In any critical judgment, therefore, of these characters, it must be borne in mind that contemporary Buddhist thought admitted of the attainment of extraordinary, and even superhuman, powers by fit subjects for this exaltation. Subjects that are actually brought in as ordinary human characters on the stage of the poem are treated actually as such and the poet thus enables one to clearly demarcate where the human element ends and the superhuman element begins. A careful study of the poem throughout, in all its fullness of detail, would leave the impression clear on the mind of a critical reader that the poet wants the human element to be so understood and as being quite distinct from the superhuman. The superhuman itself is so distinctly treated that there can be no mistake that in those cases he is dealing actually with the supernatural element and not ordinary human beings. The author carries this distinction to a point of fineness when the heroine returns to Mañipallavam with Āputra from his kingdom, Sāvakam. Mañimēkhalai as usual flies through the air. Āputra on the contrary has to order a fleet to be got ready to take him to the same destination. Therefore we are distinctly in a position to examine the human element in the poem as such in all

its human aspects and human surroundings just to find out how far this proves to be historical. The superhuman elements themselves can easily be proved to be not beyond the credibility of an average Buddhist of the time to which the author obviously makes reference. It would, therefore, seem justifiable that, notwithstanding the element of the supernatural in the poem, there is much in it that is capable of being used for purposes of history, not only history of a general character, but also in regard to even the specific details and incidents.

It has been described above that the *Manimēkhalai* is a professedly Buddhist work. As such its cultural character can be expected to be more or less North Indian and Sanskritic. But great poet that the author is, he certainly draws very freely upon Buddhist as well as Sanskritic culture. A careful reader would notice that he does not sacrifice any of the classical South Indian or Tamil features of his poem by so doing. It may almost be said that he is hardly conscious that he is producing in his work the blend of the two cultures. It is a Tamil classic out and out, but a Tamil classic with a great infusion of Sanskrit culture, producing the impression that the author is hardly aware of anything like a distinction between the two. In those circumstances, there is hardly room for the feeling that there was any hostility. Even so, there are features in it which are worthy of special remark.

Among these perhaps the most noteworthy would be the *Agastya* tradition. Readers of the Buddhist *Jātakas* know that *Agastya* there appears in a form, in the two *Jātakas* in which *Agastya's* life history comes in for discussion, that the Tamilian knows nothing of. Such tradition as the *Manimēkhalai* records of him is tradition which is more in accord with the Brahmanical form of it

than Buddhist, although it is a Buddhist author and a Buddhist work that make reference to it.

Agastya is referred to as one from whose water-pot the Kaveri took its rise. The story is related that king Kāntama prayed of Agastya for a stream of water that would fertilize his territory, and with Agastya's consent as it were, the water that he had in his water-pot was upset and flowed eastwards from it till it reached the sea. At the place where it was to enter the sea there lived an old lady, the goddess of India, Champāpati as she is called in Tamil, the goddess of 'the Jambuland,' the common name for India. Agastya directed the Kaveri to make her obeisance to the venerable lady. The goddess Kāvēri worshipped her, and was received very kindly by her; and thereafter she became the daughter of the Chola country, as it were, fertilizing with her streams the land over which the Cholas ruled, and which formed part of 'Bharatam' as it is called in Tamil, the Bhāratavarsha of Sanskrit.

The second place in which Agastya comes in for reference¹ is where he is said to have advised the Chola who destroyed 'the moving fortress in the air of the Rākshasas' by way of rendering assistance to Indra. On the advice of Agastya this Chola requested Indra that he might be personally present in the capital city of Puhār or Kāvēripattinam during the twenty-eight days' festival which he had undertaken to celebrate in honour of the god, his friend. The river Kāvēri itself was given that name because she came there in response to the request of the Chola ruler Kavēra who performed a penance in one of the small forests adjacent to the town² of Puhār.

¹ Canto I, ll. 3-9.

² Paṭikem, ll. 9-25, iii, ll. 35-56.

There is another reference to Agastya in connection with the same ruler Kāntama against whom Paraśurāma appeared in his campaign to uproot the Kshatriya race. Kāntama in difficulty sought the advice of Agastya and in accordance with that advice put the kingdom in charge of his illegitimate son Kakandan, and remained in hiding till the danger¹ should pass. In these references Agastya appears as a holy *Rishi*, who was habitually in residence in the Tamil country, and advised and assisted the Chola ruler in difficulty as perhaps others as well. In Tamil literature generally Agastya is associated with the hill Podiyil and is regarded as being specially devoted to the interest of the Pāṇḍyas.

The Rāmāyaṇa comes in for reference at least in two incidents. In canto xviii, lines 19 to 26, there is a reference to the illegitimate love of Indra to Ahalya the wife of *Rishi* Gautama. The story occurs in so many other places that it need not be regarded as exactly taken from the Rāmāyaṇa, seeing that the actual connection of Rama with the revivification of Ahalya is not under allusion here. The two references to Rama's bridge must be held as referring to the Rāmāyaṇa itself. The first is in canto v, line 37. In this all that is stated is that the famous bathing place of Kumāri is said to have 'been made by monkeys'. Nothing more is stated regarding it and leaves us merely to surmise whether it is not a reference to Rama's bridge which is now located in the island of Rāmēśvaram, a considerable distance from where Kumāri is. In canto xvii, lines 9 to 16, however, there is a far clearer and indubitable reference to the causeway built by the army of monkeys for Rama who is stated in so many words to have come

¹ xxi. ii. 25-29.

on earth as a result of the delusion brought upon him by a curse. The particular point of the reference is that all the big stones and other material for bridge-building brought by the monkeys and thrown into the water disappeared completely without the slightest assistance to achieving his object, the comparison instituted being to the great hunger from which Kāyaśandikai suffered; all the quantities of food that she ate vanished without effect as did the stones that the monkeys threw into the sea when building the bridge. Almost exactly the same detail is given in the Rāmāyaṇa in the construction of the bridge across to Lanka. It must be noted here that in this context the locality is not actually stated though taking the two together one may infer that the tradition in the days of the author of the Maṇimēkhalai connected Rama's bridge with Kumāri, as in the Rāmāyaṇa itself.

One clear incident is under reference from the Mahābhārata, from the Virāṭaparva. In canto iii lines 146 to 148 Arjuna's appearance in the city of the Virāṭa king as a eunuch is brought into comparison with the appearance of the beautiful Maṇimēkhalai in the garb of a Buddhist nun (*bikṣhunī*). There is another reference which may be to the Mahābhārata, but does actually belong to the Viṣṇuapurāṇa and the Bhagavata. This is a reference to a peculiar kind of a dance¹ which Krishna's son Pradhyumna is said to have danced at the capital city of Bāṇa, by name Śōnagaram. The allusion here is to Pradhyumna assuming the form of a eunuch and dancing in the streets of the capital of this Bāṇa-asura to recover his son Aniruddha who had been thrown into prison in a love adventure with Ushā, Bāṇa's

¹ Canto iii, ll. 222-225.

daughter. In the *Silappadhikāram*¹ there is a reference to Krishna having enacted a similar dance. The city of Śonagaram is not mentioned in the text as such. There is also a reference to Krishna's pastoral dance,² the dance of Krishna, his elder brother and sister is brought into comparison with the movement of a peacock, a peahen and a royal swan moving about together in the garden. In another place in the same canto, line 76 to 77, a white tree and a blue tree are likened to Krishna and Balarāma standing. These instances are under frequent reference in the *Śilappadhikāram*, and other instances connected with these in other Śāngam works. In the same canto, lines 51 to 56, there is a reference to the Vāmanāvatāra of Vishṇu and the gift that Bali made to him, in connection with the descent of the Chola queen from the family of the Bāṅgas who traced their descent to Mahābali himself. There are numbers of other stray instances, such as Viśvāmītra's attempt,³ in an extremity of hunger, to eat dog's flesh; and Agni's love to the wives of the seven *viśhis*.⁴

There is another reference of importance to another department of Sanskrit literature. There is a reference in canto xv to Yaugandharāyaṇa's appearing as a diseased beggar in the town of Ujjain, the capital of Pradhyota to release from prison his sovereign, the Vatsa king Udayana. He is referred to as the Brahman Yūhi. This must be a reference either from the *Bṛhatkathā* itself or a similar source elsewhere. The incident alluded to here is found described in the same detail in *Somadēva's Kathāsarit Sāgara* and in the

¹ Canto vi, ll. 54, 55.

² xix, ll. 65-66.

³ xi, ll. 84.

⁴ xviii, ll. 92-97. *M.Bh.* III. 224-25.

Pratigñā-Yaugandharāyaṇa of the dramatist Bhāsa (lines 60 to 66).

There is another important reference to a peculiar custom of the Chola royal family which regarded Chola princes dying a natural death as old men, disgraceful.¹ When prince Udayakumāra had fallen by the sword of the Vidyādhara, an old woman of the city by name Vāsantikā (Vāsantavai) went to the queen and offered her consolation. Admonishing her not to show her sorrow as a mother for the death of the son in the presence of the king, she explained to her as a feature of the Chola royal family that members of that distinguished family rarely died a natural death as old men; when by chance they did so without falling in battle, attacking the enemy and carrying on an aggressive war, or resisting an invasion by the enemy in defence of the kingdom, the dead bodies of such were laid solemnly over a bed of *kuśa* grass (*Poa cynosuroides*) by Brahmans who cut the body and quartered it as a symbol of their having fallen in battle. This ceremony, according to the current belief of the times, ushered them into the Virasvarga, the heaven of the heroes, which would have been their reward if they had fallen in battle. The occurrence of the *kuśa* grass and the officiating of the Brahman on the occasion would justify the inference that it was perhaps an imported ceremony.

These instances selected from among a large number give us an idea of the result of the contact of culture between that which may be regarded as South Indian and Tamil, and North Indian and Sanskrit. The work is a professedly Buddhist work as was said, and

¹ xxii, ll. 11-16.

Buddhism being a northern cult must have brought along with it much that was northern though not necessarily Sanskritic. It is an open question whether the earliest Buddhist teaching was embodied in Sanskrit or one of the Prakrits including Pāli. But the details of culture collected have no reference to Buddhism and are perhaps all of them Brahmanical in point of character. The choice has been made advisedly so that what is attempted to be illustrated is the degree of contact between the two cultures and their consequent intermingling. The fact that the author and the work are professedly Buddhist, makes these all the more valuable as an indication that the infusion of Sanskrit culture was not of the partially religious kind. The inference therefore seems clear that the contact has been of considerable standing, and the result, one of friendly borrowing without narrowness or jealousy. There is no evidence of hostility in it, notwithstanding that several of these Brahmanical traditions are brought in in such a way as to indicate disapproval. The religious and philosophical tenets that are incorporated do undoubtedly show Sanskrit influence as in fact it is inevitable in that connection. But what is to the purpose here is the flow of Northern culture seems to have been free, and the incorporation of the elements of that culture equally free. It is not the characteristic of Tamil works of this class alone; but even works of a more severely Tamil character exhibit that contact no less decisively. Notwithstanding this free infusion of Sanskrit culture these classics as well as others, still could maintain their distinct character as Tamil works in their method and in their spirit. The infusion of Sanskrit culture seems to have been generally taken to be of such benefit that undoubtedly later inscriptions

could place the translation of the Mahābhārata into Tamil on a footing of equal importance with the establishment of the institution, the Tamil Śāngam, in Madura. A detailed examination of these borrowed elements in Tamil literature would lead to conclusions of the first importance both in regard to Tamil literature itself and in regard to Sanskrit culture generally. A chronological datum by itself is of no importance whatsoever. But it is of the first importance in its bearing upon the development of Indian culture generally both in its Dravidian and in its Aryan aspects. If we should succeed in arriving at a tolerably certain age for the Śāngam and the Tamil works associated with it, it would give us a chronological starting point for the forward movement of the two cultures as a result of this fruitful contact. It would enable us to determine what exactly the state of Dravidian culture at the time was and what important results flowed from its coming into contact with Sanskrit at that particular stage of its development. We would be enabled to throw light, and undoubtedly important light, upon the stage of development of Sanskrit culture itself. To illustrate our position we have only to take up that single incident drawn incidentally from a free comparison of Yaugandharāyana's appearance at the city of Ujjain in the circumstances in which this has been introduced in the Mañimāhalaī. Scholars are not yet agreed as to the date of either the Bṛhatkathā or its translations, even as to how far the Sanskrit versions of the Paiśāchi original actually follow the text. A connected question with this is the Bḥāsa problem which has been receiving a great deal of attention in recent times. If this single incident may not do to settle those questions, it may throw its own particular light upon them and, if a few other

specimens like this could be got together, the light that we gain may be adequate for a reasonable settlement of the whole question. It would be an interesting question whether the knowledge that the author of the Maṇimēkhalai had of Yaugandharāyaṇa's achievement in Ujjain was derived from the Bṛhatkathā itself, or one of its translations, or even the drama of Bhāsa, Pratiḡṅgā-Yaugandharāyaṇa. That is only so far by the way. The general conclusions that may be drawn from these elements of Sanskrit culture in the Tamil classic is to a very great extent supported by the Śāṅgam classics themselves as a whole. Scholars argue that the incursion of Sanskrit culture into the Tamil land was a product of much later times and therefore works that show that infiltration must be of a later age. Such an argument is putting the cart before the horse. It is essential to any conclusion of that kind that a serious examination should be made of the elements of Sanskritic culture in Tamil before we could formulate a position as to the actual age of the infusion of this culture. To this end the examination above made of the elements of Sanskrit culture in the Maṇimēkhalai may make its own slight contribution.

III

MAṆIMĒKHALAI: THE HISTORICAL MATERIAL AND THE CONCLUSIONS TO WHICH THEY LEAD

Taking only the more prominent features, it was already pointed out that Maṇimēkhalai refers to the three royal capitals of the Tamil land and Kānchi. The story begins with the Chola capital of Puhār, the capital of the Cholas from the days of the legendary king Kavēra. It

is generally accepted as a fact that the Chola Karikāla improved it and made it exclusively the capital of the Cholas in his days. Uṟaiyūr, called Uṟandai in Tamil, seems to have shared the honour with it. We can infer from the Śilappadhikāram that the great Chola Karikāla was anterior to the period of the story contained in the Śilappadhikāram itself and of Maṇimēkhalai as well, perhaps not long anterior. It therefore is in complete accord with this tradition, and Puhār is shown in the Maṇimēkhalai as in a very high state of prosperity, as it is in the Śilappadhikāram as well. The description contained in these may be confirmed almost in every detail by the undoubtedly Śāngam work of the famous poet Rudran Kaṇṇan, whose poem Paṭṭinappālai forms one of the collection Paṭṭu-Paṭṭu. This latter work is a description of the city in the days of the great ruler Karikāla. Therefore the two descriptions are not far apart of each other in point of time.

The brother of the Chēra Śenguṭṭuvan, Iṅgō, describes himself as the son of a Chola princess, and his grandfather's name is described as the Chola, 'of the high car drawn by seven horses.'¹ It is possible, with good reason, to equate him with Karikāla, but the equation is nowhere stated explicitly. His Chola contemporaries are referred to in the Śilappadhikāram at any rate, as his cousin in whose behalf he defeated a number of rival claimants to the Chola throne at a place called Nēri-vāyil.² This contemporary ruler is described in one place as Neṭṭumuḍi Killi,³ in various other places he is Killi, which is synonymous with Chola, with various attributes. The attributes alone vary; the varying

¹ Canto xxix. Introductory prose passage.

² xxvii. ll. 115 ff. and xxviii. ll. 112 ff.

³ xxiv. 29.

attributes are 'Velvél,' '1' 'Māvay' 2 and so on, 3 merely indicative of some feature or other of prosperity or prowess. At the latter end of the story of Maṇimēkhalai and, certainly in the later years of his own reign, the city of Puhār suffered destruction by the sea. The result of this was that many people abandoned the city and migrated elsewhere, some temporarily and many others permanently, and the prosperity of the city seems to have been, greatly diminished, if not completely destroyed, as a result of this calamity. 4 That is as far as we can go with the story of Maṇimēkhalai. In an undoubted Sangam poem Śīrupāṇāṟṟuppaḍai of a period perhaps in the generation following, the three crowned kings of Tamil India are described more or less fully, and the capital of the Cholas is there, clearly stated to be Uṟandai without any mention of Puhār, which seems to confirm, though indirectly, what is inferred from the story of Maṇimēkhalai. Perhaps the Cholas themselves abandoned Puhār as a capital and went to Uṟaiyūr in view to the war of succession ending in the battle at Nēri-vāyil. The Ceylon tradition connected with Gajabāhu's visit to India for the first time as an enemy of the Cholas treats of Uṟaiyūr as the Chola capital and not Puhār. 5 In the details so far gathered from Maṇimēkhalai, the author has taken care not to let the supernatural interfere with the progress of human history except in regard to one particular, and, that is, that the destruction of Puhār was brought about by the disappointment of Indra at his annual festival having been forgotten to be celebrated, and, as a consequence, his directing the goddess Maṇimēkhalā to bring about the destruction of the city.

1 xxix. 3.

2 xix. 127.

3 S' Vaḍi-vēl Kilḷi' in xxv. 193.

4 xxv. ll. 176 ff.

5 Upham's *Mahāvamsa*, etc., ii, 57-58 and corresponding parts of *Rājatanākari* and *Rājāvali*.

The forgetfulness to celebrate the festival to Indra referred to in the paragraph above was brought about in connection with the story, as detailed in the work Maṅgimēkhalai itself, of the birth of a son to the Chola by a Nāga princess. The princess goes by the name Pilivaḷai, and was the daughter of the valiant king of the Nāgas by name Vaḷai Vaṇan. She appeared unexpectedly and alone in one of the outer gardens of Puḥār when the Chola was taking air one summer evening. The appearance of a beautiful damsel overpowered the monarch and led to their union as a result of love at first sight. After a month's stay with him, she left without intimation, and the distressed king was informed by a *Bauddha Chāraṇa* that she was the daughter of a Nāga king, that he would never see her again, but that he would get from her a son who would prove to be an ornament to his family.¹ This story appears in connection with Tondamān ḷam-Tiraiyan of Kānchī in another Śāngam collection, Pāttu-Pāṭṭu. But the full story is not there and the commentator Nacchinārkiṇiyar actually supplies the details. According to this source, she left the Chola with an understanding that she would find means to send his son to him who was to recognize that son by a twig of the *tonḍai* (*Capalaandra Indica*, Indian caper) creeper round his right ankle, undertaking to despatch him by setting him afloat in a well-protected box. Disregarding all artistic embellishments in the story it would appear permissible to take the two stories as referring to the same incident, namely, the birth of Tondamān ḷam-Tiraiyan who became famous, as ruler of Kānchī in the following generation. That he could not be very far off in point of time is clearly in evidence in the Śāngam poem

¹ xxiv. 11, 25 ff.

Perumbāṇāruppaḍai of the poet Radran Kaṇṇan, the author of Paṭṭinappālai. Even granting a whole century of life to Radran Kaṇṇan, it would be barely enough that he could have been a contemporary with the great Chola Karikāla from whom he received a sumptuous reward for his Paṭṭinappālai, and lived to celebrate at the same time prosperous Kānchī under Iḷaṅ-Tiraiyan. The inference from this is clear, namely, that Kānchī in the period to which Maṇimēkhalai refers was Kānchī anterior to the days of Tonḍamān Iḷaṅ-Tiraiyan, as the Chola viceroy at Kānchī at the time of Maṇimēkhalai's visit was Iḷaṅ Kiḷḷi, the brother of Neḍumuḍi Kiḷḷi, the Chola ruler. Among the number of Kiḷḷis figuring in the Puraṇānūru¹ it is possible to identify the brothers Neḍumuḍi Kiḷḷi and his brother Iḷaṅ Kiḷḷi. Neḍumuḍi was probably the person who was besieged in Uṟaiyūr and Āmūr by Nalam Kiḷḷi, and the number of Kiḷḷis that figure in this connection would justify what is stated in regard to Śenguttuvan Chēra when he had overcome at Nērivāyil the nine Chola princes that rose against the ruling Chola, his own cousin.² It seems therefore justifiable to infer that, in regard to the Chola ruler and his brother the viceroy of Kānchī, they were historical rulers, and it may be noted that the Maṇimēkhalai ascribes to them nothing unhistorical.

Coming down to Madura and the Pāṇḍya country, we have but brief references, only two such, to Takkana Madura³ (Southern Madura) and one to Korkai.⁴ The references to them in the Śīlappadhikāram are far fuller, and there is a great deal more that that poem has to tell of

¹ Poems 43 to 47.

² Śīlappadhikāram xxvii, ll. 115 ff. and xxviii, ll. 112 ff.

³ xiii, 105, and xxii, 106. 'Tamil Madura' in xxv, 133.

⁴ xiii, 84.

Madura than Maṇimēkhalai. Maṇimēkhalai refers to the ruler as a Seḷiyān ' of the Golden Car '.¹ This ruler is the successor of the one who gave up his life in consequence of his thoughtless perpetration of an act of injustice to Kaṇṇaki. Here again the historical is kept clear of the supernatural. Coming to the third capital, Vanji, Maṇimēkhalai is brought over there sailing across the air from Puhār to the fortified capital of the Chēra monarch Śenguttuvan. He is referred to in the connection as one who had made the limits of the earth itself as the boundaries of his *Malainādu*, to have carried on a successful invasion to the north, and, crossing the Ganges by means of boats, to have defeated Kanaka and Vijaya and compelled them to carry a supply of stone for making an image of Kaṇṇaki from it.² That is all that is said of the Chēra Śenguttuvan in this poem. But Śenguttuvan and his achievements are described in far greater detail in the Śilappadhikāram and one section of the Śāngam collection Paḍiṟupattu.³ The author of the Śilappadhikāram⁴ takes care to depict Śenguttuvan as a great ruler, the admiring friend of the poet Sāttan, as having ruled more than fifty years, warring all the time. His achievements against the north is described in full detail. Numbers of other battles in which he was victorious are mentioned. There are references even to his achievement against the chieftain Paḷaiyan of the Madura country and the victory that he won at Nērivāyil against the Chola rebels in favour of his cousin, the ruling Chola. Some of these, the achievement against Paḷaiyan are described more elaborately in the Paḍiṟupattu collection. But what is relevant to the question here is that all these confirm each other and make him

¹ Śil. 84. *Porṟṟ* may mean merely beautiful.

² Bk. v.

³ xvi.

⁴ Bks. xxx-xxx.

by far the most powerful ruler of his age. It is the Śilappadhikāram that is responsible for the statement in the body of the work,¹ not merely in the prologue, that Gaḷabāhu of 'the Lanka surrounded by the sea' was present at the consecration of the temple to Pattini Dēvi. Lanka is defined as surrounded by the seas for very good reasons. There were other Lankas on the continent of India, and the attribute therefore is called for in order, that the ruler of Lanka may not be mistaken for those on the continent of India.

It is necessary to point out here that a predecessor of his, very probably an immediate predecessor extended the territory of the Chēras on the west coast by annexing by conquest the region of Kongu to it² and carrying his conquest further eastward so as to bring under his influence, if not his rule,³ the territory extending up to the eastern sea. He is said, in the collection Padirupattu,⁴ to have celebrated his anointment from the waters of the two seas in one bath. Other stray references we have in the Sangam collection by which the Kollimalais⁵ and the Salem District had been brought under the control of the Chēras, as also the territory of the Adiyamān⁶ with its capital at Tagaḍūr, the modern Dharmapuri. We see here at work, in the various stages, the aggressive policy of the Chēra rulers of the time. We shall revert to this point further down.

Maṇimēkhalai who had learnt all that the heretical teachers had to teach at Vanji, happened to see her grandfather there in the Buddhist *vāḱāra* outside the

¹ xxxi. 160.

² *Padirupattu*, poem 22, ll. 15-16.

³ *Ibid.*, Padigam to Third Ten.

⁴ Ek. iv

⁵ *Kallidāsa*, Abam 209; *Kaḷilar*, Nāṇṇai 370.

⁶ *Padirupattu*, Section VIII, poem 73 and padigam.

fortress, and flying again through the air, she goes at his direction to meet Aravaṇa Adigaḷ and obtain from him the orthodox teachings of the Buddha. Kāñchī happened to be suffering from a very severe famine, she was advised to go there chiefly to find use for the inexhaustible begging bowl, that she carried in her hand. She acceded to her grandfather's request and proceeded to Kāñchī. She was received by Iḷaṁ Kiḷḷi, the viceroy, and was allotted accommodation in the south-western corner of the city in a grove called Dharmadavana, wherefrom she fed the suffering people from her inexhaustible bowl much to the relief of the ruler and the ruled alike. The grateful viceroy provided for her a big *vikāra* with all its appurtenances for her residence in the city and did all else she wanted. She got a Buddha seat erected and a special *chaitya* for holding the footprints of the Buddha, and received the teaching of Aravaṇa Adigaḷ, there, as she was not satisfied with all that she had learnt of other than Buddhist teachers. She obviously remained there for the rest of her life as the fact is referred to in a prophesy made in regard to her future in the course of the story. It is this Iḷaṁ Kiḷḷi, the viceroy of Kāñchī apparently, that is said in an earlier part of the poem, in canto xix, to have won a victory against the Chēras and the Pāṇḍyas at Kāriyāru.¹ He carried from the field of battle, as spoils of war, the state umbrellas of the enemies which he duly presented to his brother, and these umbrellas are referred to in an address to the reigning Chola ruler on the occasion when his officials carried him the information of the doings of Maṇimēkhalai in Puḥār feeding prisoners from an inexhaustible bowl. The question when the battle was

¹ ll. 119-128.

fought would arise from this specific statement that Iḷam Killi won a victory against the combined Chēra and the Pāṇḍya armies at Kāriyāru. There are poems in the Puraṇānūru in celebration of 'a Chola who fell in battle at Kāriyāru'. Therefore we may infer at once that Kāriyāru was a place very probably on the bank of a river in which the Cholas had to do much fighting against their enemies. The fighting was not a single incident or a mere battle; probably the frontier was exposed to protracted war where constant vigilance on the part of the Cholas was required. The reference in the Maṇimēkhalai makes it clear that the enemy against whom operation had to be undertaken on that particular occasion was the Chēra and the Pāṇḍya combined. But that detail is not stated in the other connection. So far as this specific statement goes, it gives a material point for identification of the locality that this battle was a battle that the Chola viceroy had to fight against the Chēra and the Pāṇḍya. Where is Kāriyāru then and when was the battle actually fought? The battle was actually fought at a time anterior to the advent of Śenguttuvan or even anterior. But it seems likely that it was in Śenguttuvan's reign that the incident took place. We have already stated that the immediate predecessor of Śenguttuvan claimed having brought the territory of Kongu directly under his rule and extended his influence across to the eastern sea. We have also a reference incidently to the fact of the Malayamān Kāri of Tirukkoviḷūr killing Ōri of the Kolli-malais and making over the territory to the Chēra. Therefore even before Śenguttuvan came to the throne, the Chēra aggression in the east was gradually extending, till it came into touch with the Chola frontier all along the line towards their west and north-west. The effective

intervention of the Chēra Senguṭṭuvan at Nērivāyil a place not far from Trichinopoly again shows that the territory under the control of the Chēra was not very far from where the battle was actually fought. We may, therefore, look forward to Kāriyāru anywhere along this frontier, and the battle might well have taken place in one of these campaigns in the reign of Senguṭṭuvan himself. In an aggressive war of the Chēras it is not a very rare occurrence that the Pāndya was associated with him, as in fact it was a normal political relation between the three Tamil kings of the South that whenever any one of the three got the dominant position the other two were certainly opposed to him generally, and got into an active alliance against him as occasion offered.

In the passage of the poem where a reference is made to the victory at Kāriyāru the army of invasion is definitely said to have started from Vanji, the Chēra capital. Among the flags hoisted in front of the army on the field of battle, the flags of the fish and the bow are said to have been fluttering. The two points therefore are clear. The object of the invasion is also unmistakably stated to be 'the desire for land,' in other words, earth-hunger, the desire for addition of territory. That was the character of the invasion which was beaten back by the viceroy at Kāriyāru. The location of the river therefore must be in the vicinity of the Chola frontier, which would answer to this actual description. It would at once be clear from this description that the attack could not have been delivered anywhere on the frontier of the Chola kingdom proper, as in that case the army of the headquarters would have repulsed the invasion, while it is possible that the younger brother, the viceroy of Kānchī, might none the less have led the army. In those circumstances, it is not likely that the credit of the

victory would have been assigned solely to the prince, commander-in-chief though he might have been. The victory is described as having been won by the viceroy-prince. It should therefore have been within the limits of his viceregal authority, and he must have won it without assistance from the ruling monarch for the time being. Otherwise the description would be from the point of view of language somewhat inappropriate. We would therefore be justified in looking for Kāriyāru somewhere on the frontiers of the viceroyalty of Kānchī. About the time to which this refers, the distribution of territory was such that between the Chola kingdom proper and the territory dependent upon Kānchī, there was at least one region which had its own chieftain though that chieftain might have acknowledged allegiance to the Chola ruler for the time being. These chieftains who, at different periods of the Śāngam age, counted, five, seven, eleven and fourteen, according to occasions, ruled their own territory and acknowledged allegiance to one or other of the three crowned kingdoms as occasion demanded, and asserted their independence as opportunity offered. It is petty wars among these and their deep-seated hostility to one another that were responsible at this time for the extension of the territory of the Chēra through the middle block of territory comprising within it the territory of Kongu, the chieftaincy of Adiyamān of Tagaḍūr and the chieftaincy of Ōri round the Kollimalais. There was another chieftain Pāri whose territory seems to have lain still farther west, or as some take it in the south. There was still another who does not figure in these transactions, and his territory lay well within the territory of modern Mysore. The territory, therefore of Malaiyamān Kāri, with his capital at Tīrukkovilūr, came actually between the Chola

kingdom proper and the province of Kānchī. The chieftain Kāri was at this time in active alliance with the Chēras whose relative he was and for whom he actually conquered the territory round Kollimalais as was stated already. Hence if Kānchī could have been the objective of attack, assistance from the Chola kingdom could not always be at hand. It is one of such attacks that is clearly meant in the actual description of the battle that is given in this work. Where could we possibly locate this Kāriyāru?

Kāri at the time seems to have been a common name, the Tamil equivalent of Sanskrit Krishna, and as common as the name Krishna is now-a-days was Kāri then in the Tamil country. Of course, it takes other forms more dialectical and popular. The Malayamān chieftain was called Kāri, as was stated already, and Kāriyāru is open to the interpretation that it was a river which was a feature of the territory of the chieftain Kāri. It does not happen to be so in this context however. The Editor of the work with his usual learning and circumspection, has quoted a verse from the *Periyapurānam* in connection with the life of Tirunāvukkaraśu or Appar. Describing his visit to the holy places of the Śaivas, he is said to have visited the shrine which is named Tiru-Kārikkarai. Omitting the complimentary expletive at the beginning, the name would stand Kārikkarai, the bank of the Kāri river, which may either be the river by name Kāri or by translation black river. Appar is said to have visited Tiruvālangāḍu near Arkonam, passed from there to Tripāśur and then after a prolonged journey, crossing hills and rivers, he arrived at Tiru-Kārikkarai, worshipped Śiva there, and at the next stage of his march reached Kālahasti. This eleventh-twelfth century work the *Periyapurānam* clearly marks out for us the

itinerary of Appar in the seventh century. Whether Appar actually did the journey or no, the eleventh century conviction of the Śaivas was that Appar did visit these shrines, and in all probability visited them in that order. The passage is certainly very good authority for the eleventh century geography of this tract, and may not be altogether fictitious in regard to the seventh century when the Śaiva saint is said to have performed the journey. Whatever may be the actual truth of the historical fact, the geographical features cannot have changed so very thoroughly.

Kārikkarai may usefully be looked for in what must have been the high road of communication between Tirupāśūr which is near Tiruvaḷḷūr, and Kālahasti. We know of roadways in this region in the eleventh century certainly, and references can be quoted even for the seventh and eighth centuries, to the existence of trunk roads, two of them at any rate, Vaḍuhavaḷi East and Vaḍuhavaḷi West, one of them described in Sanskrit also as Āndrapathā. Therefore then there must have been a recognized way for these pilgrims from the holy shrines of importance like Tirupāśūr to perhaps the still more important shrine in Kālahasti itself. Somewhere midway between, rather nearer to Kālahasti than Tirupāśūr must have been the Śaiva holy place Kārikkarai. Fortunately for us we do find a Śiva temple answering to that description. There is a place called Ramagiri now, straight north of Tiruvaḷḷūr and on the way to Kālahasti, somewhere between Nāgalāpuram and Satyavēḍu.

As the place is located at present, it is regarded as in the basin of the river Araṇi which empties itself into the sea near the town of Pulicat. But Araṇi apparently is not the river Kāri, as the place is some distance from the river itself. The place is none the less called

Kārikkarai in inscriptions datable from about the ninth century up to the days of the great Dēvarāya II of Vijayanagar about the middle of the fifteenth century. It is described by the alternative names, Vāliśvaram or Kārikkarai, and the god enshrined in the temple is called Vāliśvaram Uḍaiyār or Kārikkarai Uḍaiya Nāyanār according as the name is Sanskrit or Tamil. But if that is Kārikkarai it is not likely to help us very much so long as we do not find the river Kāri, which exactly is what we want. There is a river, however, formed of two small streams, one on each side of the Nagari Hills, the two uniting and forming what is called the Kāṅgi river, which passes through the railway station at Sūḷurpet, and empties itself into the Pulicat lake, not far from the salt manufacturing townlet of Tada. The western stream which is a respectable distance from Nāgalāpuram is called by the name Kāṅgi and the eastern is now named Kālēru. The source of the Kālēru is not any prohibitive distance from the place now called Ramagiri, the Vāliśvaram or Kārikkarai of olden times. The Collector, Mr. C. A. Henderson, I.C.S., with whom I discussed the matter, considers that the identification is perfect though Ramagiri is not actually on the stream Kālēru, as the level of water has gone down considerably through the centuries. But this defect notwithstanding, it is near enough on the map to mark the source of the holy river and perhaps the river has its obscure beginnings in the Hill Ramagiri itself. Hence the modern Ramagiri, the Vāliśvaram or Kārikkarai of the inscriptions and the Periyapurāṇam, must mark the spot in which, or in the immediate vicinity of which, there was a stream Kāri. The Kālēru which takes its rise not far from it is sufficiently near to it in geographical location and phonetic affinity to be equated with each other. The present day

name Kālêru consists of two parts, the latter part 'êru' is the equivalent of river, the first part 'Kāl' must be the equivalent of black, Kāla is black in Tamil and Kannada, and Kāla itself certainly occurs in Telugu meaning black in Sanskrit compounds, at any rate. It would not be surprising if the simple word has passed in this as in the other languages into popular use, its Sanskrit origin notwithstanding. Kālêru therefore may be identified with the Kāriyār. The identification may be philologically satisfactory but it must be proved to be satisfactory geographically and historically. Kālêru may be taken to be Kāriyār in Tamil. But was that the region that was likely to be attacked by the combined army of the Chêra and the Pāṇḍya advancing against, it may be even, the territory dependent upon Kāñchī?

All that territory almost up to Nellore itself was included in the Tamil land in those early times. The Śāngam poems have reference to a Tīraiyan, distinct from the Tondamān chief, Ijārū Tīraiyan, whose hill is described as Vēngadam (Tīrupati); his capital was, according to one Ahanānūru poem,¹ Pavattiri. Pavattiri can now be satisfactorily identified again from the Nellore inscriptions with Reḍḍipālem, in Gūḍūr taluk of the Nellore district. Inscriptions in it describe the place as Pavattiri in 'Kaḍaikonḍa Kākandī Nāḍu', Kākandī Nāḍu that is submerged in the sea. Till a comparatively late period inscriptions in the Gūḍūr taluq, up to the frontier of the Pulicat lake in its northern extremity, are in Tamil. The old territory of the Tīraiyan must have extended as far north as that. In other words the northern frontier of the territory

¹ Poems 85 and 290. In the latter the author Naṅkīrar seems to state that Pavattiri had already ceased to be a prosperous place

dependent upon Kānchi must have been in that region. The name Kākandi Nāḍu has its own tale to tell. Kākandi is the name of Kāvēripaṭṭinam, and the derivation of that name is given in the Maṇimēkhalai¹ itself. When Paraśurāma came to attack the Chola king Kāntama, he took the advice of Agastya and escaped, leaving the kingdom in charge of an illegitimate son of his by name Kākandan, as the latter's illegitimacy gave him immunity from attack by Paraśurāma. Hence the name Kākandi for the Chola capital. The description of this territory as Kaḍalkonḍa Kākandi Nāḍu would indicate that it at one time bore the name Kākandi Nāḍu which later got submerged in the sea. It is possible that the name Kākandi was given to it after conquest by the Cholas whenever that conquest actually took place, possibly under Karikāla.

But the point that requires to be cleared up is why should the Chēras and the Pāndyas go so far out of their way, in an invasion even if it be against the territory of Kānchi in the far north. No explanation is given to us in the works. But the Sangam age is the period when this had become a sort of debatable frontier between the Āndhras and the Tamils. The Āndhra-Sāta-vāhanas had at one time extended their territory southwards and the fact that their ship coins of *potin* have been found almost as far south as Cuddalore would show that their aggression had not always been futile. It must have been therefore a peculiarly dangerous frontier for the Tamils and as such liable to easy attack. But beyond this, we have no definite facts to explain why these two southern kings attacked the Chola kingdom on their extreme northern frontier in Maṇimēkhalai itself.

¹ xxii. ll. 37-38.

The Malayamān chief Kāri, however, is said to have fought single-handed against the Āryas¹ and turned them back. This must, in point of time, have been anterior to the transaction under reference in the Maṇimēkhalai, as then the Malayamān chief was still in possession of his territory unmolested.

Having said so much about this identification, we may bring the historical references in the Maṇimēkhalai to a close by referring to the passage in which Kōvalan's father explains to Maṇimēkhalai how he happened to be in Vanji at the time. When Maṇimēkhalai visited Vanji for the purpose of learning the heretical systems, she met her grandfather there. He explained to her that on hearing of the tragic end of his son and daughter-in-law at Madura he made up his mind that life was not worth living and distributed all his wealth and became a lay disciple of the Buddha. He was living the life of a lay *upāsaka* for some time in Puhār and came to visit Vanji to worship at the *chaitya* erected for the Buddha by his own ancestor, Kōvalan's grandfather in the ninth generation. As the latter was a great friend of the contemporary Chēra monarch, he built that *chaitya* in the immediate vicinity of the city of Vanji. Maṇimēkhalai's grandfather himself arrived there luckily on that day when Senguttuvan and his royal ladies, spending a pleasant time in the garden, saw a number of Buddhist holy ones descending from the air and taking rest upon a rock in the garden. Understanding their holy character, Senguttuvan entertained them, and, as they were expounding the teaching of the Buddha to the king, he himself arrived there and had the benefit of it along with the royal party. Hearing from them that Puhār was going

¹ Nāricai 170.

to be destroyed by the sea in a short time, he made up his mind to stay in Vanji alone. They also gave him the information that Kōvalan and his wife after a certain number of births would ultimately reach *Nirvāṇa* in their last birth at Kapilavāstu. This passage has been somewhat misunderstood, and Śenguṭṭuvan has been even made the contemporary of the ancestor of Kōvalan in the ninth generation. It seems quite clear however that Kōvalan's father first takes up the tale of his arrival there at Vanji when Śenguṭṭuvan actually entertained the holy ones, and congratulates himself upon having had the benefit of what those holy ones had to teach Śenguṭṭuvan and his court. The purpose of his visit he proceeds to narrate was to offer worship at the *śaīṭya* which his own ancestor built in the outer gardens of the city of Vanji. The two incidents are thrown together one after the other, and may be mistaken at a somewhat casual reading. These passages in the Maṇimēkhalai state in the clearest terms the contemporaneity of Śenguṭṭuvan Chera to the events described in the Śilappadhikāram and the Maṇimēkhalai. It is hardly necessary for us to go out of the Maṇimēkhalai to establish this contemporaneity although we have much valuable evidence to confirm it otherwise in the Śilappadhikāram and the Śāngam collection Paṭiṟrupattu.

Before concluding this part of the subject, it is necessary to consider two points of some importance relevant to the subject. The first of these is such astronomical details as we get in the Maṇimēkhalai which may enable the fixing of a date by calculation, if need be. The first chronological feature that appears is where the birthday asterism of the Buddha is given in canto xi. The point of the reference is that the

miraculous Buddha-seat is said to appear on the day when the Buddha himself was born, namely in the season of the early sun, in the second sign of the zodiac (*Rishabha*), in the fourteenth asterism, 'the begging bowl would appear at the same point of time as the Buddha himself.' This is followed by a reference that that day and that hour was that at which Tivatilakai, the guardian deity was actually giving this information. The accepted date of the Buddha's birth is the Nakshatra *Vaiśāka*, and the full moon day of *Vaiśāka* (month). The asterism referred to therefore is *Viśāka*. This is said here in the poem to be the one following the thirteenth, that is, the fourteenth asterism. This would be the fourteenth only if we count it from *Kṛttikā* and not from *Aśvini*. The point immediately arises whether this statement has reference to the period anterior to the days of Varāhamihira who is said to have introduced 'Aśvinyādi calculation', that is, counting from *Aśvini*, instead of from *Kṛttikā*. Probably it was so; at the same time it is possible to argue that this is a statement taken from current northern tradition, and may have reference to any period since the time of the Buddha. If the author is merely quoting a current tradition like that, it could offer us no test of time.

The next reference is in canto xii where a prediction is made that '1616 years after the time the Buddha will appear.' There are other references besides in the body of the work to the appearance of the Buddha. In fact, it is a stock story. Kōvalan and Kaṣṇaki were to be born when the Buddha appears on earth in northern Magadha and, becoming his direct disciples, were to attain to *nirvāṇa*. Manimēkhalai was also informed that she would come to the end of her present existence in Kānchī, and, after a number of births, she would be born

a man in northern Magadha when the Buddha should be preaching there, and, becoming his first Śāvaka (Śrāvaka) disciple, would attain *nirvāṇa*. All these references are of the nature of predictions and have reference to the coming Buddha, not to the Buddha that had actually come and gone. These cannot be drawn into evidence for purposes of chronology.

The next point for consideration is a reference to *kuccharakuṇḍikāi*, the *guṭikā* or a small temple described as *kucchara*. *Kucchara* is the Tamil equivalent of the word Gūrjara in Sanskrit, referring either to the country or to the people of Gujarat when that had come into being. The learned commentator has suggested this equation in the course of his comments. This had been taken to fix the age of the poem by the fact that the Gūrjaras were not in India before the beginning of the sixth century A.D. at the earliest. The reference is to the temple of Champāpati, the patron deity of the city of Puhār. The Mahāmahopādhyaya's interpretation is based on the tradition that the Gūrjaras were well known artisans in building. There undoubtedly is a later tradition to that effect. The Gūrjaras were good builders but there are references in the *Maṇimēkhalai* to artisans from various countries engaged in the building of the hall in the royal garden in Puhār, among whom the Gūrjaras as such do not figure. There are references to the people of Magadha, Avanti, Yavana and Mahrāṭṭa, but no reference to the Gūrjara at all. This omission is a clear indication that the reputation of the Gūrjaras as experts in building had not been known then. In a corresponding passage from the *Perumkadalai*, which the Mahāmahopādhyaya quotes, there is a reference to jewellers from Magadha, carpenters from Yavana, smiths from Avanti, painters from Kōśāla, workmen in stones from Vatsa, and

there is a name gone of expert goldsmiths. In none of these do we find any reference to the Gūrjaras as such. If the omitted name should be that of the Gūrjaras in the Perumkadai, it would still be workmen in gold, and it is not the goldsmith that is likely to be under reference in the *gufika* or small temple to the goddess Champāpatī in the Chakravālakottam at Puhār. Hence the interpretation that *kucchara* refers actually to the Gūrjaras is at the very best doubtful. Very probably the name Gūrjara itself is derived from a Tamil or Dravidian word *Aucchara*, and this possibility must be investigated carefully. In any case, it cannot be held as decisive evidence to prove either that the work is later than the sixth century because of the occurrence of this expression or that the expression itself is an interpolation. In any case, with our present knowledge of this particular question, no decisive inference is possible. The question, therefore, of the age of Mañimēkhalai will have to be decided on other grounds than this.

IV

MAÑIMĒKHALAI: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AND THE CONCLUSIONS TO WHICH THEY LEAD

In this part we propose to deal with the matter contained in chapters xxvii, xxix, and xxx of the Mañimēkhalai. These refer respectively to the heretical systems of thought, Buddhist logic and Buddhist teaching as such. Chapter xxvii considers ten systems which ultimately resolve into five different religious systems according to the work itself. The ten referred to are (1) what is generally described as *Pramāṇa Vāda* of the Vaidika systems, (2) *Saiva Vāda*,

(3) *Brakma Vāda*, (4) *Nārāyaṇīya* or *Vaiṣṇava Vāda*, (5) *Vāda Vāda*. All these together constituted what Maṇimēkhalai assumed as the heretical systems based on the Veda. Collectively they may go by one name *Vaidika Vāda*, or the teachings which accepted the Veda. Then follows the system of the Ājīvaka as taught by Markali, Markali Gōsāla of the Jaina and Buddhist tradition, and the Niganta or Nirgrantha, with the chief teacher 'Arhat worshipped of all the Indras'. The first of these systems is what is generally understood to be distinct from Jainism throughout its history more or less. But in South India, as in the Maṇimēkhalai itself, the two systems are regarded as branches of a common system which is spoken of as that of the *Samaṇas* or *Amaṇa*, the Sanskrit Śramaṇa, which had a wider general significance than the Tamil equivalents. The authoritative text-book of the Ājīvakas is stated in this work, to be *Navakadīr*, a work the name of which has not come to our notice elsewhere in these discussions. The confusion between Jainism and that of the Ājīvakas has been as old as the *Divyavādāna* ascribable to the age of Asoka in the third century B.C. The Ājīvakas are said to have flourished in a place called *Samadanda* in the work *Nilakēṣi* as yet unpublished. The Maṇimēkhalai seems to regard these two as one system that of the *Samaṇas* or *Jains*. A later Tamil work, *Nilakēṣi* and the Śaiva canonical work *Śivagṇānasiddhi* state distinctly that the two systems were branches of one. In other places and other conditions the Ājīvakas were confounded¹ with Buddhists, as in the Kannada country about the time contemporary with *Śivagṇānasiddhi*.

¹ For this confusion between the religion of the Jains and the Ājīvakas there is very good reason. In the matter of externals, the order instituted by Markali Gōsāla, the founder of the Ājīvakas, a body of naked ascetics,

Then follow the three systems Sāṅkhya treated with some elaboration, Vaiśēshika, the substance of which is given perhaps a little less fully than Sāṅkhya but equally clearly, and lastly the Bhūtavāda, the atheistic system, treated as almost the same as the Lokāyata of other works. After having heard all that the teachers of these respective systems have had to say in Vanji, Maṇimēkhalai ridicules the last one, and, still in disguise, satisfied herself that she had acquired a competent knowledge of the 'Five Systems' notwithstanding the fact that she enquired of the ten teachers and obtained knowledge of their systems.

We already drew attention to the confusion that prevailed between the system of the Ājīvakas and the Jains both being regarded as one in the Tamil country. While the Maṇimēkhalai, in its final passage, seems to include the two in one, it still treats of the two separately to the extent of being regarded, if not as independent, at least as separate systems, which is somewhat unlike the treatment accorded to it in South India in times later than this. But it must be noted here in passing that in the Śilappadhikāram Kappaki's father is said to have distributed his wealth among the Ājīvakas of great

resemblance to the Digambara Jains. Apart from other similarities in the details of teaching between the two, there is one point where the similarity is very close. People are said to be born in six colours in an ascending order, namely, black, dark blue, yellow, red, golden and white, according to the Ājīvakas. In the process of transmigration people have to pass on in regular ascending order from one to the other till reaching the white birth, they could attain to birthlessness. That is the teaching of the Ājīvakas according to the Maṇimēkhalai; that is the teaching of the Ājīvakas according to Śivagāna Sūdhār; that is also the teaching of the Jains according to the Jivakachintāmasi (Muttylambakam 513, and Nachchizārkinīyar's comment thereon.). Such closeness of external appearance and internal conviction would be justification enough if surrounding communities took the one sect for the other.

penance, and himself became an *upāsaka*,¹ his wife having given up life completely by putting an end to herself, as did Kōvalan's own mother. This is a very important reference inasmuch as the religion of the Ajīvakas, if it could be so described, was undoubtedly practised in South India at the time. One other minor point to note is that the Sāṅkhya system is treated with a certain degree of fullness.

Coming to the Vaidika systems, there is much that would throw light upon the age of the work, although the point has received no attention so far. Taking up the *pramāṇya vāda*, the first section, there are three authorities specifically quoted, Vēda Vyāsa, Kṛtakōṭī and Jaimini. These are stated to have laid down that the valid *pramāṇas* were ten, eight and six respectively. Interpreted on the basis of the text itself, Vēda Vyāsa must be given credit for the ten, Kṛtakōṭī for the eight, and Jaimini for the six. This is a point of great importance. The latest translator (the Pāṇini edition) of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, Pandit Mohanlal Sandal, makes Jaimini responsible for eight *pramāṇas* and gives the credit of the reduction to six to Śābara, the commentator, which is obviously a mistake as we shall show. The Maṇimēkhalai treats of the ten *pramāṇas* at the commencement of the chapter more or less fully, and they are (1) Kāṭchi (Pratyaksha); (2) Karuttu, (Anumāna); (3) Uvamam (Sans. Upamāna); (4) Āgamam (Sans. Agama, otherwise called Sābda); (5) Aruttāpatti (Sans. Arthāpatti); (6) Iyalbu (Sans. Svabhāva); (7) Aitiham or Ulahuṛai (Sans. Aitihiya); (8) Abhāvam (Sans. Abhāva); (9) Mīchi or Oḷibu or Oḷivu (Sans. Pāriśēsha); (10) Uṇḍāneri or Uḷḷāneri (Sans

¹ Canto xxvii. ll. 98-100.

Sambhava).¹ These are the ten full *pramāṇas* defined and illustrated and have to be ascribed to Vyāsa. The Maṇimēkhalai itself winds up the discussion with stating six as the *pramāṇas* current 'at the time' of the composition of the work. They are, the first five and the eighth of the ten recited above.² It would be desirable to know what the actual eight *pramāṇas* are which are ascribed to the other author if the six of Maṇimēkhalai should be recognized as that of Jaimini as we should. To the six given at the end, add Sambhavam and Aitihiyam of the ten; and these eight therefore may be ascribed to Kṛtakōṭi³ whoever he was.

Kṛtakōṭi is a name which has so far remained little known elsewhere, and I believe up to the present time there has been no other reference in European works to this Kṛtakōṭi whether it be the name of an author, as presumably we shall have to take it to be, or of a work. The truth may be a combination of both. Maṇimēkhalai has preserved for us the name and this important detail that he was responsible for the formulating of eight alone of the ten *pramāṇas* as valid. It is therefore of the utmost importance if we could know something about this Kṛtakōṭi. The other two are well-known names. It is the science of Mīmāṃsā, one of the

¹ Vāda Vyāsa's 10.

² (1) Pratyakṣa. (4) Ūpanāna.
(2) Anumāna. (5) Arthāpatti.
(3) Śābda. (6) Abhāva.

³ (1) Pratyakṣa (1) (5) Arthāpatti. (6)
(2) Anumāna (2) (6) Abhāva (8)
(3) Śābda (4) (7) Aitihiya (5)
(4) Ūpanāna (3) (8) Sambhava (7)

These two groupings are given in the Fēhki translation, the six under 1.1.5 as those of the commentator; the eight are given in the introduction, in the analysis of *Pāda* 1. These seem really, to be those of Jaimini and Vṛttikāra respectively, the latter being quoted by Śabaravāmin. See Keith's *Karma Mīmāṃsā*, p. 3, the passage quoted below.

Upāngas of the Vēdas, that sets itself up to enquire into the rationale of Vēdic sacrifices, etc., and as such feels called upon to enter into knowledge and the nature of knowledge; *pramāṇyas*, being means of cognition, naturally come under its sphere of enquiry. Vēda Vyāsa is well known as the author of Uttara Mīmāṃsā, Jaimini is equally well known as the author of Pūva Mīmāṃsā. Who is Kṛtakōṭi then ?

Light comes from a very unexpected quarter in a work published recently by the late Mahāmahopādhyaya Ganapati Sastri of Trivandrum. We find reference to this Kṛtakōṭi in the Prapanchahrdaya, as the work is called, under the chapter heading Upānga Prakaraṇam.¹

¹ Chapter iv, pp. 39-50.

Prapanchahrdayam (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, XLV).

Upāngaparakarṇam.

Tatra sāṅgopāṅgasya vēdasya pūrvottarakānda sambhinnasya āśeṣavā-
kyārtha vicāraparāyagām Mīmāṃsā Śāstram.

Tadidam vimśatyadhyaīya nibaddham. Tatra śhōḍaśa adhyaīya nibad-
dham Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstram pūrvakāndaśya dharmavichāraparāyagām
Jaiminīkṛtam; Tadevyadadhyaīya Chatuṣṭakam Uttaramīmāṃsā Śāstram.
uttarakāndaśya Brahma vicāraparāyagām Vyākṛtam.

Tasya vimśatyadhyaīya nibaddhasya Mīmāṃsā Śāstrasya Kṛtakōṭi sāmā-
dhyaīya bhāṣhyam Bōdhāyanēna kṛtam. Tad graṇthabāhūjyabhāṣyādhu-
pēkshya kīuchid saṃkshiptam Upavarshēpakṛtam. Tadapi mandamātā
prati dushpradīpādam vistīrṇavādīty upēkshya śhōḍaśalakṣhaṇa Pūrvā-
mīmāṃsā Śāstramātrasya Dēvasvāmīnā āśeṣīkṣiptam kṛtam. Bhavadā-
śēnāpi kṛtam Jaiminiya bhāṣhyam. Pannardīkaṇḍē Dharmamīmāṃsā Śāstrā-
pūrvasya tantrakāndaśya Achārya Śabaravēniṣṭīssankshēpēṣa Sankar-
shakūḍam dvīḍyam upēkshya kṛtam bhāṣhyam. Tathā Dēvatākāndaśya
Sankarshēṣa. Brahmakāndaśya Bhagavatpāda, Brahmaḍatta, Bhāskari-
dībhīrmatābhōḍēnāpi kṛtam. Tathā Śābarbhāṣhyam vākhyārthamabhō-
ḍanadhyaīyagāmya Bhaṭṭa Prabhākarābhyaṃ dvīḍhā vyākhyātam. Taus
bhāvānā paratvēna Bhaṭṭakomārēṣa, niyōgaparṇasayā Prabhākarēṣa.

Tasya vimśatyadhyaīya nibaddhasya Mīmāṃsā Śāstrasypṛatyadhyaīya-
māthavīśēṣaḥ pradatīyatē. Tatra Mīmāṃsā Śāstrē pramāṇa pramāṇyavi-
chārah kṛiyatē. Tatra sāṅgōpāṅgōvēdāḥ pramāṇam. Pramāṇaḥ para-
śhēritāḥ. Tasya pramāṇa bhūtasya vēdasye pṛatyakshkēḍi lekhīkapramāṇaḥ
śhaḍbhīraprāmāṇyam kṛtakavāḍīyatva apauruṣhēyatva paratantratvādī

This work states that it is the function of the Mimāṃsā Śāstra to determine the meaning of all that is stated in the Vēda, and is of two parts, Pūrva and Uttara. This Mimāṃsā Sāstram, continues the statement, was a work of twenty chapters of which the first sixteen constitutes the Pūrva Kāṇḍa, which sets itself to enquire into the Dharma and is said to have been made by Jaimini. The remaining part of four chapters forms the latter part, Uttara Mimāṃsā, and has for its subject an enquiry into Brahman and was composed by Vyāsa. Then follows the important statement that the science of Mimāṃsā thus constituted of twenty chapters had a *commentary by name Kṛtakōṭi composed by Bodhāyana*. As this commentary was very vast, an abridgment of it was made by Upavarsha. It is following Upavarsha that another commentator by name Dēvasvāmin made his commentary upon the sixteen chapters constituting the Pūrva Mimāṃsā, having regard to the fact that otherwise it was much too large a subject for study. This work is considered a far greater abridgment than that of Upavarsha. Another commentator, Bhavadāsa by name, also compiled a commentary on the work of Jaimini. Of these sixteen chapters, chapters constituting the Pūrva Mimāṃsā or Dharma Kāṇḍa as it is called, the first twelve seem to have dealt with sacrifices proper (Tantra Kāṇḍa). The following four were called Dēvatā Kāṇḍa setting itself up to enquiring into the *Dēvatās*, invoked by the various *mantras* of the Vēdas. Of these the first two were commented upon very briefly by Śabarasvāmin. There was another commentary by Sankarshana for the whole of the Dēvatā Kāṇḍa (books 13 to 16) apart from

śloka kalāpānāntakāhya prāmāṇyam pratasaṅgdayāyē pratipādyatē. Tasya caivaduṣharahitasya vēdasya bhēdābhēdau dvitīyē. Tantra etc.

the Brahma Kānda (books 17 to 20). There were different commentaries on this last according to difference of views by venerable commentators, Bhagavatpāda, Brahma-datta, Bhāskara and others. Following Śābara's commentary, but differing from him in views, Bhaṭṭa, and Prabhākara composed their own two part commentaries. Bhaṭṭa Kumārila's commentary follows the *bhāṣana*, and Prabhākara, *vijyoga*, etc.

It is clear from this that the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra was regarded as one science of twenty books, though compiled by two authors, Jaimini the first sixteen chapters, and Vyāsa the following four.¹ The whole work was commented upon by Bodhāyana and the commentary was called Kṛtakōṭi. This is the commentary on the whole work which was abridged by Upavarsha. It is after Upavarsha that the subject came to be divided into two, and Dēvasvāmin was responsible for taking the first sixteen chapters and treating of that portion as Pūrva separately. He was followed in this by Bhavadāsa. Up to the time of Dēvasvāmin therefore, the work was regarded as one. This is a point of very great importance, as the Mīmāṃsā is generally regarded as two in orthodox parlance. The Poem Mapimēkhalai treats the Mīmāṃsā as one as does the Viṣṇu Purāṇa,² and not as two separate Śāstras as in later usage.

Another point has come out clear from this, that is, that Kṛtakōṭi was originally the name of the commentary from which the author himself got the name afterwards.

¹ This division which is quite clear in the Prapanchahydaya itself is made clear beyond doubt in the Introduction to Sarva Siddhānta Sangraha ascribed to Śaṅkarāchārya (Śl. 20). This work otherwise confirms the description given above of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra substantially (Śl. 17-22 *idem*).

² III, vii.

His real name, however, was Bodhāyana. Bodhāyana wrote a commentary on the whole of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* of twenty chapters.

Writers on *Mīmāṃsā* know of a commentary called *Vṛtti*, and the commentator is generally spoken as *Vṛttikāra*. So far not much has been known of this author and who he was. The *Śābara Bhāshya*, the earliest commentary extant, refers to the *Vṛttikāra* and *Upavarsha*. The *Vṛttikāra* has been taken by Jacobi to have been a commentator who followed *Upavarsha* because *Śābara* uses the honorific *Bhagavān* before *Upavarsha*, and not before the *Vṛttikāra*. But Keith points out that in other connections *Bhagavān* and *Āchārya* are used before the term *Vṛttikāra*, which passage Professor Jacobi has overlooked. Dr. Ganganath Jha tried to identify him with *Bhavadāsa*. As was pointed out above, *Bhavadāsa* was the second of the commentators who commented upon the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* alone. Keith says 'that the extract from the *Vṛttikāra* (*Kumarila's* comment on ii. 3, 16) proves that an important addition has been made to the teaching of the *Mīmāṃsā* in the shape of the introduction of discussions of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms.' Could we not equate the *Vṛttikāra* in these circumstances with *Bodhāyana*, the author of the *Kṛtakōṭi* and is not the commentary *Kṛtakōṭi* actually referred to as the *Vṛtti*? Professor Jacobi made the guess that the *Vṛttikāra* must be *Bodhāyana* and the *Prapanchahrdaya* confirms this. The *Manimēkhalai* reference to *Kṛtakōṭi* seems to throw welcome light upon the obscurity that has enshrouded the personality of the *Vṛttikāra* quoted. What egregious mistakes were made in regard to this *Vṛttikāra* becomes clear when the latest work on the subject, Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* refers

to him as having commented upon the Sābara Bhāshya¹ itself, and the Pāṇini translator of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā convicts Ramanuja of error in having treated Bodhāyana as the Vṛttikāra. He makes the remark that Upavarsha was the first commentator on the Mīmāṃsā, and offers the remark in a footnote that some are of opinion that Bhavadāsa was the Vṛttikāra. How unfounded these views are seems clear from the extracts above. For our present purpose it is clear that the Maṇimēkhalai refers to the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra as one and accepts the six *pramānas* of Jaimini as current at the time, thus clearly indicating a period before the Sābara Bhāshya. Vyāsa propounded the ten *pramānas*, Kṛtakōṣi eight and Jaimini six. These are under reference in the Śābara Bhāshya and the six are ascribed by mistake to Śābarasvāmin instead of to Jaimini in the Pāṇini office translation of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra.

¹ P. 370. That Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* (which are with us the foundations of Mīmāṃsā) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā Sūtras were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the groundwork of the Mīmāṃsā system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as Bhartrihari (alluded to in Nyāyaratnākara, verse 10 of Śloka-vārttika), Bhavadāsa, (Pratijñāsūtra 63) Hari and Upavarsha (mentioned in Śāstradīpika). It is probable that at least some of these preceded Śābara, the writer of the famous commentaries known as the Śābara-bhāshya. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr. Ganganath Jha would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of king Vikramāditya as being the son of Śābarasvāmin by a Kshatriya wife. This Bhāshya of Śābara is the basis of the later Mīmāṃsā works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Vārttikakāra by Prabhākara and merely referred to as 'Yathāhuḥ' (as they say) by Kumārila. Dr. Ganganath Jha says that Prabhākara's commentary Bhāṣā on the Śābara-bhāshya was based upon the work of this Vārttikakāra.

The late Dr. G. Thibaut's remarks on Bodhāyana seem apposite here.

'It appears that Ramanuja claims, and by Hindu writers is generally admitted, to follow in his bhāshya the authority of Bodhāyana, who had composed a *vṛtti* on the Sūtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the Śrī-bhāshya (Pandit, New Series vii, p. 163) "Bhagavad-Bodhāyana-kṛtām vistṛpām brahmasūtra vṛttim pūrvāchāryaḥ samkikshipus tanmatānusārēna sūtrāksharāṇi vyākhyāsyantē." Whether the Bodhāyana to whom that *vṛtti* is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sūtra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient *vṛtti* on the Sūtras connected with Bodhāyana's name actually existed, there is no reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places in the Śrī-bhāshya, and, as we have seen above, Śankara's commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the Vṛttikāra. In addition to Bodhāyana, Ramanuja appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers, Pūrvāchāryas, who carried on the tradition as the teaching of the Vēdānta and the meaning of the Sūtras."¹ This makes the position clear that presumably the *vṛttikāra* under reference is Bodhāyana, and the *Vṛtti* has reference in this context to the *Vṛtti* on the Brahma Sūtras. Is this not the Bhagavān Āchārya Vṛttikāra of the Sābara Bhāshya ii. 3, 16? Sankara² in the Vēdānta Sūtra iii. 3, 53, states clearly that Upavarsha wrote on both the texts, Pūrvā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, and Upavarsha is stated in the Prapanchahrdaya to have merely abridged the vast commentary of Bodhāyana's *Kṛtābhāṣī* on both the sections of the Mīmāṃsā, both Dharma kāṇḍa and the Brahma kāṇḍa.

¹ Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxviii. 268.

² Śankara Bhāshya, pt. ii.

Does not the *Vṛtti* therefore refer to the *Kṛtakōṭī* of the Achārya Bodhāyana, and could we not therefore take the *Vṛttikāra* to be Bodhāyana himself?

We have the following references to Kṛtakōṭī in other places. The first is in Śānkara's *Samyamī Nāmamālā*, ix. of Burnell's Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Tanjore Library, p. 47. Here occurs the verse:—

Hālabhūtiṣṭu' pavarshaḥ Kṛtakōṭī Kaviścha saḥ.
This half śloka occurs in the dictionary *Vaijayantī* as line 308 on page 95, of Oppert's edition. In the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣha*, *Brahmavarga*, śloka 23, also contains the name:

Upavarshō Hālabhūtiḥ Kṛtakōṭīr Ayāchitaḥ.

In both these cases it will be seen that the name in either form Kṛtakōṭī Kavi or Kṛtakōṭī is identified with Upavarsha. But the reference in the *Vaijayantī* and the *Samyamīnāmamālā* seems to indicate, in the light of the *Prapanchahrdaya* extract, Upavarsha's abridgment of the vast commentary Kṛtakōṭī, notwithstanding the fact that the particle *Kavi* is omitted in the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣha* quotation. Sucharitamīśra's *Kāśīka*, a commentary on the *Śloka-Vārttika* contains the following reference in a discussion on the *pramānas*:—

Nyāyavistarē hi prasiddha sādharṇyāt sādhyā
sādhanam upamānam ity uktam.

Tataḥ Pārāśarya matēna arthāptir udāhṛtā,

Taduttarakālam Tanmatānusāriṇā Kṛtakōṭīnā uktat-
vāt.

In the *spōṣavāda*¹ of the same work occurs the following:—

Atra bhāshyakārēṇa kaha sabdaḥ iti pṛsthvā gaka-
āraukāra visarjanīyā iti

¹ *Ibid.*, 294. I am indebted to the Pandits of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library for some of these references.

Bhagavān Upavarsha matēna Uttaram dattam.

Tatra Upavarshasya ētaḍ darśanam napunarasyēti
bhrānti nirākaraṇārtham āha Pratyaksha iti |

From these references in Indian Literature that I have been able to collect, it comes out clearly that Upavarsha is the most quoted author in regard to the commentary on both Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā. He is referred to even by the name Kṛtakōṭi itself, sometimes with the particle *kavi* (meaning writer), sometimes without. In deciding the question whether Upavarsha and the Vṛttikāra are the same, it is almost clear from the references given by Professor Keith himself that the two have to be regarded as distinct.¹ The Prapanchahṛdaya

¹ *Karva Mīmāṃsā* by Keith, pp. 7, 8.

* It is, therefore, not improbable that he is also in error in finding any reference to the Vijñānavāda, for the passage seems to deal with one topic only, and that the Śūnyavāda. It follows, accordingly, that the date of the Vṛttikāra was probably not later than the fourth century A.D. since, had he lived later, he would hardly have omitted an explicit discussion of the tenets of the idealistic school of Buddhism.

* The name of the Vṛttikāra is uncertain. The conjecture that he was Bhavadāsa mentioned in one place by Kumārila, may be dismissed as wholly without support. The current opinion makes him to be Upavarsha, who we know from Śaṅkara (*Vedānta Sūtra*, iii. 3. 53) wrote on both the texts. To this the objection has been brought that in the passage cited from the Vṛttikāra by Śābarasūtrīn there is a reference to Upavarsha with the epithet Bhagavat, implying that he was in the eyes of the Vṛttikāra an author of venerable authority. It is probable, however, that the citation from the Vṛttikāra is only a résumé not a verbatim quotation, and that Śābarasūtrīn is responsible for the reference to Upavarsha, the Vṛttikāra's proper name, and for this view support may be derived from the mode in which the Vṛttikāra and Upavarsha are referred to by Kumārila elsewhere (ii. 3, 15). If this view is rejected, it is possible that he is Bodhāyana, who certainly wrote on the Vedānta Sūtra, but this theory is a bare and unnecessary conjecture, seeing that Bodhāyana nowhere else appears as a Mīmāṃsā authority. Of other presumably early commentators we hear of Bhartrmīra and Harī, but there is no reason to identify either of these with the Vṛttikāra.

* The extract from the Vṛttikāra proves that an important addition has been made to the teaching of the Mīmāṃsā in the shape of the introduction of discussions of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms.*

statement is indubitably clear that Upavarsha's services consisted in merely abridging the commentary Kṛtakōṭī, and therefore the author of the Kṛtakōṭī must be different from him. The point of importance for us is whether the Kṛtakōṭī under reference is the Kṛtakōṭīkavi-Upavarsha or Bodhāyana, who was actually the author of the original work Kṛtakōṭī on both the sections of the Mīmāṃsā, Pūrva and Uttara. The fact that the Maṇimēkhalai places Kṛtakōṭī on a footing with the authors of the Mīmāṃsā, Vēdavyāsa and Jaimini, and the importance that it attaches to his position as one formulating eight *pramāṇyas* as against the ten of Vēdavyāsa, and the six of Jaimini, it would be fairer to regard him as Bodhāyana rather than Upavarsha. From the extract quoted above from Sucharitamīśra's Kāśīka, Kṛtakōṭī came after Vyāsa Pārāśarya in point of time, and was Vyāsa's follower in point of teaching. Whether it be the one or the other, the Maṇimēkhalai knows of the Mīmāṃsā only as a single system and it does not know of it as two separate systems, as it had come to be recognized later.

One point before passing out of this discussion, and that is, that the six systems, as current at the time, are recited in the Maṇimēkhalai as Lōkāyata, Bauddha, Sāṅkya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśēshika and Mīmāṃsā. There are several points to note in regard to this list of six. The orthodox systems accepted now-a-days consist of three pairs; Vaiśēshika and Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and Yōga, and the two Mīmāṃsās, Pūrva and Uttara. These are the accepted *Vaidika* systems. The Maṇimēkhalai recital differs in the following particulars. Mīmāṃsā is still treated as one; that means that the work must have been composed at a time when the Kṛtakōṭī and the Upavarsha commentaries were holding the field, and the division of

Dēvasvāmin had not come into existence. The Mañimēkhalai includes Lōkāyatam and Bauddham among the *Vaidika* systems. It has not treated of Lōkāyata in this chapter unless we take Lōkāyata and Bhūtavāda as synonymous as indicated in the text, the latter including the former. It would seem strange that the Bauddha religion should be included among the systems to which the *Vaidika pramāṇyas* applied.¹ But it is so stated here. The various systems quoted in a commentary on the Vigñānamātra Śāstra later than Aśvagosha's time² show a certain similarity to the recital in the Mañimēkhalai, and perhaps they are both of them referable to about the same time.

One other significant feature is that the *Yoga* system as such is not in reference in the chapter at all. Sāṅkhya is treated by itself, and without any association with

¹ According to Mahāmahōpādhyāya Haraprasad Śāstri all early Buddhists from Buddha to Vasubandhu were indebted to Akṣhapāda for their *pramāṇyas*, or instruments of right knowledge.

² It is not precisely known how many philosophical schools, called *śrīśāktas* by Buddhists, were flourishing just at the time of Aśvagosha. The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* and the *Vimala Kīrtiśāstra Sūtra* mention six of them which were existing at the time of the Buddha, (1) Pūrāṇa Kaśyapa, (2) Mākarīṇ Gosāilputra, (3) Saṅjaya Vātsīputra, (4) Ajita Keśakambāja, (5) Kakudhā Kātyāyana, (6) Nirgrānta Jñātiputra. In a commentary on the *Vijñānamātra Śāstra* however, which is a later production than this discourse, twelve different *śrīśākta* schools are enumerated. They are (1) the Sāṅkhya school, (2) the Vaiśeṣika school, (3) the school which believes in Mahēśvara as the creator, (4) the school which believed in Mahābrahman as the creator, (5) the school which maintains that Time is the creator, (6) the school which maintains that Space is the creator, (7) the school which maintains that Water is the creator, (8) the school which says that the world exists by itself, (9) the school which says that the creation comes from the quarters, (10) the school which maintains that the Ego is the principle of existence, (11) the school which maintains the immortality of articulate sounds, i.e., the Nīmāṅka school, (12) the Lōkāyata school, an Indian Materialism. For further references see Dr. Buryo Inouye's *Gedo Yatsugata* (Philosophical systems of the *śrīśāktas* 1887, Tokyo, Japan). (Aśvagosha's Awakening of the Faith, p. 110, Note 2.)

Yoga, as in the orthodox acceptation of the six systems. Professor Jacobi was inclined to take it that among the various Sūtra¹ systems the *Yoga* system of Patanjali is the latest and refers the system to about the fifth century. That seems supported by the fact that the *Yoga* system finds no mention in the treatment of the heretical systems in Mañimēkhalai. Professor Jacobi also held that the Sāṅkhya system was comparatively late, the contrary seems inferable from the recital in the Mañimēkhalai. Hence chapter xxvii of the Mañimēkhalai is of the greatest importance to the history of Indian culture, Sanskritic as well as Dravidian, and an attempt at arriving at an approximately correct age for the classic is not a mere fad of the student of research but is of the utmost importance to any correct understanding of the character of Indian development as a whole.

Chapter xxix introduces us to the Buddhist system of thought though not to the actual teaching of Buddhism itself. Like the sister systems, this has also its own particular method of enquiry into the validity of knowledge and the actual means of attaining to valid knowledge. It is therefore essential to a correct understanding of the actual teaching of Buddhism that prevailed at the time that a preliminary enquiry should be made into knowledge and the means of attaining to that knowledge by a logically valid method. Chapter xxix of the Mañimēkhalai therefore presents us with a treatise on Buddhist logic as taught in the schools of Buddhism at Kānchi or more generally in the Tamil country. It would, therefore, be very useful if we could understand the treatise as a whole first and then compare it with treatises of other authors, otherwise known to us, if

¹ *J. A. O. S.* 1911, pp. 1-20.

possible of the same locality, or of systems that prevailed in the near vicinity. Luckily for us we have some knowledge of a well-known propounder of Buddhism who hailed from Kānchi, but controverting all over India, and who had left behind treatises on the subject, which though considered, till within very recent times, to have been entirely lost to India, have been preserved in Tibet and China in correct and complete translations. Quite recently one or two of these have been discovered in manuscript in India itself and are likely to be made available in a complete form soon.

The chapter begins with the statement that the recognized teacher of Buddhism is Jinendra which is another name for Buddha, and this name should not be confounded with Jina Vardhamāna or Mahāvira, the founder of Jainism. According to this teacher the accepted *pramāṇas* are only two, *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*. It is generally assumed that the Buddhists always recognized only two *pramāṇas* which, on the face of it, seems a very unlikely position.¹ A certain number of *pramāṇas* must have been enunciated and applied, and each system, Buddhism among them, must have examined these, and recognized only those that seemed valid by a method of inclusion or by that of rejection. It will be clear from the Mañimēkhalai that the other four *pramāṇas* were also current at the time which were alike applicable to Buddhism;² and of these six, Buddhist teachers actually

¹ Pratyakṣam Kalpanāpodam
Nāma Jātyādyasamyutam.

² Mah. Pandit Haraprasad Śāstri, *J. B. and O. R. S.*, vol. viii, p. 23.

³ For we know distinctly from Chinese and Japanese sources that *Analogy* and *Authority* were great polemical instruments in the hands of the early Buddhists, i.e., all early Buddhists from Buddha to Vasubandhu were indebted to Akṣhapāda for their *pramāṇas* or polemical instruments of right knowledge. Mātṛeya discarded *Analogy*, and Dignāga discarded *Authority*, and made Nyāya pure logic, in the English sense of the term.

selected two by the method of inclusion. Pratyaksha (Sūttuparvu) is defined 'they say Sūttuparvu is Pratyaksha, and leave out of consideration *Nāma, Jāti, Guṇa and Kriyā*, name, class, quality, and action as these could be included in *Anumāna*.'¹ Dignāga defined it in his *Pramāṇa Samuccaya*, as that which is free from illusory experience, and unconnected with name, genus, etc.²

Anumāna is said in the work to be of three kinds: *Kāraṇa, Kārya* and *Sāmānya*, following the other schools of Hindu thought. It is also described as liable to error. But one of these *Kārya anumāna* is stated to be unerring. So far the Mañimēkhalai. Dignāga regards *Anumāna* as of two kinds: (1) *Svārtha*, for one's own knowledge; (2) *Parārtha*, for the purpose of convincing others.³ Dignāga comes round, after an analysis, to the opinion that the second is really included in the first as there could be no effort at convincing others without being convinced oneself. Mañimēkhalai deals with only the first part, convincing oneself, without any reference whatsoever to the second. According to Dignāga, *Anumāna* is defined as 'the understanding of the meaning by a reason' almost exactly the *kārya-anumāna* of the Mañimēkhalai: Pratyaksham Kalpanāpoḍam, Anumānam lingāt Arthadarśanam.³ The Mañimēkhalai states generally that the other *pramāṇas*, obviously those referred to as six at the end of *Pramāṇavāda* of book xxvii, are capable of inclusion in *Anumāna*. 'All the remaining *pramāṇas* being capable of inclusion in *Anumāna* may be regarded as such.' Dignāga on the contrary considers

¹ Book xxvii. 11. 83-85.

Real perception, inference, authority, analogy, presumption and absence, these and these alone are the *pramāṇas* now current. For *real* the term used is 'they'—true, that is, free from error—'Kalpanāpoḍam.'

² *Pras. Sam.*

³ *Nyāya Pravēśa.*

two other *pramāṇas* only, namely, *Upamāna* and *Sādhā*, of the four *pramāṇas* according to the logicians, particularly, Vātsyāyana, and rejects both as not valid treating each separately. This means that Dignāga is criticizing Vātsyāyana, while the Mañimēkhalai belongs to a period when Vātsyāyana's teaching had not come into vogue.

Then the other instruments of knowledge, according to the Mañimēkhalai, are *Pakṣa*, *Hētu*, *Driṣṭānta*, *Upanaya* and *Nigamana*. The work proceeds to define each and illustrates it by examples. These are obviously the five limbs (*avayava*) of a syllogism as accepted by the Naiyāyikas of the Brahmanical systems. The five names according to them are *Pratigñā*, *Hētu*, *Udāharana*, *Upanaya*, *Nigamana*. It will be seen that only the names of one and three differ from the Mañimēkhalai recital, in the sense of using different words, synonymous though they are. After dealing with the first three elaborately, defining and illustrating, the Mañimēkhalai comes to the conclusion that the connected *Upanaya* and *Nigamana* may both be included in *Driṣṭānta*, and as such, are not considered separately. Then the work proceeds to consider the good and the bad applications of the three *Pakṣa*, *Hētu*, and *Driṣṭānta*.

Dignāga, on the contrary, starts with the statement 'demonstration and refutation together with their fallacies are useful in arguing with others, and perception and inference together with their fallacies are useful for self-understanding. Seeing these I compiled the Śāstra' (Introduction to the Nyāyapravēśa). He proceeds to state clearly that *Pakṣa*, *Hētu* and *Driṣṭānta* are the three limbs of a syllogism, and it is by means of these that knowledge is imparted clearly to a questioner who does not understand it already, and enforces the position by the following statement: 'That these three are there-

fore generally spoken of as the three limbs of a syllogism.¹ Nyāyapravēśa is quoted in a very recently published work *Tattvasaṅgraha* in the Gaikwad's Oriental Series. It is worth observing in regard to this that the Maṇimēkhalai considers the five limbs and states that the last two can be included in the third, while the Nyāyapravēśa apparently does not find it necessary to consider the last two at all. The current opinion is that Dignāga was the logician who reduced the five-limbed syllogism of Gautama and Vātsyāyana to one of three limbs only, thus giving it the form of an Aristotelian syllogism. 'The most important service Dignāga did was by reducing the five members of a syllogism as propounded by Akshapāda and Vātsyāyana to three, thereby giving it a form more similar to the Aristotelian Syllogism of three members.'¹ He is also believed to be the first author to have proved the invalidity of *Upamāna* and *Śabda* as proofs, while the Maṇimēkhalai merely states that the two may be included in the third without in any way asserting their invalidity. This point of difference between the two should also be noted.

A *pakṣa* is valid when it contains a minor term explicitly stated and a major term also similarly stated, and a statement that the predicate will actually differ in other application, as for example, the statement that sound is non-eternal. In this the *dharma* or predicate is either eternal or non-eternal. The *hētu* or *liṅga* or *sādhana* is the connecting term, the middle term of modern logic, which appears in three forms; either it is attributed to the subject, or it is ascribed to an example by analogy, or it is denied to the contrary. *Sapakṣa* or homogeneous statement is that which is contained in a general statement giving to another subject a predicate

¹ *Tattvasaṅgraha*, vol. I. Introd., pp. lxviii-lxiv.

which is the same as that of the *paksha* itself. If the character of being non-eternal should be ascribed to *śabdar*, the *sapaksha* would be like the pot, etc., which are also non-eternal. To state that which is contrary, as, whatever is not non-eternal is not a product like ether (*ākāśa*), the capacity of being made and of appearing as a product are features which are found in the *paksha* as well as in the *sapaksha*, but are not found in the *vipaksha*. These constitute the *hētu* or the reason for the character of being non-eternal.

This is what is expounded almost in the same terms in the *Nyāyapravēśa*; *lingasyatraitrūpyam*, the middle term must possess three characteristics, namely, (1) the whole of the minor term, *Paksha*, must be connected with the middle term as in the example.

Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a product like a pot,

But unlike ether (*ākāśa*).

In this, product, which is the middle term, contains the whole of sound, which is the minor term. (2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, as in the example, all things produced are non-eternal, as a pot. (3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, as in the example, nothing that is not non-eternal is a product as ether.

Valid *drishṭānta* is of two kinds, either homogeneous (*sādharmya*) or heterogeneous (*vaidharmya*). That which is homogeneous is where there is similarity of character, there is also a similarity of attribute, e.g. non-eternal like a pot where the example is similar to the pot. An example is heterogeneous as where the predicate does not exist, the reason also does not exist.

Similarly the three, *Paksha*, *Hētu* and *Drishyānta* could be fallacious. These are respectively called *Pakkappōli*, that which looks like a *paksha*; *Hētuppōli*, that which looks like *hētu*; and *Drishyāntuppōli* that which looks like *Drishyānta*.

Of these *Pakkappōli* (fallacious thesis) is of nine kinds: (1) a thesis incompatible with *Pratyaksha* or direct perception; (2) a thesis (*paksha*) incompatible with inference (*anumāna*); (3) a thesis incompatible with one's own statement (*Svavachana-viruddham* in the text, obviously for *Svavachana*); (4) a thesis incompatible with what is generally accepted as true (*Lōka-viruddham*) (5) a thesis incompatible with accepted tradition, (*Āgamaviruddham*); (6) a thesis with an unfamiliar attribute or predicate or a major term (*Aprasiddha-vēśeshaya*); (7) a thesis with an unfamiliar minor term (*Aprasiddha-anēśeshyam*); (8) a thesis with an unfamiliar major and minor term (*Aprasiddha-ubhayam*); (9) and a thesis already accepted by one but unacceptable to the opponent (*Aprasiddha-sambandham*). Of these the first is incompatible with what is directly perceived as when it is said that sound is not audible to the ear. *Anumāna-viruddham* is contradictory to inference as in saying that a pot is eternal when it is known to be non-eternal being a product. The third thesis is contradicting one's own statement as when one asserts the barrenness of his own mother. The fourth *Lokaviruddham* is incompatibility with what is recognized by all, as when seeing the moon one says that it is not the moon, (5) *Āgamaviruddham* is when it goes against the accepted authoritative book of one's own faith, as when a *Vaiśēshika*, who believes in the non-eternality of things, ascribes the character of being eternal to that which according to him is non-eternal. (6) *Aprasiddha-vēśeshaya* is that which is

incompatible with the predicate of the opponent, as when a Bauddha tells a Sāṅkhya that sound is destructible not knowing that he is a believer in the non-destructibility of sound. (7) *Aprasiddha-viśēshya* is where the subject or the minor term is unfamiliar to the opponent as when a Sāṅkhya addressing a Bauddha states that the soul is capable of animation, the Bauddha being one who does not believe in the existence of a soul, the statement proves to be incompatible with his own conviction. (8) *Aprasiddha-abhaya* consists in both the minor term and the major term being incompatible as when a Vaiśēshika addressing a Bauddha asserts that for happiness and all that is associated with it, the cause is the soul;—the Bauddha not believing in soul, nor accepting any connection with it of happiness, neither of them is compatible with his position. Lastly (9) *Aprasiddha sambandham* consists in the assertion of what is the actual conviction of the opponent, as when to a Bauddha it is put that sound is non-eternal, the Bauddha believing that it is non-eternal, it is superfluous to prove it to him.

Śāttan similarly takes up the fallacious *leṭiu* or the fallacious middle term, and states that they are of three kinds: (1) *Asiddham* or unproved, (2) *Anaikāntikam* or uncertain, (3) *Viruddham* or contradictory. Then he shows that the first is of four kinds: (1) *Ubhayāsiddham*, (2) *Anyathāsiddham*, (3) *Siddhāsiddham* and (4) *Āśrayāsiddham*. Similarly, the second is of six kinds: (1) *Sādāraṇam*, (2) *Asādāraṇam*, (3) *Sapakkaikadēśaviruddha-Vipakḥavyāpi*, (4) *Vipakkaikadēśaviruddha-Sapakḥavyāpi*, (5) *Upaiyikadēśaviruddhi*, and (6) *Viruddha-Vyabhichāri*.

The third, *Viruddham*, is similarly of four kinds: (1) Where in the statement of the *Paksha* or *dharma*, the major term is contradictory to the *Sādhana* or the

middle term, (2) where the *Dharmaviśēṣha* or the attribute or the predicate implied in the major term is contradictory to the middle term *Sādhana*, (3) where the form of the minor term is contradictory to the *Sādhana* or the middle term, and (4) when the predicate implied in the minor term is contradictory to the *Sādhana* or the middle term. These are similarly illustrated as in the others.

Then he passes on to the fallacious example, *Drishṭānta ābhāsa*. He divides the *Drishṭānta* into two:— (1) homogeneous, and (2) heterogeneous. Of these the former falls into five parts:—

- (1) *Sādhana*dharma^{vikālam} or imperfect middle.
- (2) *Sādhyā*dharma^{vikālam} or defective major term.
- (3) *Ubhaya*dharma^{vikālam} or defective major and middle.
- (4) *Ananvayam* or non-concomitance and
- (5) *Viparīta-anvayam* or contrary concomitance.

The latter or heterogeneous example is similarly of five kinds:—

- (1) *Sādhyā-avyāvṛtti* (not heterogeneous from the opposite of major term).
- (2) *Sādhana-avyāvṛtti* (not heterogeneous from the opposite of middle term).
- (3) *Ubhaya-avyāvṛtti* (heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term).
- (4) *Avyatirēka* (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term).
- (5) *Viparītavyatirēka* (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of an inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term).

These again are fully explained and illustrated, the

definitions and illustrations alike being almost identifiable with what is given in the *Nyāyapravēśa* of Dignāga.

Having thus explained the whole position, the author concluded ' in the manner expounded above, understand clearly the fallacious character of the inference that is produced by the fallacious character of the reasoning. Thus distinguishing truth and falsehood by the method taught above, understand without doubt and on due consideration what is truth. This seems on the face of it, merely to be an exhortation to the pupil to understand the truth, and thus must be held to invalidate the inference that, since the exposition has taken the form of syllogistic argument, it is intended to carry conviction to others rather than to convince oneself. The fact of an argument being thrown into a syllogistic form need not necessarily involve the obligation that the argument is intended to convince others. It may be thrown into that syllogistic form for convincing oneself, irrespective of any consideration to argue and convince others. The discussion of syllogism and syllogistic form notwithstanding, the explicit statement of the author seems to imply that he was primarily concerned that each individual must so examine the arguments to convince himself. As such, the chapter seems to involve no more than the *Svārtha* form of inference of Dignāga, and has nothing whatever to do with the *Parārtha* form of inference that Dignāga for some reason had to consider and conclude that it is already involved in the *Svārtha*.

Taking a complete view of the chapter in comparison with such knowledge as we have of the works of Dignāga on logic, it seems clearly arguable that the Buddhist saint *Arvaṇa Aḍigaḷ* who taught in the Tamil

country and in Kānchī in the latter days of his life, taught the logic that ultimately found its most illustrious exponent in Dignāga. It may be possible to argue that Aravaṇa Adigaḷ in chapter xxix of the *Mañimēkhalai* is merely expounding the logic taught by Dignāga and therefore followed him in point of time. If we had no valid reason against this, the chapter is certainly open to that inference, although, as I have pointed out above, there are points in it which would seem clearly a transition from the school of Akshapāda (and Vatsyāyana) to that of Dignāga, and apart from the valid evidence going against this inference, there is enough in the system of logic expounded in chapter xxix to justify the inference that Dignāga belonged to this school, and ultimately codified the teaching in the form in which he has given it out to the world.

It must be remembered that Dignāga was a native of Kānchī. Even if he was not born there he lived there for a considerable length of time in the early stages of his life. He went afterwards to northern India to learn from Vasubandhu who was long resident in Ayodhya. Dignāga is actually said to have gone there in the Tibetan sources of his life, but we are not told what exactly he learnt from Vasubandhu. It is not likely that he went to Vasubandhu to learn logic. From Vasubandhu he learnt perhaps the Yogāchāra Philosophy of Buddhism to which there is no reference in chapter xxx of *Mañimēkhalai*. He went from Vasubandhu to Nālanda, and therefrom he proceeded on a controversial tour and ultimately went to Kānchī to settle down as a teacher there though according to one account he died in Orissa. Vasubandhu's time must now be taken to be contemporary with the reign of Samudragupta and Chandragupta, his son, and Dignāga could not be far

removed from him. A.D. 400 would be the ultimate downward limit for him, and the school of logic in Kānchi representing the teachings of Araya Aḍigaḷ in the poem must have had anterior existence. Other considerations of a historical character, and even the cultural details contained in the Brahmanical sections of the book, seem to indicate a period considerably anterior to Dignāga as the period of the work. Hence the conclusion seems borne in upon us that the Manimēkhalai represents a school of logic from which Dignāga sprang, not a school of logic which expounded Dignāga's teaching.

Book xxx of the Manimēkhalai takes the form of the teaching of the essentials of Buddhism such as it was understood to be by the author Sāttan, or such as was prevalent in the Tamil country at the time. It begins with laying down, as a necessary preparation for it, that one should be prepared to make gifts freely to worthy people and adopt a conduct of righteousness in life, thus exhibiting in practice the two qualities of Dhāna and Sīla, the first two of the ten Buddhist perfections (Pāramitas). Then the novice should put himself unreservedly under the direction of the three jewels by a frank declaration of such resignation into dependence upon the three jewels Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Thus Araya Aḍigaḷ began his teaching with how the Buddha came into the world and how he attained to enlightenment, and begins to expound the discovery that he made of the 'Four Truths,' suffering, origin of suffering, cessation of suffering, and the way to bring about cessation of suffering, a truth which according to this teacher had been taught by a succession of venerable Buddhas before. The realization of these 'Four Truths' could only be

achieved by overcoming the chain of causes and conditions incorporated in the twelve *nidānas*. These twelve are so related to each other as cause and effect that the cessation of the one necessarily brings about the cessation of the following. We are told that these may be regarded in the relation of subjects and of attributes as the attributes could not exist if the subjects themselves cease to exist. These *nidānas* are then expounded fully, and each one of these is actually explained in the way both the Northern and the Southern schools of Buddhism actually do. The exposition seems actually to follow closely that of the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. Ignorance is explained as the chief cause of it all. It consists in a want of capacity in oneself to perceive truth, and in the capacity for deluding oneself in believing that which could not be perceived, on the authority of others. The ultimate result of this leads to a cycle of births in the six different worlds of beings, of which the first three are respectively, Dēva, Brahma, and the human; the next three, animal life, the spirit world and the nether world itself. Good deeds take one to birth in the first three, and evil deeds to that in the following three. Removal of ignorance therefore would remove all else as of consequence. These twelve *nidānas* are divided into four sections with three joints as in the Sarvāstivādin Karma phenomenology. These again are divided into past, present and future. 'Desire, attachment and ignorance, these and the birth resulting therefrom, constitute action in the present and cause future birth. Consciousness, name and form, organs of sense, contact, sensation, birth, age, disease and death, these are consequential experiences in life, both present and future. These are full of evil, of deeds, and of consequences resulting from these deeds, and thus constitute suffering.'

As such these are regarded as impermanent, coming thus to the first cardinal statement of Buddha's teaching, 'Everything is impermanent', '*sarvam anityam*'. Results from this suffering are said to be becoming, when one understands that there is nothing like a soul in anything existing. This brings us to the second cardinal principle of Buddhism, 'Everything is without a soul', '*sarvam anātmakam*'. 'Consciousness, name and form, the organs of sense, contact, sensation, birth, disease, age and death, with the resulting anxiety and helplessness, these constitute disease and suffering. The causes of these are ignorance, action, desire, attachment and the collection of deeds.' It is this attachment that brings about suffering and death. If this attachment should be given up, it brings about cessation of birth, and bliss 'Nirvāṇam alone is blissful peace', '*Nirvāṇam evaśāntam*'. Thus are expounded the 'Four Truths'.

One statement in the course of this deserves closer attention, that is, the statement that in anything existent, there is nothing like a soul. It is as a general statement the same as '*sarvam anātmakam*', but somewhat narrower in its application as it is actually stated in this context as well as in a passage following near the end of the chapter.¹ Here the statement '*anātmakam*' seems to imply the negation of individual souls in things existing, and not in its further development of a common soul which is believed to be a refinement introduced by Harivarṇa (A.D. cir. 250), the chief disciple of Kumāralabdha, the founder of the Sātyasiddhī school.

Then follows the question of theological method, and then an exposition of the five *śāndhas*. The

¹ 11. 177-254.

skandhas and their manifestations, it is taught, are caused by desire, anger and illusion, and could be got rid of by getting rid of these three. Each one of these is to be examined separately, its real nature understood and adhesion to it got rid of. An examination would thus show that everything is impermanent, full of suffering, without a soul and unclean. By so understanding it, desire must be given up. The best attitude of mind is attained in the realization of friendliness to all living beings, kindness to creatures, and joy at the well-being of all, and these must therefore be cultivated. Illusion is got rid of by hearing '*Śruti*'; by mentation, *Chetana*; experiencing in mind—*Bhāvana*; realizing in vision—*Darśana*. By practising these steadily one can get rid of darkness of mind. Mañimēkhalai is then said to have agreed to doing so and set up as an ascetic *tāpasi*, which put her on the highroad to *Nirvāṇa*.

In this chapter, Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ follows the main lines of *karma* phenomenology as taught in the school of the Sarvāstivādins and what South Indian Tamilians describe as the teaching of the school of the Sautrāntikas. There is no hint of any element of the teaching of the school of the Vigānavādin in it of which Dignāga was a shining exponent and even other teachers from Kānchi down to the days of Dharmapāla were distinctly exponents of that school. As was pointed out already, there is nothing that could be regarded as a reference to the Śūnyavāda and the Mādhyamika school; nor even of the characteristic teachings of the Sātyasiddhī school, a transition as it were between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna in the doctrine of *anātma* that is actually referred to here. This again seems to give us a clear indication that the time of Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ, or the author Śāttan, could not be referred to a

time when the most distinguished teacher in Kānchī was a shining light of the Vigānavāda school. It must, however, be noted here that, according to Hsuen-Tsang, the prevalent form of Buddhism in Kānchī was the Sthaviravāda.

There is yet another school associated intimately with Kānchī to which reference may be made here. The Chinese know of a school of Buddhism called the Dhyāna School which seems to have had a continuous existence in China since the days of its introduction in the sixth century to the present time. This is called in Japanese Yen-shu. This was introduced into China by an Indian priest called Bodhidharma. 'He was the third son of a king of Kānchī in South India. He came to China in A.D. 527.' 'This school does not cling for support to any particular portion of the Tṛpitaka, but rather takes up whatever is excellent in the various portions of the sacred canon, not without subjecting it to a critical examination. The Dhyāna school moreover believes that the human tongue is too weak to give expression to the highest truths. As a natural consequence of such a belief, its adherents disclaim attachment to Sacred Books as their final authority. But nevertheless they respect the canon regarding it as an efficient instrument conducing to the attainment of enlightenment.' There is no indication of anything like this teaching in the Buddhism of Maṇimēkhalai. If Bodhidharma went to China in A.D. 527, his teaching must have been fairly well known about A.D. 500. Perhaps this may give a slight indication that the teaching of Aṣavaṇa Aḍigaḷ must have been earlier than A.D. 500.

It may be stated in conclusion that the teaching of Buddhism as embodied in Book xxx is enforced by Sāttan at least in three other places in the course of the

work. He puts it once in the mouth of Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ himself in Book xxiv where he taught it to the queen; he puts it into the mouth of the spirit of 'the statue in the pillar' in Book xxi, and he puts it again into the mouth of the image of Kappaki addressing Maṇimēkhalai as on the previous occasion. In all this it is the same teaching that is given detail for detail. That the teaching followed was that of the Sautrāntika is in clear evidence where Kappaki is made to tell Maṇimēkhalai, 'having learnt in this old city the wise teaching of those that profess the various religions, and after feeling convinced that they do not expound the path of truth, you will then accept "the path of the Piṭakas of the Great One", and follow it without transgression.' This makes it as clear as it is possible to expect in the circumstances, that the teaching of Buddhism embodied in the Maṇimēkhalai is the Sautrāntika form of Buddhism, and by no means the Viḡṇānavāda with which the names of Dignāga and the succession of his pupils down to Dharmapāla are intimately associated.

V

EXAMINATION OF OTHER VIEWS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS OF MAṆIMĒKHALAI

THE foregoing account of Books xxvii, xxix and xxx of the Maṇimēkhalai follows faithfully the text of the work, but the exposition of it is entirely my own. It would have become obvious to the reader who has perused the whole of it with any care, that perhaps other views than those expounded above can possibly be urged and other conclusions drawn with very considerable justification. It may be as well that those other lines are

considered and my reasons for taking *the* line that I have taken indicated as a necessary supplement to my exposition of the subject. In regard to this part of the subject, I have had the great advantage of discussion with a scholar of the eminence of Professor Jacobi of Bonn who did me the kindness to look through the manuscript portion relating to the translation of these books and the whole of my exposition thereof. As his criticism is quite typical of the views possible, I set them forth, as far as may be, in his own words, with a running commentary of my own as perhaps the best way of explaining the position.

The first point to call for attention relates to the remarks of the learned Professor regarding Kṛtakōṭi. Kṛtakōṭi, it will be remembered, is a name which occurs in the Maṇimēkhalai along with those of Vēdavyāsa and Jaimini among those who were regarded as authoritative expounders of *Vaidika Pramāṇyas* (instruments of knowledge resting upon the Vēda for their authority). Professor Jacobi writes in his letter dated the 28th April 1927 :—

‘Your explanation of Kṛtakōṭi as the name of the first commentary on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras is of great importance. The vexed question about Bodhāyana and Upavarśka is brought nearer its solution by your discovery. In connection with it I may be allowed to make the following remarks :

(1) The Vṛttikāra cannot be equated with Kṛtakōṭi, if the report of the Maṇimēkhalai may be trusted. For Kṛtakōṭi taught eight *pramāṇyas*, and the Vṛttikāra but six ; see Śābarasvāmīn’s quotation from him ad. I, 1, 5 (p. 10, *B&M*. Ind. Ed.)

(2) Vēdavyāsa in connection with the *pramāṇyas* cannot be Bādarāyana, since no school of the Vēdāntins is known to have admitted ten *pramāṇyas*, but some acknowledged three, some six. (In the Sūtras of either Mīmāṃsā occur only the three original *pramāṇyas*, as acknowledged by Sāṅkhya. In the Vēdānta Sūtras *avāśpatti* does not occur, in the

Mīmāṃsā Sūtra ; it does occur twice or thrice but the word there denotes something quite different, in no way connected with the *pramāṇa arthapatti*). Perhaps Vēdayāsa should be taken to be the author of the Purāpas, though the Paurānikas acknowledge eight *pramāṇas* according to the usual tradition.

We shall consider the points in this extract seriatim. Kṛtakōṭī is the name of a person according to the Maṇimēkhalai. But what is said of Kṛtakōṭī in the Prapanchahr̥daya passage quoted *in extenso* shows Kṛtakōṭī to be the name of the commentary from which the author must have been subsequently named Kṛtakōṭī. The very formation of the word seems to indicate it as a personal title, though, according to our authority, it is unmistakably the name of the work. The Prapanchahr̥daya passage quoted makes it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that Kṛtakōṭī is the author of the commentary as a whole, and Upavarsha was the expounder of that commentary who, for convenience of teaching and reading, felt it necessary to make an abridged edition of it. That is the position according to this Sanskrit work. But the point to which the professor takes exception is whether Kṛtakōṭī can be identified with the Vṛttikāra as I have taken it in my exposition. The commentators quote largely a commentary as the work of a Vṛttikāra. They do not, in the great majority of cases, give any other name than that of Vṛttikāra. But the Prapanchahr̥daya clearly states that it was Bodhāyana that wrote the commentary Kṛtakōṭī, and that Upavarsha's work was no more than an abridgement. So where it is quoted as distinct from Upavarsha, sometimes in juxtaposition, the possibility seems to be that Bodhāyana is quoted under the name Vṛttikāra as the Śrī Bhāshya of Rāmānuja refers to Bodhāyana Vṛtti as an authoritative work 'following the

text of which closely he writes his own commentary on the Brahma Sūtras ' or Uttara Mīmāṃsā. The Prapanchahy-daya makes the statement clear that Bodhāyana wrote the commentary on the whole of the Mīmāṃsā, Pūrva and Uttara, and Uṇṇavarsha's abridgment similarly takes into it both the sections of the Mīmāṃsā. But Professor Jacobi's point of objection is that the Vṛttikāra formulated eight *pramāṇas* according to the Mañimēkhalai. If Kṛtakōṭi should be taken to be the Vṛttikāra, the eight *pramāṇas* are nowhere mentioned in Vēdānta works as formulated by him. He takes the six *pramāṇas* clearly stated in the commentary on Sūtra I. 1.5 of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in Śābara's commentary to be a quotation from the Vṛttikāra. My point against this is that the position seems to be supported indirectly by what Professor Keith has to say of the quotation from the Vṛttikāra in this commentary, that the six are the *pramāṇas* accepted by the commentator as the *pramāṇas* of the Sūtrakāra, that is Jaimini. As against this, the Professor points out in a later letter dated the 12th July, 1927.

' You say that the six *pramāṇas*, mentioned first in the extract from the old Vṛttikāra, were those formulated by Jaimini, the Sūtrakāra himself. But by the evidence of the Sūtras their author knew only the first three *pramāṇas* and no more.'

I must admit I had overlooked this point. But then the point admits of an explanation. In that particular chapter, Jaimini is apparently considering the *pramāṇas* generally admitted as such by other Śāstrakāras, it may be the Naiyāyikas and others, and of these, for the purposes of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, the first part of it in particular, he rejects the first three as of no validity and accepts the fourth, Śabda alone, as of valid authority. That position of the Sūtrakāra does not appear to me to

be necessarily inconsistent with Jaimini's regarding six as valid *pramāṇas* generally from the point of view of the systems of the followers of the Veda as a whole. This is confirmed by the Prapanchahr̥daya which treats these six as *laukika* (secular). With such a clear statement as is found in the Maṇimēkhalai any other explanation would make the author absurd, and I believe it would be carrying criticism too far to ascribe to an author an absurdity of this gross kind.

In regard to Vēdavyāsa himself, the Professor's point is that no Vēdānta work has accepted ten *pramāṇas* as such. But that is not incompatible with Vēdavyāsa having formulated ten *pramāṇas*.

In the section under consideration, the Maṇimēkhalai deals with the Vaidika *pramāṇas* as such, not those of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra alone. Among those who dealt with the subject of *pramāṇas* generally the work mentions three, Vēdavyāsa formulating ten *pramāṇas* as valid, Kṛtakōṭi eight and Jaimini six. The formulating of these as generally acceptable, is not incompatible with the position that where particular sciences or Śāstras are taken into consideration, these get reduced, for the purposes of the particular Śāstra, to a smaller number. That seems the only satisfactory way of accounting for the varying numbers of the *pramāṇas* that we find in the different Śāstras. But in regard to Vyāsa himself, the Professor is of opinion that probably he was not Vyāsa Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Sūtras. Indian tradition seems to be uniform in regarding Vēdavyāsa as actually the author of the Brahma Sūtras. No treatise of his on *pramāṇas* has come down to us, but Vēdavyāsa is regarded as a teacher, and it is just possible to believe he taught, as a necessary preliminary Vaidika *pramāṇas* as such, and in the course of that teaching

formulated ten *pramāṇas*. This position seems to find confirmation in the passage quoted from the commentary Kāśīka on the Ślokavārttika where the names of Kṛtakōṭi and Vēdavyāsa are brought into connection. Vēdavyāsa is there indicated by the name Pārāśarya, son of Parāśara, and Kṛtakōṭi is there referred to as one that followed him in point of time and as one that followed him in point of teaching as well, so that Kṛtakōṭi was one that followed the teaching of Pārāśarya Vyāsa coming later in point of time. It seems therefore understandable that, on the general question of the *pramāṇas*, Pārāśarya Vyāsa the teacher held ten such as acceptable, while the comparatively late disciple elected to accept only eight of his teacher's, just as Jaimini, traditionally the pupil of Vyāsa, is said similarly to have accepted only six. The whole position is merely one of classification. While it is possible for one to regard some of these as distinct enough for separate treatment, others may legitimately hold that they are easily capable of inclusion in some of those already considered.

It seems likely there is manuscript warrant for the confusion in the printed texts of the commentary of Śabara on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. The Pāṇini translator in his comment on Sūtra I, 1, 5 of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā translates only six *pramāṇas* as those of the commentator. In his analysis of the first *pāda* of the work that he prefixes to the translation, he recounts eight *pramāṇas* without indicating where exactly he obtained the information from.¹ Is it not possible then that this list of eight is the eight of the Vṛttikāra as quoted by Śabara, and therefore the eight of

¹ A letter of mine asking for the source of this information regarding the eight *pramāṇas*, fetched the reply, to my great regret, that the learned translator died on 16th June, 1927.

Kṛtakōṭi as we find it stated in the Maṇimēkhalai? That there is some little confusion would become clear from the following extracts from Professor Keith's Karma Mīmāṃsā. On page 8, he has :—' The extract from the Vṛttikāra proves that an important addition has been made to the teaching of the Mīmāṃsā in the shape of the introduction of the discussion of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms.' Further down he has 'it is not illegitimate to assume that the Vṛttikāra indulged also in metaphysical discussions'. If the Vṛttikāra held eight *pramāṇyas* as valid and is quoted as such in commentaries, and if the Maṇimēkhalai said Bōdhāyana Kṛtakōṭi formulated eight *pramāṇyas* as such, is there not justification for regarding the two as the same person? The point that the Sūtras actually discuss only four *pramāṇyas* does not materially affect the question as these *pramāṇyas* are *pramāṇyas* of validity for the purpose of Mīmāṃsā Śāstra particularly, while the eight may be held as generally acceptable. The four considered in the Sūtras may be the four generally taken to be those accepted by the Naiyāyikas. That Vēdāntins discuss only the three *pramāṇyas* of the Śāṅkya would mean no more than that the preoccupation of the Vēdānta writers is to consider or controvert the Śāṅkya, at any rate, to consider it as perhaps the most influential system obtaining at the time. Coming to the point that the Vēdavyāsa referred to in the Maṇimēkhalai may be the Paurāṇika Vyāsa, I do not know if there is sufficient justification for distinguishing so many Vyāsas. But it is just possible that the *Paurāṇikamata* follows the teaching of Kṛtakōṭi, who, after all, is described as a follower of Vyāsa in point of conviction. In the work Sarva Siddhānta Sangraha ascribed to Śāṅkarāchārya there is a Vyāsa Siddhānta discussed, but it seems to be a

Siddhānta incorporating the teaching of the Mahābhārata as such. This work, *Sarva Siddhānta Sangraha* may be the work of the great Sankara or no. But it apparently was a work considered of some importance and standing as the Vaishṇava Āchārya Pillai Lokāchārya seems to have considered it as a work of some authority. In any case, there seems to be no room for a decisive negation to the statement in the *Mañimēkhalai* that Vyāsa in his treatment of the Vaidika *pramāṇas* accepted ten *pramāṇas* as of general validity.

While, therefore, we may not be in a position to support by a decisive authority categorically stated of the position indicated in the *Mañimēkhalai*, there seems to be quite enough of circumstantial evidence to support the general position of the *Mañimēkhalai* that Vaidika *pramāṇas* as such received treatment at the hands of three *āchāryas* of high rank, Vyāsa, Kṛtakōṭi, and Jaimini, the *pramāṇas* actually upheld by the three being respectively, ten, eight and six. It further turns out that Kṛtakōṭi was a follower of Vyāsa in point of teaching, which may mean that he was a teacher of the system formulated by Vyāsa, and this involves his exposition of Vyāsa's teaching, which took the form of a commentary, such as the *Prapanchahrdaya* actually indicates it to be, the work Kṛtakōṭi of an author Bōdhāyana. Where Rāmānuja speaks of his following the text of Bōdhāyana's *vṛtti* in his *Śrī Bhaṣya*, the ground for identifying Bōdhāyana with Kṛtakōṭi does not seem to be quite without support.

The next point of the professor's criticism is the relative position of Dignāga and the author of the *Mañimēkhalai*, as their teaching of Buddhist logic is almost identical in point of form. Since the good professor has given me full permission to extract from his letters, I shall

take the liberty of expounding his position by quoting his own words :—

'I now understand what you meant by saying that in the *Maṇimēkhalai* the logical teaching of Dignāga is anticipated. According to your opinion, there was in South India a school of Logicians headed by Aravaṇa Aḍigal where Dignāga learned the system of Logic which later in North India he proclaimed as his own. This is a bold assumption which would require very strong arguments to pass as admissible. A *prima facie* objection, of which you seem not to be unconscious, is the following :—The *Maṇimēkhalai* is a romance the scheme of which is laid in the remote past. The events narrated in it are a fiction of the poet (or his predecessors), and so are the persons figuring in it. Why should Aravaṇa Aḍigal be an exception? Is he, or his school, well attested by Tamil tradition in the Śaṅgama Literature? In many Jaina romances there is introduced some *Yati* who gives an exposition of the law, converts the hero, etc., etc., but nobody has taken these teachers for historical persons. They serve the purpose of the poet to give a sketch of the Jain doctrines, or as the case may be to refute heterodox ones. Similarly Śāttan introduced Aravaṇa Aḍigal as the exponent of what he himself considered to be the essence of Buddhism. As he is no Śāstrin, no professor of Philosophy, but a poet and grain merchant, he naturally had to gather information from different sources. This accounts for the occasional inconsistencies in his 'report,' e.g. 'when first five *Avayavas* are taught (in accordance with Akṣapāda and Vasubandhu) and afterwards the two last *Avayavas* are included in *dyānta* so that only three remain (as taught by Dignāga); or when in chapter xxvii the Buddha system is reckoned among the six systems which are based on the *six pramāṇyas*, and in chapter xxix Buddha is said to have admitted but *two pramāṇyas*.'

In the passage the first point that emerges is the character of the work *Maṇimēkhalai*. *Maṇimēkhalai* is undoubtedly a romantic poem. But I have taken pains to show that it is a romance based on historical occurrences.

It at least seems to have been the traditional opinion of the commentators that, while the treatment of the subject in the work is of the character of a romance, the incidents narrated in it are of the character of historical incidents. This is, to some extent, supported by the fact that the author, who is described undoubtedly as the grain merchant of Madura, was a contemporary of the Chera king, 'Śenguttuvan', in whose court he was a much respected figure. He was the particular friend of the Chera king's younger brother, Iṅgō, the author of Śilappadhikāram, who more than once, in the body of the work, refers to Śāttan as a friend of his brother, the monarch. Śenguttuvan is a character whose deeds are found described in works, whose character as Śāngam works is beyond cavil. The achievements of this monarch are described in identical terms almost, in these two romantic works as well as in a more or less definitely historical poem, the Padiṟupattu, by Paranaṛ, a Śāngam classic by common consent. Whatever opinion we may form of the works themselves, their character must be governed by this consideration that Śāttan and Śenguttuvan were contemporaries.

The next point is, whether Aṟavaṇa Aḍiḷaḷ, the author, gives an exposition of Buddhism and Buddhistic logic in this work exactly in the style of the Jain authors referred to, the Jain celebrities described in the work Prabhāvakacharita. The Professor is undoubtedly right in saying that Śāttan was first and foremost a poet and not perhaps a philosopher or Śāstrin. But if the tradition of the Tamil Land could be believed much true philosophic influence has been inspired to professed teachers and founders of systems from sources far less reputable than that of the grain merchant Śāttan. I have nowhere stated that there was a particular school of logi-

cians, or that Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ was the head of a particular school. All that I meant was there must have been teachers of logic teaching at various centres in the Tamil country. Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ was typical of those teachers and as was usual with these teachers he spent a wandering life here, there, and everywhere, at any rate, in the Tamil country. In the last stage of his life, he was teaching in Kānchī, as he did in a previous stage at Kaveripattinam. He may have anticipated the teaching of Dignāga in the enunciation of two *pramāṇas*, namely that the *pramāṇas* definitely applicable to the teachings of Buddhism are only two, and that the *Avayavas* (members of a syllogism) need be only three. My position that Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ anticipates Dignāga is taken on these two points that at the end of the discussion of Vaidika *pramāṇas* in Book xxvii, he definitely states that six are the current *pramāṇas* applicable to the six recognized systems of the time, and according to him one of the six recognized systems was Buddhism. At the commencement of Book xxix where he treats of Buddhist logic, he treats of the *Pramāṇas*, *Pratyaksha* and *Anumāna*, and winds up with the statement that the other *pramāṇas* are capable of inclusion in the second, i.e., *Anumāna*. In the *Nyāyapravēśa* and the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* of Dignāga, Dignāga solemnly discusses the four *pramāṇas* of the logicians rejecting the last two and accepting the first two. To me it appears that Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ's position marks a transition to what ultimately became Dignāga's teaching. If a man of the reputation of Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ as a teacher taught the system in Kānchī, one may take it that serious students at Kānchī had some knowledge of it, and when one of them of the genius of Dignāga systematized the teaching of Buddhist logic, he might have improved upon it by

making a deliberate investigation of the whole position including that of the most authoritative school of the time, that of the Naiyāyikas, and laid it down that two are the *pramāṇas* and not four, while Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ merely says that there are other *pramāṇas*, but they need not be considered separately, as all of them could be included in the second, the *all of them* here being apparently, the remaining four out of the six. It does not affect our position even if Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ were a mere creation of the poet, as it would then be that Śāttan incorporates in the Mañimēkhalai what was the prevalent notion among Buddhists at Kānchī, or what is perhaps better, in the Tamil country. In regard to the *ananyas* the same transition is indicated almost in the same manner, that is, he discusses the three and leaves the other two as capable of inclusion in the third. That is the reason why I regard it as a transition from the current beliefs of anterior times to the teachings of Dignāga.

The professor follows up his criticism with further remarking,

‘ Though it will probably ever be impossible to ascertain all sources from which Śāttan drew his information which he embodied in theoretical chapters of the Mañimēkhalai, but still it can be done in one case beyond the possibility of doubt. Indeed on a comparison of the exposition of the fallacies of the Mañimēkhalai with the corresponding part in the Nyāyapravēśa it will be seen that the number and order of the fallacies, and as you yourself state, “ their definitions and illustrations alike are almost identical ”. Now the material agreement of two texts amounting practically to identity cannot be set down as a mere chance; it is impossible to expound it in any other way than by assuming that one text is immediately or mediately an abstract of the other; in the case under consideration, it is evident that the author of the Mañimēkhalai, in this part at least, has borrowed from the Nyāyapravēśa of Śānkara-

svāmin, nor can it be assumed that both Śāttan and Śankara borrowed from a common source. For we know that Śankara's source was Dignāga's Nyāyadvāra of which a Chinese translation has been preserved; but he gave a masterly exposition of his teacher's logical system improving however on one point by adding four more to Dignāga's five *Pakṣa-ābhāsas*. As the same four additional *ābhāsas* are adopted in Śāttan's abstract, it is clear that the latter has copied from the Nyāyapravēśa. In this regard the verdict of all unprejudiced scholars will be unanimous. Therefore the posteriority of Śāttan to Śankarasvāmin and a fortiori to Dignāga must be regarded as established. The upper limit of the position of the Mañimēkhalai may be taken to be A.D. 500.'

In this part the professor takes up the position of Śāttan's being later than Dignāga on the basis of what is contained in Book xxix of the Mañimēkhalai. His position would be less open to objection, and mine perhaps less capable of justification, but for the fact that the position taken by him is not altogether without its own weak points. We agree in respect of the teaching of Buddhist logic in Book xxix of the Mañimēkhalai and that of the Nyāyapravēśa and Pramāṇasamuchchaya being almost identical. Our difference is only which is first and which is next. There are two points in the professor's criticism which challenge consideration. The first is that the Nyāyapravēśa is ascribed to Śankarasvāmin, the immediate disciple of Dignāga himself. There is the further point that the Nyāyapravēśa in regard to *Pakṣa-ābhāsas* improves upon the teaching of Dignāga by adding four more *Pakṣa-ābhāsas* thus bringing it into closer identity with the teaching of the Mañimēkhalai. Therefore the position comes to be that the Mañimēkhalai copied not the work of Dignāga himself but that of his disciple. But the Nyāyapravēśa

is regarded by others, on equally valid evidence of which the principal features have already explained by me above, as the work of Dignāga himself and not of Sankarasvāmin. Therefore the addition of four *Pakṣa-ābhāsas* by Sankarasvāmin to the teaching of Dignāga would have no basis to stand on. The question then would be the teaching of Dignāga according to Nyāyapravēśa and the exposition of the *Pakṣa-ābhāsas* in Book xxix of the Mañimēkhalai. Which is anterior and which is posterior is the question. The main features of the argument upon which the particular *pramāṇya* is ascribed to Dignāga have been indicated above in summary, and the references given to where further information could be had. I requested the good offices of the learned professor to contribute the appended note on the other side of the question of Śankarasvāmin's authorship of Nyāyapravēśa as some of the sources are not accessible to me. In this context the professor's position that the Nyāyapravēśa is based on Nyāyadvāra of Dignāga is seriously called in question. Both the Nyāyadvāra and the Nyāyapravēśa are ascribed to Dignāga, and are regarded as separate works altogether. Therefore the position is not quite so clear, and opinion is not so unanimous as to the authorship of these works. To me it appears that it is a matter of no importance comparatively whether the Nyāyapravēśa is Dignāga's or Sankarasvāmin's as Śankarasvāmin is accepted as the immediate disciple of Dignāga. I agree with the learned professor that the two works are so close to each other as to be almost identical that the one must have taken it from the other. But the real point of difference is whether it is impossible that Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ could have taught the subject without formulating it as in a text-book as Dignāga had done it later.

Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ was a mere teacher, and not a codifier and controversialist like Dignāga, whose main purpose was to defend Buddhist logic as against those that may be interested in assailing it. It is unnecessary for this position that Dignāga should necessarily have learned it from *Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ* or somebody else in Kānchi, or that he should take himself away to *Northern India* to misappropriate the teaching, as it were, and publish it as his own. From all that we know of teachers that taught in those times they had freedom to make the alterations implied in this process to be able to do it in their own particular localities. The only characteristic feature that ought to be paid attention to in the case of Dignāga is that he went about controverting, and had therefore to give his teaching a definition which a teacher like Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ did not perhaps quite feel called upon to do from the necessities of controversy. We cannot in our present state of knowledge be so definite about the position of Akshapāda and Vāsubandhu that these teachers originated the teaching in regard to the five *avyavahāras*, or in regard to anything else. It would be very difficult to ascribe the originating of any very particular item of teaching in these departments to particular authors except to the extent of their having committed these items of teaching to writing in works that have become accessible to us. As a rule it may be taken that these teachings were for a considerable length of time in the floating traditions of the schools before they got entry into written texts, and when they actually reached this state they had necessarily to take a more definite form. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to ascribe any moral turpitude to Dignāga in doing what he actually did, giving to the teaching of the schools before him, of which Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ is a mere

representative, the current definition in this formulation of the *pramāṇyas* and the *avayavas*. On the basis of the reasons given by the learned professor, the date A.D. 500 may seem quite reasonable. But Vasubandhu's date is nowadays taken to be somewhat earlier, and cannot go as far as A.D. 400. It is now taken as proved that Vasubandhu was a contemporary of Samudragupta, and Dignāga therefore could not have been very much later. He might have been somewhat younger than Vasubandhu but could not have been so late as to be capable of being brought to A.D. 400. That from our point of view seems a minor one.

While we are discussing this point, I may as well note here a remark of my friend, Mr. R. Narasimhacharyar, till lately Director of Archaeological Researches in Mysore. He is as well convinced as Professor Jacobi himself as to the Maṇimēkhalai expounding the Nyāya-pravēśa of Dignāga. But he put it to me that, having regard to what Book xxix of the Maṇimēkhalai expounds as Buddhist logic, it would not be unreasonable to argue that Dignāga was an earlier teacher and therefore earlier than the date of the Maṇimēkhalai, that is, the second century A.D. In other words, he would take the date of Maṇimēkhalai to be the second century A.D. and would place Dignāga earlier than that date. This position of my friend goes to indicate that perhaps the more legitimate historical argument would be to fix the date of the Maṇimēkhalai and shift that of Dignāga, for after all, Maṇimēkhalai's dating is to be primarily on the historical considerations indicated above rather than on the philosophical systems such as they are in the work. I may, however, note that there are difficulties in the way of accepting that position. Dignāga's contemporaneity with Vasubandhu would be difficult to call in

question unless we are prepared to throw to the four winds all the available evidence of literary tradition completely. Vasubandhu cannot be taken to an anterior date such as this would imply without doing very great violence to accredited Buddhist tradition and Chinese evidence of a definite character. The more reasonable position to take therefore seems to be that which is taken in the course of the exposition of the work above.

The professor's further point of criticism is in regard to the omission of all references to Mahāyāna. Here is the professor's position :—

‘Śāttan in his exposition of Buddhism nowhere, as you say, refers to Mahāyānist ideas. It may, therefore, be assumed that in his time the Mahāyāna was not yet in existence, and accordingly Śāttan must be earlier than Nāgārjuna; but this conclusion can easily be shown to be wrong. For Śāttan refers to Akṣhapāda and Nyāya, and as in the Nyāyasūtra, the Śūnyavāda is discussed and refuted, there can be no doubt that in Śāttan's time, the Mahāyāna was already established long since.’

In this point again, I am sorry that the professor's argument overshoots the mark. There is no reference to Mahāyāna in the exposition of Buddhism in the Mañi-mēkhalai, and the conclusion cannot be that Śāttan did not know the Mahāyāna either to accept it as an orthodox system, or to condemn it as a heretical system. That may be due to Śāttan being anterior to Nāgārjuna and therefore of Śūnyavāda, or of his not knowing it, the teaching not having had sufficient time to have become well known, and reach the Tamil country. The latter is the view that I have taken, and not exactly the former, guided here again by the governing historical considerations. The learned professor, on the contrary, bases himself on the position that the teaching of Akṣhapāda

and the Nyāyasūtra are identical in every particular. In regard to the Śūnyavāda that is discussed and refuted there again, there is not that agreement in regard to what exactly the teachings of Akshapāda were and what additions were made to the Nyāyasūtras since the time of Akshapāda. This would mean that the discussion of the Śūnyavāda must be proved to be in the part ascribable to Akshapāda, as in fact it cannot be, if according to other scholars who have specialized their studies in the Nyāya, Akshapāda was far anterior to Nāgārjuna himself. All I wish to point out is that an argument such as this cannot be held to be decisive in our present state of knowledge of the chronology of these works. The Mahāyāna is not a product of Nāgārjuna's teaching. The teaching of Mahāyāna can be traced back to the days of Asoka, if not earlier. But the actual Śūnyavāda in the form in which it has come down to us is still generally regarded as the teaching of Nāgārjuna. The possibilities are that Śāttan's teaching embodies whatever was in the opinion of the Tamil country, the orthodox teaching of Buddhism, about the same time as Nāgārjuna was expounding the Śūnyavāda of the Mahāyānistic school in the Āndhra country across, both being the result of the same stir, particularly in the continent of India, that is indicated in the Mahāvamśa of Ceylon as the famous Vaitulya controversy. The heretics are located, according to the Mahāvamśa, in the coast country set over against Anurādhapura extending northwards into the Āndhra country. Therefore the time at which Śāttan lived seems to me the time which actually produced Nāgārjuna and Dēva and possibly a little anterior. Much as the great Master of the Law, Hiuen-Tsang, does not make any reference to Dharmakīrti who lived in his time and perhaps was actually teaching when

the great traveller was in India, Śāttan fails to mention Nāgārjuna or his Śūnyavāda.

The analogy brought in by the learned professor can hardly be accepted as holding good in this case. His position is :—

' Similarly in the Vēdānta Sūtra and in the passage from the Vṛttikāra quoted by Śabaraśvāmin ad. I, 1, 5 the Śūnyavāda is discussed and refuted. It is true that in the Maṇimēkhalai there is no explicit reference to the Vēdānta philosophy. However the same remark applies also to the Nyāyavārttika, for Uddyotakāra altogether ignores the Vēdānta though at his time it was almost certainly a separate system of philosophy. The same attitude towards Vēdāntism taken up by Uddyotakāra and Śāttan rather speaks in favour of the assumption that both authors were not far removed in time from each other.'

Uddyotakāra is a commentator pure and simple on the Nyāya. It is open to him not to mention the Vēdānta as a system, unless he saw particular reason for doing so, or the actual text that he commented on necessitated a reference. Śāttan stands on a different footing. He lays himself out to discuss what he regarded as heretical systems and then to expound the system of Buddhism that commended itself to him. The difference is vital and of considerable force. It would be therefore difficult to believe that Uddyotakāra and Śāttan were near enough in point of time because of the omission in the works of both of them of any reference to Vēdānta as a system.

Coming to the exposition of Buddhism in Book xxx of the Maṇimēkhalai, the professor's criticism is as follows :—

' The translation of chapter xxx of the Maṇimēkhalai is very welcome, though it is rather disappointing being a mere meagre account of Buddhism. I wonder who Śāttan's authority was in this part. It contains only such teachings

as may be acknowledged by all Buddhists, both Hinayānists and Mahāyānists. It has not any reference to the Sarvāstivāda nor the system of the Sautrāntikas, for the central conception of these two schools is the theory of the dharmas which is not even hinted at in Śāttan's abstract. I think he merely related what every Śrāvaka was supposed to know.¹

It may be stated at once that Śāttan although he does not indicate the authority upon which he relies for the summary of Buddhism in Book xxx refers elsewhere to what his authority is. The Buddhism that he teaches is, 'the path of the Piṭakas, of the Great one.'² He is expounding the fundamental teachings of the Buddha and not the teachings of schools of Buddhism which are elaborations and modifications of systems-builders of later times. It is possible to make the inference from this alone that Śāttan was anterior to the growth of definite systems that we know of in Buddhism, particularly the four which are so prominently associated with the Buddhism of a later age. But that argument need not be pushed to any extreme. A German scholar of the twentieth century, laying himself out definitely to disentangle the teachings of the Buddha from the excrescences of subsequent ages and teachers, inculcates in substance what is the teaching of Śāttan, neither more nor less.³ So Śāttan's teaching may be regarded as the teaching of 'the Piṭaka of the Buddha', and therefore indicates a deference to the authority of the 'word of the Buddha' such as it was known to be in his time. In that sense it would be what is called *Sthaviravāda* and may be regarded as *Sautrāntika* also, not in the technical sense that the expression acquired, but in a more general sense. Śāttan's anxiety is to teach what the Buddha taught. It

¹ Book xxvi, 1, 56.

² *The Doctrine of the Buddha* by George Griener, Leipzig, 1926.

is just possible on this very ground to claim for him anteriority, though it is equally possible that a later writer could lay himself out to disentangle the actual teaching of the Buddha from its outgrowths. But the claim to Śāntan's anteriority, according to me, rests not so much on this feature as on the particular feature that the other systems as such did not come in for commendation in the book on Buddhism, and what perhaps is more to be expected, in condemnation along with the heretical systems. One explanation is possible that, while he condemns systems which did not recognize the Buddha, he merely expounds a system taught by the Buddha, and passed over outgrowths from that system with a tolerance which is not unusual in Indian thought.

I have taken it upon myself to make this elaborate criticism of the views of my much esteemed and learned friend, Professor Jacobi, because the importance of the subject and the eminence of the scholarship of the professor alike demand it from me. The stimulus to this line of investigation at this time, came from him to me, and it is but fair to him that I should acknowledge it here, and consider his criticism with the respect which is due to the eminent source from which it comes. The elaborate criticism and the extensive answer that that necessitated, alike go to show that the line of investigation that was undertaken has shown clearly, though somewhat disappointingly, that this line of investigation cannot by any means lay claim to that finality which, perhaps in the first instance, was expected of it both by Professor Jacobi and by myself. If I could go by this investigation alone I should not have any great difficulty in accepting the position arrived at by the eminent scholar. But once that position is accepted, it is incumbent upon me, as a student of history, to test the

position by other lines of enquiry. Without repeating the details of history, I may merely draw attention here to two facts which stand out. The first is that the author is demonstrably a contemporary of Śenguṭṭuvan Chēra, and of his younger brother, Iṅgō, the author of the Śilappadhikāram. That is one fact of history which it would be difficult to call in question. The second is that at the time to which the work refers which is undoubtedly the time of the author, Kānchī was not under the Pallavas, nor under the Tondamān chieftain, Iṅam Tirayan, but under the princely viceroys of the Chola family. The history of the Pallavas as such certainly goes back to the age of Samudragupta in the middle of the fourth century as we take it at present. That is a date not far removed from that of Dignāga. The Tondamān chieftains, particularly Tondamān Iṅam Tirayan of Śangam fame, must have ruled earlier. The Chola ascendancy in the Tondamaṅḍalam (the country round Kānchī) must be referred to an age anterior to this. This position had been sought to be got round by the Epigraphists by the assumption of a Chola interregnum previous to the Pallava king Kumāravishnu II who in one of his records is said to have retaken Kānchī. Leaving aside for the moment criticism of details in connection with this particular statement, it may be said at once that the Chola interregnum such as is postulated must be an interregnum extending over five generations or roundly one century of time. The Sangam works give evidence of Kānchī being under the rule of the Cholas and then of the Tondamān Iṅam Tirayan, and arranging the authors and the patrons referred to therein in the order of succession merely, we get to somewhat like this line of five generations and a length of time of a century. Therefore no conclusion can be accepted which does not satisfy this

condition primarily; the age indicated by Professor Jacobi on the line of reasoning that he has adopted, with the philosophical systems of the Manimēkhalai as a basis, can hardly satisfy this condition. The alternative suggestion of Mr. Narāsimhacharyar has been briefly adverted to.

While therefore acknowledging with gratitude the criticism of the learned professor, I may join in his regret that we cannot come to an agreement on this investigation.



APPENDIX

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *NYĀYAPRAVEŚA*

BY

MONSIEUR TOBIANSKI

IN an excellent note in the *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences*, 1926, Russia, Monsieur Tobianski attacks the problem of the authorship of the treatise, *Nyāyapraveśa*, and gives his vote in favour of the *Nyāyapraveśa* known to the Chinese and regarded by them as the principal treatise on Buddhist logic being the work of Śāṅkarasvāmin, and not of Dignāga. I am obliged to Professor Jacobi of Bonn for a copy of the note, and am merely giving a summary of the arguments in favour of this position as presenting the other side of the question, the more readily as Professor Jacobi writes to intimate that he is in full agreement with Monsieur Tobianski.¹ There are four works bearing names though slightly different but near enough for any one of them to be confounded with another. Two of these are in Chinese, two in Tibetan. The first of the Chinese works is *Nyāyapraveśa* ascribed to Śāṅkarasvāmin.

2. The *Nyāyadvāra* in two translations by Ywan-Chwang and I'Tsing respectively, and attributed to Dignāga.

3. Similarly there are two works in Tibetan (a) *Nyāyapraveśadvāra* and (b) *Nyāyapraveśa*, both of them ascribed to Dignāga.

Both Murakami and Suglura, on an examination of the Chinese texts, but without any knowledge of Tibetan sources, came to the conclusion that the two Chinese works, *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Nyāyadvāra* were different. S. C. Vidyabhushan working from the Tibetan side alone and relying chiefly upon an examination of one of the two works, *Nyāyadvāra*, reduced these to three, the two Tibetan works being regarded by him as one.

¹ For a full statement of the opposite position reference may be made to the newly published volume in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, volume No. xix (Introd.).

Mironov was able since to compare the Tibetan *Nyāyadvāra* with the Sanskrit *Nyāyapravēśa* and found the two to be the same work, the Tibetan apparently being a translation from the Sanskrit. Mironov also considered the *Nyāyapravēśa* as also identical with the two works relying on the remark of Haribhadra, the Jain commentator. According to Tubianski Haribhadra's comment cannot bear the inference drawn from it that the *Nyāyapravēśa* was a work of Dignāga.

H. Ui in his *Vaiśēshika philosophy* (1917) was in a position to compare the two Chinese texts, *Nyāyapravēśa* and *Nyāyadvāra*, and the Tibetan work *Nyāyadvāra*. His conclusion was that the Tibetan *Nyāyadvāra* or *Nyāyapravēśadvāra* was quite different from the Chinese *Nyāyadvāra*, but is the same as the Chinese *Nyāyapravēśa*. This reduces the position of there being only two works, the Tibetan *Nyāyapravēśadvāra* being a translation of the Chinese *Nyāyapravēśa*, the two constitute but one work, and the Chinese *Nyāyadvāra* stands distinct. S. C. Vidyabhushan in his latest work on the History of Indian Logic was able to prove that the Tibetan *Nyāyapravēśa* was identical with the Tibetan *Nyāyadvāra*. So the two Tibetan versions come to be versions of the same work and get to be the equivalent of the Chinese work *Nyāyapravēśa*, the Chinese *Nyāyadvāra* standing distinct. The question to decide therefore is who is the author of the *Nyāyapravēśa*, and who of the *Nyāyadvāra*. The latter is correctly attributed, according to Tubianski, to Dignāga, as this figures among the works of Dignāga according to I'Tsing under the slightly different name *Hēlu-Vidyā-Nyāya-dvāra Śāstra* abbreviated into *Nyāyadvāra*. In this form it is also mentioned by Dignāga himself in his *Pramāya Sannucchaya Vytti*. Further the Chinese *Nyāyadvāra* contains *ślokas* quoted by Vāchaspati Miśra as from Dignāga, although they have been found to be in the *Pramāyasannucchaya* of Dignāga. The *Nyāyadvāra* therefore becomes a work of Dignāga. Did he write the *Nyāyapravēśa* also? Here it would be much better to quote Tubianski textually:—

‘ But if it is true that *Nyāyadvāra* was written by Dignāga, it is impossible that *Nyāyapravēśa* should be also written by him. For this we have inner and outer grounds. The inner ground is, that both works are not only different, but so different that they

could not be produced by the same author. Sugiura pointed out already that in *Nyāyapravēḥa* there are added some types of fallacies of the thesis which are not mentioned in *Nyāyadvāra* and that the fourteen types of fallacies of refutation (*dāśhayābhāsa*) of *Nyāyadvāra* are omitted in *Nyāyapravēḥa*. But the absence of these fourteen *dāśhayābhāsas* signifies a radical reform of the whole logical doctrine inside Dignāga's school of course. These *dāśhayābhāsas* fill almost half of the whole text of *Nyāyadvāra*, and represent a hardly justifiable remainder of the ancient brahmanical *Nyāya*. Dignāga himself ascribes their origin to Akṣapāda and though the question is not as yet cleared historically, it seems that they correspond indeed to the twenty-four varieties of *śāstī*, expounded in the first chapter of the fifth book of the *Nyāyasūtras*. They were reduced—probably by Dignāga to fourteen, and incorporated not only into his *Nyāyadvēḥa*, but even in the *Pramāṇyasamuccaya*, which must have been written considerably later. That they are useless as such and that all their logical and even critical import can be safely represented by the ordinary *hetuābhāsas*, treated under the topic of *sādhanaābhāsa*, was clearly shown by the disposition of *Nyāyapravēḥa*, as well as by *Dharmakīrti* in his *Nyāyabindu*. If we add the extreme lucidity of the terminology and of the whole manner of exposition which characterizes *Nyāyapravēḥa* in contradistinction to *Nyāyadvāra*, their belonging to different authors will be beyond doubt. The following are the external evidence:—

1. Chinese information must be reliable as the *Nyāyapravēḥa* has remained their basal text for logical studies.

2. Among the list of works of Dignāga in I'Tsing, none of the names could be regarded as corresponding to the name *Nyāyapravēḥa* according to Tubianski.

3. The Tibetans apparently made an error in equating the *Nyāyapravēḥa* and *Nyāyadvāra* as the Tibetans did not possess a translation of the *Nyāyadvāra*.

4. The Tibetans seem almost aware of their error when they say in one of their catalogues that the *Nyāyapravēḥa* should not be confounded with the *Nyāyadvāra*.

PROLOGUE

THE Goddess Champāpati, the guardian deity of this land of Jambudvīpa, who had her birth on the top of 'the golden mountain,' with a coiffure of matted locks and an effulgence resembling that of the sun, remained seated under the shade of the spreading branches of a Jambu tree, performing penance to counteract the evil wrought by *Rīshikasas* of cruel deeds. King Kāntama, the Chola, wishing to have water which would make the dynasty of the sun prosper, prayed of *Rishi* Agastya for the favour. Agastya accordingly allowed his water jar to get upset, and the water flowing therefrom flowed straight east and reached the sea in the immediate neighbourhood of where goddess Champāpati was doing penance. The venerable lady got up to welcome with pleasure the young lady of the river thus approaching, and addressed her 'Hail! heavenly Ganga, much beloved of all, the brilliant one that satisfied the desire of the king for water.' *Rishi* Agastya who did not feel it undignified in him to follow her, told the young lady Kaveri, 'Dear one, this venerable ascetic is worthy of your obeisance. Do show her the respect due to her.' The daughter of Tamil, of unfailing bounty even when the dry summer should last far longer than its length, and even when the sovereigns of the Tamil land should become unrighteous by chance, sovereigns who in the land of Bharata were far-famed for unswerving righteousness, made a profound obeisance and stood respectfully in front of her. 'May you prosper; this city which, from the days of creation by Mahā-Brahma of all the creatures of the world of gods and all the worlds of Brahma, had been known by my name; may it be known hereafter by yours.'

The great city composed of two separate divisions was in the tumult of the announcement of the great festival to Indra 'of the hundred sacrifices.' Hearing of the announcement, Chitrâpati, her mind distraught, sent word of it to her daughter Mâdhavi through her companion Vasantamâlâ. Following this came Mañimêkhalai's entry into the flower garden outside the city for gathering flowers. Then, seeing that, the young Chola prince was following her into the garden. She entered the crystal hall in it and shut herself in. Seeing her form through the glass, he returned with a mind somewhat unbinged at the failure. Then there appeared the goddess Mañimêkhalâ; carrying Mañimêkhalai away from the garden, she left her in the island of Mañipallavam. This goddess of high repute then woke up Mañimêkhalai's companion Sutamati in the garden. Mañimêkhalai herself woke up in the island and finding herself alone, wandered about till she came in sight of a Buddha seat of bright effulgence. She learnt from the miraculous seat all that took place in her previous birth. Appearing before her then, goddess Mañimêkhalâ taught her some *mantras* to be used as occasion arose. Then there appeared before her Tivatilakai, the goddess of the island. By means of this last, Mañimêkhalai obtained possession of the miraculous begging-bowl of the Buddha. With the begging-bowl in her hand, and accompanied by her mother and her companion, Mañimêkhalai visited the sage Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ. The sage taught her the actual nature of Āputra. He further recounted to her how he obtained the begging-bowl from the 'goddess of learning.' Mañimêkhalai carried that miraculous bowl in her hand and entered the streets of Puhâr for begging. Ladies of chastity in the city deposited alms for her in the bowl.

The good damsel having satisfied the insatiable hunger of Kāyaśaṅḍikai, entered the public hall of travellers in the city. Hearing of her presence there, the prince followed her to the public hall. To save herself from his importunities, she assumed the form of a Vidyādhara woman. The king, his father, strict in administering justice, transformed the State-prison into a house of charity. The Vidyādhara Kārchana approached Maṇimēkhalai in the belief that she was Kāyaśaṅḍikai, his wife; he found her however irresponsive, to his surprise and chagrin. This Vidyādhara cut the prince in two by his sword when he came near her, in the belief that he was responsible for his wife's estrangement from him. Sorrow-stricken at his death, Maṇimēkhalai consoled herself on hearing what the divine statue had told her. The king then threw her into prison from which she was ultimately released. Maṇimēkhalai taught the queen the *Buddha-dharma* and passed on to the kingdom of Āputra. Taking him with her she went to Maṇipallavam. There she assumed the form of a venerable ascetic and entered Vanji. In that city she learnt from teachers of different sects their religious dogmas. Searching there for Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ and 'the mothers' she entered Kārchī. At Kārchī throwing off her disguise, she became a disciple of Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ. Taught by him, she assumed the form of an ascetic and devoted herself to the performance of penance in order that she might destroy birth in this world. These separate incidents constitute the story of her life, which prince Iṅango listened to with great kindness, when the prosperous grain merchant Śāttan, had set these separate incidents, each in a book of its own, and composed a work of thirty poems in excellent Tamil on the subject of the renunciation of Maṇimēkhalai.

BOOK I

On the advice of Agastya of the Malaya Hill, the Chola king who destroyed the 'castle in the air' of the *Rākshasas*, stood before Indra in profound obeisance and prayed of him, for the enhancement of the fame of his old city, that Indra might be present during the twenty-eight days of the (great Indra) festival in Puhār. As Indra with great beneficence consented, the well-informed people of the city used to celebrate the festival without fail. Therefore all those teachers of varying religions who expounded absolute truth, actual practice of the world, the good teachings of truth, and of release from worldly life, and those expert in 'the science'¹ of time never ceased to reside in the city. Along with these, there were the gods themselves who had assumed forms of less brilliant effulgence, people of various languages that had collected in vast numbers than was usual, the five bodies of ministers and the eight bodies of officials of varying degrees. These arranged for the announcement of the festival by beat of the great royal drum, as the guardian deity in the public square and the deity set up in the bazaar will both molest the inhabitants of the city if, by chance, the celebration of the festival should be forgotten. In this belief the prosperous drum in the temple of Vajrāyudha² was taken out and placed on the back of the royal elephant, and by beat of that drum, the announcement was made in the following terms:—

' May the city of this old royal family prosper !
 May the land be blessed with the three rains every month !
 May the planets follow their course because of the righteousness of the sovereigns !
 On the occasion of

¹ Astrologers.

² The characteristic weapon of Indra, Śakti, thunderbolt.

the propitiatory festival of this great land, the thousand-eyed Indra along with the four classes of *Dēvas* (gods), and the eight *ganas* or groups of *Dēvatas* (minor gods), would arrive here in the city making the heaven of Indra empty, as was this royal city itself, when the great Chōla Karikāla left the city on a distant expedition of conquest. Do therefore decorate the city, the great royal roads and the halls of faultless learning; put in their appropriate places jars filled with water, seed vessels with budding sprouts and statues holding lamps. Decorate the streets and buildings with *aroca* and plantain trees carrying bunches of fruit, creepers of *vamji* and other kinds, and plant them with sugar-cane. Along the open plinths of houses suspend strings of pearls from pillar to pillar. Remove the old soil and spread new sand over the streets. Hoist flags and hang festoons over the gateways of houses. Tidy up temples ranging from that of the god "with an eye in the forehead"¹ to the guardian deity of the public square, with what requires to be done under the instructions of those expert in it. Let those well-versed in the holy teachings take their place under awnings, or in canopied halls. Let those well-versed in various religions assemble in the halls of learning set apart for discussion. Give up feelings of enmity even to those who are inimical to you. Do all these things, these twenty-eight days when the gods and men in friendly company keep moving about on hillocks of sand, in gardens full of flowers, in islets in river beds and in bathing ghats.'

This announcement by beat of the royal drum was made while warriors with drawn swords, cars and cavalry and elephants moved in procession escorting the State elephant which carried the drum. The announcement

¹ Śiva.

closed with the prayer that hunger, disease and enmity may cease to exist, and that rain and the resulting prosperity may perpetually be on the rise.

BOOK II

On the occasion of the great festival thus announced, Mādhavi and her daughter Manimēkhalai were not in their accustomed place. Distracted with grief at this remissness on the part of her daughter and grand-daughter, Chitrāpati summoned her daughter's companion Vasantamālā and sent word through her that the great Indra festival had been announced. Vasantamālā being of Chitrāpati's way of thinking went to where Mādhavi and her daughter were, and seeing their languishing form, told her in sorrowful tones:—

'Have you cause of dissatisfaction? You that are expert in the arts in their varied branches, does it not ill-become you to assume the garb of penance? So say all people in the city, the wise people and the others alike. It does not become you to be that. It is much rather matter for shame that you should adopt this line of conduct.' Mādhavi replied: 'Having heard of the death of my beloved, I have lived without sending my life away along with his. I have lost the esteem of this beautiful old city and have given up all feeling of shame. When women in worldly life lose their husbands, they heave sighs of sorrow and give up their own lives. Failing that, they usually consign themselves to the flames, entering fire as if it were the cool water of a tank. If they should not do that, they would wear their body out in prayer and penance in order that they may, in another birth, live happily with their beloved. This is the way of the chaste in this broad world. Our dear one Kaonaki,

the chaste wife of my beloved, finding it impossible to bear the sorrow of the calamity that had overtaken her husband, with her hair all dishevelled, with tears flowing in torrents over her breasts, burnt the great city of the Pāndyas by mutilating her breast. Maṇimēkhalai the daughter of that chaste one is fit only for the life of an ascetic and not for the life of a courtesan full of evil. Further than this in the extremity of sorrow I came here to the hermitage of the holy ones and threw myself at the feet of the sage Aṣavaṇa Aḍigaḷ as the only saviour. Learning from me what had befallen my beloved one, he taught me that "those that are born enjoy only growing suffering. Those that cease to be born do enjoy unending great bliss. By attachment comes the first; giving up attachment brings the next. Bear this in mind." He further expounded the character of the *śīlas* (discipline according to Buddhism), and impressed it upon me that this is the only way of saving oneself. Please therefore convey this to my beautiful companions and my mother.' Hearing this from her, Vasantamālā, not knowing what to do, returned as if she had dropped a jewel of immeasurable value in the sea.

BOOK III

Information of this reached Maṇimēkhalai, as the time had come for her to give up attachment to things worldly. So she wept tears of great sorrow for the fate that had befallen her father Kovalan and his chaste wife. She was therefore asked to throw away the garland of flowers that she was then making as it had got contaminated by her tears, and directed to go and bring fresh flowers for making other garlands as a diversion from her sorrow. Mādhavi's companion Sutamati protested

against her going alone as the great charm of her looks was likely to prove dangerous to her in the great city. Sutamati took occasion to explain to MādHAVI that a similar lonely adventure was the cause of her presence in the Chola capital. She was the wife of a Brahman Kauśika in Champa (Bhagalpur on the Ganges). She went into a garden alone for gathering flowers when she was carried off by a Vidyādhara who was flying through the air to see the festival of Indra at Puhār. Having spent some time with her, he left her behind in the city and went away to his own place, and that accounted for her presence in the city. She pointed out therefore the danger that beset young women being found alone, and offered to escort Manimēkhalai to the garden. Rejecting a number of flower gardens in the city as being exposed to one or other of the dangers from men or beings other than men, she pointed to a garden outside the city, with ever-flowering trees, and sacred to the memory of Buddha. It contained in it a pavilion made of crystal containing a lotus seat with the footmarks of the Buddha of miraculous power. Flowers in bloom shot into full blossom immediately, if placed on it; full blown flowers placed on it never faded; bees would not smell them. Further, people who wished to offer flowers to any of the gods would have their wishes fulfilled if, with their thoughts on their gods, they placed their flower offerings on the seat; if without any thought flowers should be placed on it, they would never go out of it.

This Buddha seat with the peculiar features described above was erected in this garden by the divine architect Maya, to illustrate at one and the same time the two principles that those who do a thing without setting their minds upon it in full, will not reap the fruit of their action; and that whatever is done without an un-

disturbed resolution of the mind to do so, will not bear fruit. Having said this Sutamati with Maṇimēkhalai went along threading their way through the various crowds of idle people, a crowd following these two praising the beauty of Maṇimēkhalai and blaming her mother for having consigned her to this life of asceticism, and ultimately reached the flower garden, which was their objective.

BOOK IV

Having reached the garden, Maṇimēkhalai and her companion wandered round enjoying the lovely scenes in it, to which Maṇimēkhalai's attention was drawn by her companion. The city was in the meanwhile in great commotion as the state elephant Kālavēgam got into *maṣṭ* and went out of control. As it turned hither and thither in the city like a ship caught in a tornado causing destruction on its way, the prince, heir-apparent, mounting his horse, went after it at the head of a guard to bring it back to discipline. Having successfully done so, he was returning in his car leading the victorious guard that attended him and the crowd that gathered round the cavalcade. Passing through the street of the dancing women, he saw, in the front room of the first floor of one of the houses, a merchant prince standing like a very statue with the stem of his *vīṣa* in his embrace, his sweet-heart by him. Looking through the window the prince asked the young merchant what it was that had so stunned him. The young merchant said in reply that, as he was playing on the *vīṣa*, he looked out through the window and saw Maṇimēkhalai in the garb of a Buddhist novice passing along with her companion towards the flower garden outside the

city. The sight of her brought to his recollection all that befell her father Kovalan in Madura. Thus disturbed in mind, his fingers passed unconsciously on to the wrong string, and that was what actually brought him to the painful state of abstraction in which the prince found him. Understanding from what he said that Maṇimēkhalai had gone to the garden, the prince turned back telling the young merchant that he would proceed forthwith and bring back Maṇimēkhalai with him in his car, and rapidly drove forward. When the car came near the garden Maṇimēkhalai heard the rattle of the approaching wheels and told her companion that she had heard from her grandmother that prince Udayakumāra had set his heart upon her, and that, in all probability, the approach of the rattling sound gave indication of his coming. She wished to know what exactly she could do to escape this calamity. Sutamati, her companion, asked her to get into the crystal pavilion in the garden and bolt the door from the inside. She then took her stand five bows' distance from the pavilion. The prince having approached the pavilion and seeing the solitary maiden at some distance accosted her 'You are now standing alone here in this lonely garden. I understand you came here along with Maṇimēkhalai. Has she attained to the wisdom that she sought? Has she recovered her charming smiles? Have her eyes got back their enchanting beauty? How is it that she has given up the *vihāra* of the Buddhist mendicants and come to this garden?' On hearing this Sutamati felt as one thrown into an underground cellar without opening, and said to the prince in reply: 'You are descended from the great Chola Karikāla, who, as a youth, assumed the garb of age in order that he may do justice in a cause brought up before the monarch.

Young as you are in age, are you not ripe in wisdom? Is there anything that women can teach you? There cannot be. Even so let me present unto you the following :— " The human body is the product of action (Karma); is the source of further action. If you remove that which is worn to decorate it, it will show nothing but flesh. It is subject to age and decay. It is the seat of disease. It is the cause of attachment to those that attach themselves to things earthly. It is full of evil. Long-standing hatred lies hidden in it as a poisonous cobra in its hole. It contains within itself the consciousness which is subject to suffering in the present, to helplessness to get out of it, to fainting in the effort to do so, and bitter sorrow as a result thereof. Understand, therefore, oh, prince, this indeed is the nature of a human being. Please turn aside from this, your attachment to her. " ' Before even these words could reach his ears, he saw within the crystal chamber the form of Maṇimēkhalai.

BOOK V

At sight of the fair form of Maṇimēkhalai, he stood for a moment rapt in admiration of the beauty of her form, like a painter who had just conceived the idea of a beauty for painting. Realizing however, that it was Maṇimēkhalai herself, enchanting in her beauty like the Goddess Lakshmi dancing in front of the Asuras, his one thought was to enter the pavilion. He went round the crystal wall feeling with his hand for the door, and not finding anything to give indication of an opening, he turned round to Sutamati and asked her to describe to him what sort of a maiden her companion was. She replied : ' If she is not attracted by your youthful beauty and will not feast her eyes with the sight of your young

form, she is undoubtedly one given to austerity as a result of her previous good deeds. She is capable of invoking imprecations that will not fail. She is one on whom love has no influence.' The Prince said in reply that when love gains possession of her heart, there is nothing that would restrain her, and that, enchantingly beautiful as she was, he would still make her his own, and turned away from both of them to return to the Palace. As he turned round, he told Sutamati that the whole town used to speak of her as one that was left in the midst of a Jain nunnery by a Vidyādhara, and asked her to let him know how it happened that she had given up the Jain hermitage and accompanied Mañimēkhalai to the garden. Sutamati replied that she was the daughter of a Brahman and his wife both of Champa (Bhagalpur in Bengal). Having lost her mother early, and while she was still under the guardianship of her father, she was carried off by a Vidyādhara called Mārutavēga, from her native place. The father, coming in search of her towards the famous bathing ghat of Kanyākumāri 'constructed by monkeys', saw her in this town as he was returning after his morning bath in the Kāvēri. Having enquired how I came to be here, he would not give me up, although I had become unworthy to live among Brahmans, and took upon himself the life of a mendicant beggar to eke out his and my livelihood. In one of his begging rounds a cow, recently in calf, ran at him and tore open his stomach. Holding his entrails in his hand, he came to the hermitage of the Jains, which not long since was my habitation, and sought asylum with them. The inmates of the hermitage rather than give asylum turned me out from there and sent me along with him. We were wandering in this forlorn condition crying out if there were any kind-hearted people to take

us into their protection. A kind-hearted Buddhist Bhikshu who was coming on his mid-day round, handing his begging bowl to me, carried my father to the *vihāra*, where he and his companions lived, and thus helped to dispel my father's pains and sorrows of death. This hermit Sanghadharma taught her the teaching of the Buddha:—'My king possessed of all good qualities by nature, the object of all good qualities without diminution, having learned by experience various kinds of life in this world, took it upon himself to use his life not for the attainment of his own salvation, but for the exercise of kindness to things living, in order that the whole mass of living beings might attain to that salvation. Thus turning the wheel of the law, he conquered desire. Excepting his beautiful feats and their celebration, I have given up using my tongue for anything else. May you prosper, Oh excellent Prince. This in brief is my history !'

Having understood her history, the prince took leave of her giving her his mind that he would still gain the heart of Maṇimēkhalai through her grandmother Chitrāpati, and went away from the garden. Maṇimēkhalai came out from the crystal chamber fixing her eyes upon the Prince, and told Sutamati:—'My heart runs after the Prince, stranger though he is to me, and notwithstanding the fact that he described me as possessed of no virtue, as having no right knowledge for the performance of penance, not having the protection of caste, and liable to be purchased for a price. Instead of feeling angry that he should have thus described me contemptuously, how is it that my heart yearns for him? Is this the nature of what is called Love? If that is so, may it be destroyed.' Thus saying the two stood for a while where they were.

Just then there appeared in the guise of a lady of the city, the goddess Maṇimēkhala, with a view to witnessing the celebration of the great festival just then taking place in the city. She went round the pavilion containing the seat of the Buddha, reciting the following laudation:—

‘ Shall I describe you as the knowing One, the pure One of good deeds, the ancient One, the exalted One, who knew how to lead life in this world? Shall I describe you as the One who got beyond the reach of love, who was the sure guardian of all, as the One who destroyed the enemy, evil conduct? How shall I describe the feet of him who set the wheel of a thousand spokes in motion, without a thousand tongues to describe with?’

Having said this, the goddess Maṇimēkhala came down to the earth like a gem emitting fire and stood aside. Just then the setting sun sent across a bright effulgence of light on the palace tower which was the face of the lady, the city of Puhār. All nature began slowly to transform itself from the aspect of day into that of evening, when darkness strode in into the beautiful garden just like a young woman, who having lost her husband on the field of battle, returns, with nothing of her bright cheerfulness, to her parents.

BOOK VI

The evening passed and the rising moon sent forth its silver beams as if a whole quantity of milk was poured out from a silver jar. The goddess Maṇimēkhala appeared worshipping the footmarks of ‘ the Primeval First, One possessed of inexhaustible mercy ’. Seeing the anxious-looking Sutamati, and her companion, she asked her what it was that troubled them. The former described to her what had taken place just a little before, and gave her to understand the danger in which

Maṇimēkhalai was placed at the time. The Goddess replied that the love of the prince to Maṇimēkhalai would not diminish. He went out of the grove, as he did, out of regard for the fact that the grove was one where dwelt holy ones engaged in their penance. It would be dangerous if Maṇimēkhalai went out of the precincts into the public highways of the town. She therefore advised them to get through the western postern of the garden and spend the night in the Chakravāḷa Kōṭṭam, inhabited chiefly by those devoted to performing penances of various kinds. The place was referred to by that name only by the goddess and by Mārutavēgau, who brought Sutamati down to Puhār; but to others in the great city the place was known by the name 'the temple of the burning-ghat (Śuḍukāṭṭu Kōṭṭam)'. Sutamati asked to know the reason why the goddess called the place by that name. The goddess said that the burning ground which came into existence along with the town itself, was next adjoining the grove. It is enclosed in a circuit of walls broken by four gates. It contained a temple dedicated to Kālī, and monuments of various sizes bearing inscriptions descriptive of those whose dead remains they cover. These inscriptions give the details of the name, caste, mode of life and station in society and the manner of death of those whose monuments they happen to be, each one of them. There are besides pillars dedicated to the various gods of the burning-ghat to which are made various offerings. There are platforms built of stone, chambers for guards for sheltering themselves from wind and weather. There are besides triumphal arches and shady spaces in various parts. This place is also divided into sections for various forms of disposal of the dead. A small space is set apart for burning corpses; another where the corpses are simply

thrown ; a third where the corpses are actually buried in graves dug in the earth ; others where corpses are set in small chambers made in the earth, their mouths being closed afterwards ; and lastly another part where corpses are left covered over by huge earthen pots. Up to the midnight people keep coming and going constantly engaged in one or other of these various ways of disposing of the dead, and there is unceasing noise in the locality created by the crowd of visitors, the tom-tom beaten for the dead, the sounds of those that recite the merits of recluses that died, the cries of those that weep for the dead, the howling of the jackals and the hooting of the owls. Different kinds of trees also are found grown close to each other. There are places with standing *Vāhai* trees, the favourite haunt of evil spirits ; with the tree *Vilā*, the resort of birds eating fat and flesh of the dead ; the shade of *Vanni*, the resort of the Kāpālikas ; places of *Ilandai* to which resort mendicant ascetics making garlands of broken skulls. There are other unshaded, unwooded places, the resort of people who live by eating the flesh of corpses. The whole place is otherwise strewn with pots in which fire had been carried ; pots of another shape in which articles for other funeral uses had been carried ; torn garlands, broken water pots, fried paddy and other articles of offerings to the dead. While death without regard to age, standing, condition or kind of life, goes about killing in heaps in this fashion, to be disposed of in this field of death as described above, is there anything more foolish that could be imagined than that there should be people who still place faith in wealth and, losing themselves in its enjoyment, live their life without doing good ?

Such a fearsome place of death happened to be visited by a Brahman youth in the belief that it was a

part of the city. He saw there an evil spirit in ecstatic dance, and taking fright at the apparition, ran to where his mother, Gautami, was and could hardly tell her that he gave up his life to a spirit of the burning-ghat he had the misfortune to see, when he died. Distracted with grief at the death of their only support, the mother cried out in despair: 'Who could it be that took away the life of the youth who was the mainstay of her own self and the aged Brahman, her husband, both of them blind and faint with age and infirmities? Carrying her only son's corpse, she went to the gate of the burning-ghat, invoked the goddess of the town and demanded of her how she happened to fail in her duty of protection of this youth, when she had made it her business to see that no harm befell anybody in the burning-ghat, places of assembly, the ground round old trees, sequestered temples, and other places occasioning fear in people. She demanded to know if the goddess lost her righteousness, and if so, what exactly it was that she herself can do in regard to the matter.'

The goddess appeared in response to this invocation and asked her what it was that made her so sorrow-stricken as to brave the dangers of a midnight visit to the burning-ghat. Learning from her of the death of her son, she told the disconsolate mother that no devil nor evil spirit did take her son's life; his ignorance and his previous deeds are entirely responsible for his death. Old Gautami offered to give up her life if the goddess would restore her son to life, as thus restored he would be a protection to his father. The goddess replied again that when one's life goes out of the body, it follows the track of its deeds and gets into another birth immediately; there could hardly be any doubt in regard to this. 'To restore life that is gone is not matter possible of

achievement. Therefore give up useless sorrow for the death of your son. If it were otherwise, are there not many who would give life for life for kings of this earth? Do you not see in front of you hundreds of monuments erected to the memory of dead sovereigns. Give up, therefore, talk of cruelty, which would lead you only to the sufferings of hell.' Gautami said in reply: 'I have heard it said, gods can do whatever people pray for, on the authority of the *Vēda*. If you will not give me the boon that I pray for, I shall this moment destroy my life.' The goddess in her turn said: 'If, within the circuit of the Universe, any one of the innumerable gods can grant you the boon that you ask for, I shall be quite pleased to do so myself. But see now what I can do.'

Having said this, she brought down before Gautami, the four classes of *Arūpa* (formless) Brahmas, sixteen *Rūpa* (having form) Brahmas, the two light-emanating bodies, the six classes of gods, innumerable *Rākshasas*, the eight kinds of men, several groups of stars, 'the day asterisms,' the planets, all of them comprised within the circuit of the Universe and capable of granting boons to those that pray for them. Bringing all these in the presence of Gautami the goddess asked these to give the boon of the sorrow-stricken Brahman lady, and explained to them the condition of Gautami. All of them in one voice gave reply of a tenor similar to that in which she answered the question to Gautami. Understanding the truth from this, Gautami reconciled herself in a way to her sadly bereaved condition, and, disposing off the dead body of her son, returned. Thereafter to illustrate to the coming generations the extraordinary power of the Goddess Champāpati, Maya, the divine architect, constructed this monument with the mountain Mēru in the

middle, with the seven mountains all round it, four great islands, two thousand smaller islands, with other places of note, containing the kind of beings said to live in them. This was done by him as memorial of the visit of the beings of the Universe at command of Champāpatī. As this building was in the immediate vicinity of the burning-ghat, it came to be known popularly as the 'temple of the burning-ghat'. Maṇimēkhalai who was listening to this colloquy between her friend and the goddess, could only remark:—'This indeed is the character of life on this earth'. After a little while, Sutamati the companion fell asleep, and the goddess Maṇimēkhalā putting young Maṇimēkhalai to sleep by a charm, carried her through the air thirty *yojanas* south and leaving her there, went her way.

BOOK VII

The goddess returned to Puhār, and appeared before Prince Udayakumāra spending a sleepless night in bed, revolving constantly in his mind that with the dawn he would still secure possession of Maṇimēkhalai. Presenting herself to him in a vision, the goddess addressed him in the following words: 'Oh, Son of the great king! If the king change from righteousness ever so little, planets themselves will move out of their orbits; if planets change their course, rainfall will diminish; with shortage of rainfall, all life on earth will cease; the king will often cease to be regarded as king, because he would seem not to regard all life as his own; therefore cast away the evil thoughts that you set upon Maṇimēkhalai, who has assumed the life of a celibate.' Passing from there to the garden, and waking up Sutamati who was fast asleep, she told her that she was goddess Maṇimēkhalā, that she came there to see the great festival of Indra, that she

(Sutamati) had no cause to fear, as the opportune time had come for Maṣimēkhalai to follow the path of the Buddha, and gave her the information that for this reason, she had carried Maṣimēkhalai away from Puhār and left her in Maṣipallavam, wherefrom she would return on the seventh day to Puhār, having learnt in the meanwhile all that took place in her own and Sutamati's previous existence on earth. The Goddess added that although she would appear in a disguise, which would baffle identification of her by anybody in the city, her identity would be to her manifest; on the day that she returns to Puhār, there would be many strange appearances in the city. Having said this, she asked Sutamati to inform Mād'havi of the appearance of the goddess and of what took place in respect of her daughter, pointing out to her that she was on the way to enter the right path. The goddess then told Sutamati that Mād'havi had already knowledge of who the goddess was. 'When Kovalan told Mād'havi to name their daughter after the patron deity of the family, I appeared before Mād'havi in a dream and told her: "You have become the mother of a child who, devoting herself to a life of penance, would destroy the influence of the God of Passion so completely that he would for ever remain helpless not knowing what to do." She asked Sutamati to remind Mād'havi of this, which she told her in a dream though in a manner of one talking to her in physical presence.'

Sutamati woke up and in distress because of her separation from Maṣimēkhalai, was in great fear of remaining where she was, as she could hear the noise of various fearsome transactions, at dead of night in the burning ghat of the city. She therefore went across the postern in the enclosing wall, and entered the adjoining Chakravālakōṭṭam. Entering the great Dharmaśāla

there, she retired to a corner in the building, where to her great fear, a statue, on a pillar in front of her, began to address her in the following terms:—' Oh, the rare daughter of Ravivarma, the wife of Durjaya, of immense cavalry, you that met your death by an elephant when you had lost control of yourself, so as to bring about in consequence the death of Tārai your elder sister! You the daughter of the Brahman Kauṣika of Champa inhabited by Kārāḷar! You that came into the city in the company of Mārutavēgan and joined the company of your elder sister Tārai! You that were known Vīrai in your previous birth, and are known Sutamati in this life, listen. Your younger sister Lakshmi, understanding all that happened in her previous life and yours, will return to this city seven days from to-day. Therefore have no fear that she has been taken away from you.' In these words the statue spoke to her in the voice of a God. Sutamati, her fears increased on hearing this, managed to spend the night somehow, and, starting at break of day, went through the streets of the city to the house of Mādhavi and recounted to her all that took place the previous day. On hearing of what had taken place and of the disappearance of Maṇimēkhalai, Mādhavi was stricken with sorrow like a cobra which had lost its crest jewel, while Sutamati, in her company, remained incapable of action like a being whose life had gone out of her, because of the separation of Maṇimēkhalai from her.

BOOK VIII

While Sutamati was in this state of sorrow, Maṇimēkhalai woke up from sleep on the sandy beach of Maṇipallavam. Looking round she found nothing that was familiar to her, and felt herself as strangely placed as a soul in a new birth. While she was hardly able to

think what she could do, the sun rose, and in the sunlight she began to wonder whether this was a part of the garden near the city, which she had never seen before, and called out for Sutamati, her companion:—'Oh, Sutamati, you have hidden yourself, you are causing me great sorrow; I do not understand whether I see things as they are, or in a dream. My heart is quaking with fear, give me word in answer; the darkness of night has left; Mādhavi, my mother, would be in great anxiety. Oh, the finely bangled one, come on! Have you left the place? Is this a miracle brought about by that lady that appeared before me who seemed an expert in magic art? I hardly know what I can think or do; I am in great fear being alone. Do come quick.' Crying out like this, she ran about here and there to bathing-ghats on one side and to the sand dunes on the other. All her search was in vain, and finding nobody that she knew, she began to weep aloud. Thinking of her father and his tragic end, and calling upon him: 'Oh, my father, father, who had gone to another kingdom with your most delicately formed wife, and suffered death from the sword of authority.' She wandered about till she came to what seemed a seat of the Buddha. The seat had been placed there by Indra, and had the miraculous power to let those who worshipped it know their previous life, as the Buddha himself had delivered a sermon sitting on it. This happened on the occasion when two neighbouring Nāga chiefs, related to each other, fought for possession of it. As the war proved destructive Buddha appeared before them and pacified the combatants by preaching the sermon.

BOOK IX

At sight of this Manimēkhalai forgot herself in wonder. Her hands automatically folded over her head;

from her eyes flowed tears of joy ; she circumambulated the divine seat three times, and prostrated before it. Getting up she looked at the seat again, and began to recollect all that had taken place in her previous existence. She recounted to herself what had happened in the following terms :—' Oh, Holy One, one that knows the ultimate truth, I now understand clearly that all that you said on the banks of the river Kāyañkarai is turning true ; in the great kingdom of Gāndhāra, in the eastern province of it, was the city Idavayam (Rishabaka?). The king that ruled from this city, as his capital, was Attipati. You Brahma Dharma, who art his brother-in-law, foretold in conversation with him, while teaching him *Dharma* : " In seven days' time from now there will be an earthquake in Jambudvīpa. As a result of this, this capital city of yours and four hundred *yojanas* of territory in the great Nāganādu will get submerged. Therefore abandon this city and go away to another, sharp." The king announced this by beat of drum to all the citizens and vacated the city with them. As he was moving at the head of his people to the city of Avanti in the north he had to remain encamped on the banks of the river Kāyañkarai. Then, you Holy One ! there was the earthquake, as you predicted, on the day, and at the time indicated, and the royal city of Idavayam was destroyed. The king and his court, their respect for you increased by this incident, surrounded you and you were delivering them a holy sermon. At that time I came with my husband Rāhuja to listen to the sermon. Seeing me you were pleased to say that my husband Rāhuja would die on the sixteenth day by a kind of cobra the sight of which was death (*Drishtivisha*) ; that I would enter the funeral pyre with him ; that I would then be born in the city of Puhār, and that a great misfortune would befall me ;

that the Goddess Maṇimēkhalā would then appear at dead of night, and carrying you away will settle you down in an islet of the sea south of Kāvēripaṭṭinam. You will then learn what had transpired in this birth, while engaged in worshipping the seat of Buddha. Then will come to you the recollection of all that I say to you to-day. I then requested of him: that he might also enlighten me as to what next birth my husband would have. I received an answer from him that that matter would be explained to me by the Goddess, who carried me away from Kāvēripaṭṭinam. That Goddess has not yet appeared !' Saying this to herself, she remained weeping as before.

BOOK X

While she was in this state of sorrow and uncertainty, the Goddess Maṇimēkhalā, knowing that Maṇimēkhalai had already learnt of her previous birth, and that she was possessed of a beautiful disposition, came down from the clouds. Moving through the air, she recited so as to be audible to Maṇimēkhalai, 'When living beings should have lost all feeling, when their ears should have become deaf to the good teaching, when they should have lost all right understanding, and thus reduce the world to a turmoil consequent upon poverty of right knowledge, you appeared like a glorious morning sun, after there had been long suffering owing to the loss of the daily appearance and disappearance of the sun, to make *Dharma* prevail in the world. At your feet, therefore, I offer my worship. I regard your seat as yourself. I have set you on my tongue. I have placed you on my head. I have seated you on my heart, a full blown lotus flower.' When she came within hail of Maṇimēkhalai, she asked her to desist from weeping.

Descending to the earth, she went right round the seat thrice and offered it worship. Maṇimēkhalai in her turn made due obeisance to the Goddess and asked her, 'By your grace, I am now possessed of knowledge of my previous birth; where is Rāhuja born who was then my husband?' The Goddess replied: 'Oh, Lakshmi, you were one day with your husband in a garden having fallen out with him in a love quarrel. He fell at your feet to remove your displeasure. While in that position there appeared a Buddhist *Chārana* (one that moves through air) by name Sādhu Sakkaran. He had gone to Ratnadīpa to set the "Wheel of Law" going, and was returning across the air. Being mid-day, he came down to the earth as it was the hour for taking food. Seeing him, you were greatly frightened, and, feeling ashamed of yourself in the condition in which you happened to be, you offered your obeisance to him. Seeing your discomfort, Rāhuja demanded who he was in a tone of anger. Trembling with fear, you shut his mouth and told him that it was an act of great error on his part not to have done due worship at the feet of the great one who had just descended from the air and remained without addressing him in prayer. Taking him with you, you again made profound obeisance and offered to bring him food and drink though both of you, the husband and the wife, were not of his way of persuasion and requested him to accept the food of you. The *Sādhu* (the saint) consented and promised to take it. The merit that you have thus acquired by feeding him will never abandon you and will ultimately get rid of your rebirth. That Rāhuja, your husband, is the Prince Udayakumāra who came after you to the garden at the city. It is this that explains why he had exhibited that strong affection for you and, what is more, your mind also feels attracted

to him. To change that feeling of attachment and set you on the good path, I brought you over to this island and showed you this seat. There is more that I can tell you. In your former birth, when you were the daughter of Ravivarma and his wife Amudapati, king and queen of Yaśodharanagara, you had two sisters Tārai and Virai. Those two had married the king of Kacchayanagara in the kingdom of Anga by name Duchchaya (Durjaya) who took them one day to see the hills in his kingdom, and was with them on the banks of the Ganges on his return. Aravana Adigaḷ came to his camp then and in reply to his enquiry as to what brought his Holiness there, the Holy one replied that he had come to that part of the country to worship the footprints on the hill (Gṛdhrakūṭa). He said that of old Buddha stood on the top of the hill and taught the *Dharma*, in order that all living beings might release themselves from sorrow and live in happiness. While so preaching his footmarks acquired permanence and, remaining in that condition ever since, the hill acquired the name Pādapankayamalai (the hill of the Lotus footmark). He advised the monarch also to go and offer worship at it. By the merit so acquired by worship at the feet, both your sisters are born respectively as your mother and her companion Sutamati. Oh, Maṇimēkhalai, now you understand your former birth. You have also acquired a notion of what the *Dharma* is. You will some day in future hear of the teaching of the sectaries of the other persuasions. These latter may hesitate to teach you because you are a young woman. But as such knowledge is essential to you, you will have to assume a form more worthy of that teaching.' So saying she taught Maṇimēkhalai two *mantras* (spells or incantations) at the thought of which she could acquire

respectively the capacity to move through the air and to assume any form that would suit her for the occasion. She retired telling her that one essential that Maṇimēkhalai should remember was that she should adopt the path of *Dharma* as taught by the Buddha, and the next, that she was to offer her worship to the seat and return. Having ascended the air, she came down again and asked Maṇimēkhalai, 'You have undertaken to follow the path of discipline. Human bodies are built of food, and hunger is a great necessity.' She taught Maṇimēkhalai therefore another *mantra*, which would get rid of hunger at the thought of it. Having given her this, she left and disappeared through the air.

BOOK XI

Maṇimēkhalai walked about admiring the beauty of the sand dunes, flower gardens and cool tanks. In a short while there appeared before her a lady who accosted her: 'Who are you that have arrived here alone like a woman who had suffered shipwreck?' Maṇimēkhalai enquired in reply to which of her births the question referred, answering the question none the less that in her previous birth she went by the name Lakshmi and was the wife of a prince called Rāhuḷa. In the present birth, she was the daughter of Mādhavi, a dancing woman. She was known by the name Maṇimēkhalai, and she was brought to that particular spot of that island by the Goddess Maṇimēkhalā from the pleasure garden just outside of her native city Kāvēripaṭṭinam. She concluded by saying that by means of her worship of the 'Buddha-seat' in front of them she had learnt her previous birth. So saying she wished to know who the other lady was. The lady replied that in the neighbourhood of that island there

was another called Ratnadvīpa. ' There on the high peak of the hill Samantakūṭa there are the footprints of the Buddha. Having offered worship at the footprints I came to this island long ago. Since then I have remained here keeping guard over this "dharma-seat" under the orders of Indra. My name is Tīva-Tilakai (Dvīpa Tilakā). People following the *Dharma* of the Buddha strictly, offering worship to this "Buddha-seat" will gain knowledge of their previous birth, knowing their past as a result of this worship. Such are few in this world. It is only those few who are fit to acquire *Dharmapada* forsooth. Since by such a worship you have acquired knowledge of your previous birth, you must be such a great one. In front of this seat there is a little pond full of cool water overgrown with all the variety of water-lily. From that will appear a never-failing "begging-bowl" by name Amuda-Śurabī (Amṛta Surabhī). The bowl appears every year on the day (of full moon) in the season of the early sun, in the month of Rishabha, in the fourteenth asterism, the day in which the Buddha himself was born. That day this year is to-day and the hour is just now. That Bowl, I ween, will come into your hand. Food put into it will be inexhaustible. You will learn all about it from Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ, who lives in your own native city.' Maṇimēkhalai on hearing this, making her obeisance to the Buddha-seat, went along with Tīva-Tilakai, and, circumambulating the pond, stood in front of it. The bowl emerged from the water, and turning round to the right reached the hands of Maṇimēkhalai. Maṇimēkhalai felt delighted beyond measure and uttered the following chant in praise of the Buddha:--

' Hail ! holy feet of the Hero ! that subdued Cupid,

' Hail ! holy feet of Him ! who destroyed the evil path,

- Hail ! holy feet of the Great One ! labouring to set others in the path of *Dharma*,
- Hail ! holy feet of the Perfectly Wise ! who gives to others the eye of wisdom,
- Hail ! holy feet of Him ! whose ears are deaf to evil words,
- Hail ! holy feet of Him ! whose tongue never uttered other than truth,
- Hail ! holy feet of Him ! who visited hell itself to destroy sufferings there,
- Hail ! holy feet of Him ! that destroyed the sorrows of those of the Nāga world.'

• To praise you is beyond the power of my tongue ; to bow at your feet is alone possible for my body.' To Maṇimēkhalai, in this attitude of prayer Tīva-Tīlakai expounded the sufferings of hunger and the merit accruing to those that enabled creatures to appease hunger. 'Hunger,' she told Maṇimēkhalai, 'will destroy good birth, will kill nobility, will cut off the hold that learning has upon the learned people as the great support of life, will deprive people of all feeling of shame, will spoil qualities that are beautiful, will make people stand at the door of others with their wives. Such indeed is the nature of the sinful craving hunger.' To praise those who destroyed it in words is beyond the power of my tongue. She illustrated this by the following incident in the life of Viśvāmitra. Owing to failure of rain and consequently of crops, Viśvāmitra was stricken with hunger. To satisfy that he wandered here, there and everywhere, and got nothing that he could eat. Stricken beyond endurance, he made up his mind to eat the flesh of a dog, some of which was available. Before eating it however, he made the usual offerings to the Gods beginning with Indra (Vaiśvadeva). Indra coming to know of it ordered an abundance of rain, and thus removed famine that led to

this baleful consequence. Tīva-Tīlakai said: 'You may have heard the story already. Food that is given to those who can afford to provide it for themselves is charity sold. Food provided to allay the hunger of those that cannot otherwise satisfy it is true charity, and all right kind of life in this world comes to such people. Among those that live in this world those that give food are those that give life. Therefore go forward and give to those that are hungry that which will destroy hunger.' Mañimēkhalai, having heard this, said in reply: 'In my former life, my husband died of a cobra, whose sight brings death. I ascended the funeral pyre with him and while burning, I bethought myself of the food that I gave to a Buddhist Bikshu, Sādhu Sakkara. As a result of that good thought at the moment of my death, this hunger-relieving bowl has come into my hands, I believe. Like a mother's breast which at the sight of the face of her hungry child begins yielding milk, I wish to see this bowl in my hand provide a supply of food inexhaustible at sight of those who are oppressed with hunger, and wander about in dripping rain or scorching sun indifferently in search of something to appease it.' After a little while Tīva-Tīlakai gave leave to Mañimēkhalai to return to Pubār with the bowl. Mañimēkhalai, after a profound obeisance to her and circumambulating the Buddha-seat again, thought of the *mantra* which gave her the power to fly, and flew through the air. She returned to Kāvērīpaṭṭinam and meeting her mother and companion told them of her previous birth to their wonderment; taking them along with her she went to see the holy sage Aṣavaṇa Aḍigaḷ, telling them on the way that the bowl in her hand was the inexhaustible food-supplying one which once belonged to Aputra, and that the only way for them to attain good life on this

earth was by placing themselves under the beneficent guidance of Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ.

BOOK XII

Maṇimēkhalai set out with her mother and her companion, and reached ultimately where Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ was. There she met the venerable monk, his hair all grey, his body loose with age, while the tongue showed no signs of trembling, accustomed as he was, through a long series of years, to teaching. She went round him three times and made her obeisance. She then related all that happened to her ever since she went into the flower-garden adjacent to the city till her return, and concluded that she was directed by the Goddess Maṇimēkhalā to learn from him more about the previous life of her mother and her companion. She also reported that she received a similar direction from Tiva-Tilakai regarding the history of Āputra. Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ evinced great pleasure at hearing this, and began immediately to relate the story of Mādhavi and Sutamati:—‘On one occasion I visited the Pāda-Pangaya Maḷai (Gṛdhrakūṭa), and on my return met Durjaya Rāja in a grove. To my enquiry whether he and his queens were well, he told me, in great sorrow, that one of them Virai died by going unguarded in front of a newly captured elephant as a result of drink, and that her sister having heard of this got up the terrace of the palace and died by throwing herself from it. I consoled him by saying that this was the result of previous *action*, and sorrow would be useless.’ Addressing the two, he said. ‘You two have come into the world again like actors in a new disguise.’ Turning to Maṇimēkhalai he said: ‘At this time *dharma* is diminished in the world and sinful action has been on

the rise. But believing there is still the possibility of the existence of some slight tendency to *dharma*, I have not relaxed in my efforts in teaching it. That *dharma*, people in this world do not know. But within the circuit of this universe, the *dēvas* understand it and at their request *the Dēva* will come down again to this world from the *Tushita* Heaven in the year 1616. Then everyone in this world will feel impelled to practise the doctrine of mercy.' 'When the "sun of Buddha" appears, the moon and the sun will shine without interruption, asterisms that mark the day will move in their orbits without stopping, rains will never fail, earth will yield abundance, living beings will not experience evil, the wind will blow in the right direction, prosperity will attend all directions of the compass, the great sea will give good things in plenty, cows will of themselves yield pailfuls of milk, birds eating plenty will not have to go out in search of prey, beasts and men will give up even their natural enmity, fearsome beings and demons will cease to molest, human beings with defective organs will not come to birth. Those that should be born then and have the good fortune to hear the *dharma* from Him will cease to be born again. Therefore it is that birth after birth, I have made it my business to praise constantly the feet of My Lord, who acquired the knowledge at the root of the Bodhi tree.' 'Further than this, Maṇimēkhalai!' he said, 'you have to do certain things in this city. It is only after that that your mind will reach the proper stage for receiving the *dharma* that I might teach. These two are born with you because of the merit they acquired by worshipping the Buddha-feet at Gḍhrakūṭa. In your company they will get rid of the results of all their previous action and attain the state of *Nirvāṇa*. You have obtained possession of the "elixir

of life". Do go forward and destroy the hunger of all living beings by means of it. There is only one act of charity, whether it be to the Gods or to human beings, and, that is, relief of suffering from hunger.' Mañimêkhalai assented.

BOOK XIII

The sage, Aṛavaṇa Adigaḷ, then continued giving the history of Āputra in the following words:—

'There lived in Vārapāsi a Brahman teaching the Veda, known by the name of Abhanjika, with his wife Śāli. Having fallen away from conduct expected of her high station, she wished to get rid of her sin by bathing in the sea at Kumāri (Cape Comorin) notwithstanding the fact that she was enceinte. (In this condition a holy bath at sea is prohibited according to Bramanical notions.) In the course of her journey, she gave birth to a boy child about a march from Korkai, one of the capitals of the Pāṇḍyas, and, leaving it behind without pity in a sequestered plantain garden, she went her way. Hearing the weeping of the baby, a cow which was grazing not far off came near and, licking the child, gave it milk and kept with it for seven days, protecting it from harm. A traveller from Vayanangōḍu came that way along with his wife. Hearing the baby weeping, he approached, with his wife, the place wherefrom the sound came. This Brahman ḷambhūti, taking pity on the forlorn baby, told his wife that it could not be the child of a cow, and, regarding it as his own, congratulated his wife and himself that after all they had been blessed with a baby. Returning to his village, he gave the boy the education worthy of a Brahman child, and, after he had attained to the age of receiving the Bramanical thread, he put him through the further course of education

suitable to a Brahman youth. At this stage another Brahman of the village celebrated a great sacrifice. The boy entering the sacrificial ground discovered a cow, ready decorated for the sacrifice, in distress. He made up his mind immediately to steal the cow overnight and walk away with it unobserved. He loitered about the place and when night had advanced, he released the cow, and taking hold of it, walked away from the locality. The Brahmans discovered soon after that the cow was missing, and came upon the young man with the cow in the course of their search. Taking hold of the cow, they began beating the young fellow for having stolen it. Seeing her saviour oppressed in this fashion, the cow attacked the priest who was beating the boy, and ran into the woods after severely wounding him. Aputra accosted his oppressors, and requested them to listen to what he had to say, 'Feeding on the grass that grows on the village common, cows feed all people the world over from birth onwards. With a creature so kind-hearted, what cause could there be for anger?' They said to him that he was talking contemptuously of sacrifices without understanding the prescribed path of the Veda, which it is clear he did not know. Hence it is but proper, they said that he was called 'Cow's son' (Aputran). The youth retorted that 'Rishi Achala was the son of a cow, Śrīgi was the son of a deer, Rishi Vṛnchi was the son of a tiger, and Kēśakambaḷa, the revered of the wise, was the son of a fox. Are these not *Rishis* accepted of your tribe? If so, as you will admit it is so, is there much that is contemptible in being born of a cow?' On hearing this one among the Brahmans said that he knew the actual birth and parentage of the boy, and related the story of how he was born of Śālī, the Brahman woman of Benares, as he had heard it from herself. The Brahman said that he

did not care hitherto to speak about this, as it was no use doing it. It is now clear that by his conduct he justified the sinistral character of his birth. To this the boy retorted again by pointing out that both Vasishṭa and Agastya were born of the heavenly courtesan Tilōttamā. 'If so why talk of my mother Śālī,' making the innuendo that Śālī was an alternative name of Arundhatī, the model of chastity? But this dispute had its effect, however, in that his foster-father Bhūti cast him out as of unclean birth, and as it came noised abroad that he stole the sacrificial cow, he no more got alms in Brahman villages. Finding himself at the end of his resources, he came to Southern Madura, and made the front yard of the temple of the Goddess of Learning there, his abode. Therefrom he used to go daily on begging rounds and returning with what he got, distributed it among the blind, the deaf, the maimed, and those who had no one to fall back upon, and even those that were oppressed with illness. Calling upon all these and feeding them first, he took for his portion what was actually left over. When he had done this, he went to sleep with his begging-bowl as his pillow and thus spent many years.

BOOK XIV

While he was thus leading his life uneventfully, on one occasion some people approached him at dead of night while he was asleep, and asked him some food to satisfy their extreme hunger. Not having the means to satisfy them, he was in great distress of mind at his inability to be of assistance to the suffering people, when the 'Goddess of Mind' (Sarasvatī) appeared before him, and handed to him a bowl that she had in her hand, telling him that even if all the country should be stricken with famine, the bowl would remain inexhaustible. 'Give

as much as ever you like, there will be no exhaustion unless it be of the hands that received it.' Receiving the bowl with great joy and gratitude, he offered thanks to the Goddess, and attended immediately to the wants of those who were hungry to their satisfaction. Thereafter he made it his business to provide food for all living beings that he could reach so much so that the yard of the temple where he lived became a concourse of people, animals, birds and other creatures wanting food. Intimation of this was received by God Indra by the usual quiver visible in the white carpet, on which was placed this throne. The God appeared before Aputra immediately, in the shape of an old Brahman doubled up with age, to give him what boon he wanted. The old man told him that he was no other than Indra, and that he came there to give him a boon that he might ask, as he greatly appreciated the merit of the great gift of food that he was making from day to day. On hearing this, Āputra laughed, till his sides ached, in derision, and addressed Indra in the following words:—' People that practise *Dharma*, people that take care of others and protect them from harm, people that practise penance, people that do deeds without attachment, these do not constitute the heaven of the *Dēvas*. Oh valiant Lord of the kingdom of the *Dēvas*! I want nothing of you. I want in fact nothing more than this solitary bowl which enables me to satisfy the unquenchable hunger of those that feel hungry and enjoy the sight of their satisfied countenances. I wish for nothing more.' Indra got wroth at this disappointing attitude of his and vowed vengeance within himself. Returning to his place, he sent down an abundance of rain, and made the whole land of the Pāṇḍya kingdom smile with cultivation and prosperity, so that there may be no creature wanting

sustenance. Aputra soon found there was no room for the exercise of his charity, and, leaving his place, he went out in search of those that may need his services. Getting none even after that, he was going about like one forlorn, when some of those who had recently arrived from overseas, from the country of Śāvakam, told him that in that distant country there was a famine prevalent at the time owing to the failure of rain and a great number of the inhabitants had died of famine. He immediately made up his mind to travel to that land with his bowl in order that he might find an opportunity for the exercise of his charity. He took ship with this object along with other passengers. Being overtaken by a storm, the ship had to unfurl and to make a halt for a day. The ship set sail again at dead of night in the belief that all the passengers were in. Āputra, however, got left out, and being distressed at this great disappointment to him, he resolved to give up life rather than live useless in that uninhabited island, the bowl of miraculous power also being of no service in his possession. He, therefore, threw the bowl into a pond with a *gōmukha* (cow's mouth spout) with a prayer that it might reappear on the surface of the water one day in the year. He further wished that if ever any one appeared on that occasion who made it his life-work to exercise charity and protect all living beings, the bowl should pass into his hands. Having done this, he laid down without food or drink, and thus passed out of existence. 'As this was taking place,' Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ said, 'I happened to be there and in reply to my enquiry, he gave me the whole history before giving up life.' That Aputra took birth again in the land of Śāvakam from the cow of the king of the country very much like the sun which, having risen in the East, destroys darkness,

and, gives up its light in the West, only to rise again in the East.

BOOK XV

Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ continued to relate the further story of Āputra. The cow that for seven days from birth fostered the child Āputra, had taken birth as a result of its own good deeds at Dhavaḷamalai in Śāvakanāḍu where a *Rishi* by name Maṇmukha was living his austere life. In its new birth it had horns and hoofs of gold, and had a plentiful yield of milk even before it had calved, which it made use of for feeding human beings. Seeing this phenomenal occurrence, the *Rishi* who understood the past, present and future, declared that the cow would give birth to a hero from out of a golden egg. Āputra, till he gave up life in Maṇipallavam for the purpose of doing charity to all living creatures, had never lost thought of the cow that had saved him from death and brought him up during the first seven days of his existence, and, as a consequence, he appeared again on earth, as the *Rishi* had predicted. He came into existence like the very Buddha himself on the full moon of the month of Vaiśāka. Though it was not the season of the rains, there was a drizzle of holy water as at the appearance of the Buddha himself. All the holy ones in the Chakravāḷa at Puhār struck with wonder at the appearance of these good omens, and not understanding the cause thereof, went down to the hall where the statue on the pillar was accustomed to giving explanations of such phenomenal occurrences. The statue sure enough gave them the explanation that the phenomenon that caused them surprise was due to the appearance of Āputra in another birth, and directed them to the sage Aravaṇa for further details of his history. The king of

Sāvakaṃ at the time, Bhūmicandra by name, had for long been exercised in mind because he had not the fortune of an heir. In one of his visits to the *Rishi* he was presented with the child that was born of the cow, and he since then, brought it up as his own. 'That boy has now come of age and he is ruling over the land.' Addressing Maṇimēkhalāi, the sage said: 'While the great river Kāvēri flows with water and provides the land with that much-needed element, living beings suffer for lack of food for some cause as yet not understood. Therefore there is no use that you keep this boon unused as if the Gods should keep the vessel containing the celestial ambrosia, after they had taken their fill, unused for others.' On hearing this Maṇimēkhalāi paid her obeisance to the sage, and assuming the form of a bhikṣuṇī, and with the bowl in her hand, passed into the streets. Immediately on seeing her, there gathered round her a crowd, much like the crowd that had collected round Yaugandharāyaṇa when he assumed the disgusting disguise of a man suffering from disease, and entered the streets of Ujjain for the purpose of releasing Udayana, his master, from the prison into which Pradhyota the king had thrown him. The people wondered that this comely damsel who had found a hiding place in the heart of Udayakumāra should thus have made her debut in the royal streets of Puhār with the begging bowl in her hand. At this moment Maṇimēkhalāi declared that the first handful of alms she would receive should be that the best among the chaste women of the locality should offer to her. Kāyaśaṇḍikāi gave the immediate reply that, among women of chastity who could compel the clouds to rain, the most excellent one was Adirāi and that they were then in front of her house. 'Go into her house and accept alms from her first.'

BOOK XVI

Having said this Kāyaśandikai explained how Adirai attained to that eminence in chastity. Adirai's husband went by the name Śāduvan, and, having taken a fancy for a courtesan lost all the wealth he had. Being reduced to poverty in this manner, he was neglected by his own sweetheart. He then resolved to go to a foreign country and acquire wealth by trade. He took ship along with merchants trading overseas, and suffered shipwreck on the way. Taking hold of a piece of the broken mast, he swam till he reached the side of a hill in an island inhabited by naked Nāgas. Some of the other passengers of the boat similarly escaped, a few of whom returning to Kāvēripaṭṭinam itself. These people not knowing what had happened to him gave it out that all the other passengers had died of the accident. Concluding from what she heard that her husband also should have died, Ādirai resolved, with the approval of the citizens, to burn herself on a funeral pyre. Lighting up the pyre as usual in the burning ghat, she entered the fire declaring that she might go to the place that her husband was in, as a result of his works. Finding that the lighted pyre had no effect on her, she was distracted with grief even more than before, as she felt that even fire would not burn her, the great sinner that she was. There came to her a voice from the air at that time telling her that her husband was not dead and that he had escaped to the island of the naked Nāgas. The voice assured her that he would not stay there long and would return with the mercantile fleet of Chandradatta, the overseas merchant. Ādirai returned home and was constantly doing such good deeds as would hasten the return of her husband. Śāduvan, on the contrary, having reached the island, had fallen fast asleep out of fatigue under the shade of a tree. Having sighted

him, the Nāgas approached him and woke him up gleefully, believing that they would make a good meal of him. Śāduvan, however, having had occasion to cultivate their language, spoke to them in their own language to their great surprise. They took him to their leader. Śāduvan found him and his wife in a cavern, much as a bear and its mate, surrounded by pots for brewing beer and dried bones emitting smell of the most offensive kind. Talking to him for a little while, Śāduvan managed to prevail upon him to the extent of creating a good impression. To the enquiry how he came there, Śāduvan narrated what had happened. The leader ordered immediately that he might be provided with plenty of meat and drink, and a young woman for his companion. Pained at the ignorance displayed, Śāduvan declined his kind hospitality. Surprised at this refusal, the Nāga leader enquired angrily whether there was anything that pleased men more than women and food, and demanded to know if Śāduvan knew of any. 'Intoxicating drinks and the taking of life have been condemned by people of higher views. The death of those that are born, and the birth of those that die are really phenomena like wakefulness and sleep. As those that do good deeds obtain Heaven, and those that do evil reach Hell; the exalted ones have condemned these as causing evil. It would be well if you take note of this.' The Nāga chieftain laughed in anger and said contemptuously, 'you tell us that life that leaves the body takes another form and enters another body. Will you explain how life goes from one body to another?' Nothing ruffled by this, Śāduvan replied: 'When life is in the body, it experiences that which occurs; when life leaves the body, that self-same body does not experience any feeling even when it should be set fire to. Therefore you learn that

something that was in the body has left it. Everybody knows that when one leaves his place, he must needs be somewhere else. You experience in dreams that life can travel many leagues leaving the body here. Therefore you can understand that when life leaves the body here, it goes into another even at great distances.' When Śāduvan made this exposition, the habitually angry Nāga fell at the feet of merchant Śāduvan and said: 'It is impossible for me to keep life and body together without meat and beer. Therefore teach us that good life that is possible for us.' Śāduvan said in reply: 'Well said; you will follow the good path. If people suffering shipwreck should hereafter come to you alive, give them protection. Do not kill living creatures for food. Be satisfied with the flesh of animals that die.' 'We shall follow with pleasure this path of life which we can.' Thus saying he presented to Śāduvan sandalwood, aloes, cloths and other spoil of shipwreck that from time to time they took possession of from those who came to them like Śāduvan. Accepting these and taking ship in the convoy of merchant Chandradatta, Śāduvan returned to Kāvēripaṭṭinam and was at the time leading the life of householder along with his chaste wife. 'So it is,' said Kāyaśandikai, 'that I asked you to accept alms of her first.' Maṅimēkhalai entered Ādirai's house and stood silent like a picture undrawn by artist's hand. Ādirai went round her with words of praise, and offered her alms that would fill her bowl with the wish that the whole living world might no more suffer the pangs of hunger.

BOOK XVII

Having accepted alms from Ādirai, as detailed above, Maṅimēkhalai distributed the food in the bowl freely like those good people that distribute freely of their

wealth, earned in the way of virtue. However much was taken out of it, the bowl showed itself inexhaustible and proved an efficient means of satisfying the hunger of those that came for its satisfaction. Kāyaśandikāi, who was observing this, was struck with wonder, and making her obeisance to Maṇimēkhalai, prayed of her, ' Good mother, be so good as to satisfy the hunger that is unquenchable in me. My hunger is so great that all the food I take, whatever be the quantity, does as little to give me satisfaction as all the hills of stone brought and thrown into the sea by the army of monkeys in constructing the causeway across the sea for Rāma, in whose form Vishṇu appeared in the world as a result of the delusion brought on by the curse of *Rishis*. Do have mercy and destroy my hunger.' Maṇimēkhalai in response took a handful from the bowl and put it in her open hands. Kāyaśandikāi, her hunger quenched, and therefore the consequent suffering, recounted her history with folded hands: ' I come from the north from the city of Kānchanapura situated in the north of Śēdi in mount Kailāsa. With the Vidyādhara, my husband, I came on an excursion to see the Podiyil Hill¹ in the south. As fates had decreed it, we stopped for a little while on the sands of a wild stream. A Brahman, with the thread across his breast and his twisted locks of hair dangling, wearing his garment of fibre, had gone to his bath in the cool waters of a tank someway across, leaving on the sands on a teak leaf a ripe *janbu* as big as a palm fruit. I walked along proudly and, not seeing the fruit, tripped over it and destroyed it as a result of my bad deeds. Vṛiśchika, who returned anxious to take it for food, saw me thus causing destruction to his fruit,

¹ The hill of Pūṇḍya kṛōgs in Tinnevelli district in the north-west corner of it in the Western Ghats at the source of the River Tēnarapāṇi.

and addressed me thus : ' This *Jambu* fruit is a divine one that ripens once in twelve years, and the tree yields but one such fruit during that long period. That fruit intended for my food, you have destroyed. May you forget, therefore, the *mantra* by which you are enabled to travel in the air. Further may you suffer from the disease 'elephant-hunger' till I satisfy my hunger by taking the next fruit that ripens twelve years hence.' The day he marked for my release from this disease seems to be this day now that you have destroyed that unquenchable hunger. When this *Rishi* had departed in hunger, my husband returned, and, understanding what had happened, was sore troubled in heart, as I had become subjected to this great suffering even without fault of my own. As I could not rise into the air with him when he wanted me to start, and, as all the fruit and food that he could bring together would not satisfy my hunger, he left me with great sorrow, directing me the while with great kindness to go to this city even after many days' journey, a city which in the Tamil land in *Jambudvīpa* was a very rich one and where lived many people who helped those that were helpless. He comes here every year during the festival of Indra and parts again with regret counting upon his coming the next year. Now you have destroyed my hunger, I make my obeisance to you, and shall return to my native city in the north. Here in this city there is a place called *Chakravālakotta* inhabited by those hermits who make the destruction of suffering their business of life. There in that place you will find an open resting place, a work of charity; it is a habitation for all those that suffer from hunger coming from all places, of those that suffer from disease and have no one to look after them. Many others there are who, expecting that there they would

get alms, go there and live on others' charity. Having said this, Kāyaśaṅḍikai left for the land of the Vidyā-dharas. Maṇimēkhalai, on the contrary, entered the streets of Puhār, and, walking alone along one side of it, entered the public rest-house, having circumambulated it thrice, and performed her obeisance in thought, word and deed to the goddess of the city, worshipped by those of the city and others. Making similar obeisance to 'the statue of the pillar' she appeared in the hall of the hungry and the destitute, with the inexhaustible bowl in her hand, as if pouring rain had come on a wild region burnt up with the heat of the sun. She called out to those there to come and receive the food from the inexhaustible bowl of Āputra, and thenceforward the hall resounded perpetually with the noise of giving and taking food.

BOOK XVIII

Chitrāpati having heard that her grand-daughter Maṇimēkhalai had assumed the dress of a nun with the begging bowl in her hand for begging food, and that she had entered the common resting place, was beside herself with anger. Distracted in mind she resolved somehow to get Maṇimēkhalai back from this life of hers, and addressed the dancing women of her caste in the following words: 'Ever since the death of Kovalan, Mādhavi, my daughter, has given up life, and entering the hermitage of the holy ascetics, has herself assumed the form of a nun, a proceeding which evokes the laughter of our community. We are not the people that burn ourselves, like chaste wives, on the pyre of their husbands. We are like the lute of a musician; when he should die we pass from his hand to another's. Our profession is like that of the honey bee which sucks the

honey from out of the flower and passes on when it is exhausted. To assume the garb of a nun, and perform all the austerities of hermits, is not conduct in keeping with the customs of our caste. I have resolved, therefore, to make Manimēkhalai change her ascetic dress, hand her begging bowl over to beggars, and see her placed upon the car of prince Udayakumāra, who has for a long time been deeply in love with her. If I should fail to carry out this resolution of mine, let me share the fate of those who have fallen from our caste by having seven burnt bricks piled upon my head, and taken round the dancing hall and cast out so as not to have entry into the houses of dancing women ever after.' Having said this, she went at the head of a few of her companions to the palace of the prince. Saluting him in due form, and, with words of praise due from those of her station, she hinted to him how worthy of his affection Manimēkhalai was, and conveyed to him the information that she had betaken herself to the travellers' hall of the city. The prince on his side, who had never lost thought of her, described how unhappy he had been ever since he saw Manimēkhalai in the crystal hall and mistook her for a picture, and ended by saying that overnight there appeared before him a golden-coloured damsel who pointing out to him what was proper conduct, admonished him to give up thoughts of Manimēkhalai. He could not understand whether it was a goddess or one connected with a goddess. Chitrāpati smiled at the simplicity of the prince, and asked him whether he was not aware that the gods themselves were not free from the attractions even of illicit love, citing as examples Indra's love to Ahalya and of Agni's to the wives of the seven *Rishis*. She pointed the moral by telling him that the guardianship of girlhood, the care-

ful watch in married life, the complete abstinence from seeing or being seen after the death of one's husband, and, over all these, the great guard that the feeling of chastity actually keeps over women who do not know of guards other than their own virtue, is not conduct imposed upon women of our caste. It was our profession to enter public halls, and the presence of all, to exhibit our skill in dancing and music, and be seen by all in all the charms of our beauty. That is not all, our function is to be so attractive as to get into the minds of everybody that sees us, and thus enslave their minds, and remain with them so long as they proved profitable, giving them up the moment they ceased to be. She concluded by enquiring whether it was not the duty of kings to bind such to their caste custom and to save them from the evil reputation that is certain from the conduct of both her daughter and grand-daughter. Thus instigated, the prince drove down to the travellers' hall, and seeing Maṇimēkhalai there distributing food, approached her making the enquiry what her purpose was in assuming the form of an ascetic. Thinking that it was due to him that she should make her obeisance, the more so as he was her husband in the previous birth, she made a profound obeisance, and told him, 'birth, growth and decay, disease ending in death; these are the sufferings of the human body. Understanding this, I have taken it upon myself to do permanent acts of charity in this life. Saying this, she wanted to get away from him and assume another form. She entered the temple of Champāpati, and reciting the incantation which the Goddess Maṇimēkhālā had taught her, she assumed the form of Kāyaśaṅḍikai, and came out of the temple with the begging bowl in her hand. The prince entered the temple and enquired of the goddess where Maṇimēkhalai was in hiding after handing her

begging bowl to Kāyaśaṅḍikai. He vowed that if the goddess would not let him know, he would lie there hungry till she should grant the boon. So saying he touched the feet of the goddess in token of his unswerving resolution.

BOOK XIX

While prince Udayakumāra was thus making his vow, a being of the spirit-world inhabiting one of the pictures on the wall warned him, 'you are thoughtless in making your vow before the goddess. It will come to nothing.' The prince was taken aback by the miraculous voice, and, somewhat shaken in his resolution, said, 'There is something divine in the spiritual being that exhorted me to forget Manimēkhalai. The bowl that she carries in her hand with an inexhaustible supply of food is a miracle that causes me great surprise; that this painting should talk to me in this manner is still more surprising.' He resolved that he would find out the truth of all this after knowing the truth about Manimēkhalai. Having thus made up his mind, and, still beside himself with his love for her, he returned to his palace.

Manimēkhalai, on the contrary, thought that in her form she was exposed to the efforts of the prince to take possession of her, and resolved to assume the form of Kāyaśaṅḍikai. She took the miraculous bowl from the temple of Champāpati as Kāyaśaṅḍikai, and went from place to place wherever she thought there was the chance of meeting people in hunger. In the course of her wanderings, she went one day to the chief prison in the city, and, entering the well-guarded penitentiary, began with great kindness and pleasing words, to feed those who were suffering from hunger while undergoing punishment. The guardsmen were struck with wonder

that she was able to feed so many from out of one vessel that she carried in her hand, and reported the miraculous occurrence to the king. With his queen Śirtti, a descendant of Mahābali who ages long gone by, gifted, with pouring of water, the whole earth and all that was his, to Viṣṇu, when he appeared as a dwarf and sought a boon of him, and rising sky high, measured the whole earth in one stride, the king was on a visit of pleasure to the royal garden, and among them he found a peacock with its mate moving about in the company of a milk white swan. He pointed out the three to the queen likening them to Krishna, his brother and sister in their characteristic dance. In another place similarly he saw a tall bamboo standing alongside of a white *Kaṣāmbu*, which again seemed to him like Krishna and his brother standing. Having thus spent a considerable time, he retired to a garden house where, like Indra himself, he was resting for a while with his queen. This house was a work of art in which had been lavished 'the skill of the Tamiī Artisan, along with those of the jewellers of Magadha, of the smiths of Mahratta, of the blacksmiths of Avanti, and of the carpenters of Yavana'. The structure was constructed with pillars of coral, with capitals of varied jewels, with pendants of white pearl and a beautifully worked canopy of gold. Here the head of the prison-guard entered with permission and, performing due obeisance from a distance, addressed him: 'May your Majesty live long! The Majesty of the monarch of the strong arm, *Māraṅkīlī*, in whose behalf the white umbrellas of his enemies were taken as spoils of victory by his younger brother at Kāriyāru; enemies who, stimulated by a desire to get possession of more of the earth, started from Vanji, prepared for an aggressive war, taking with them broad eared

elephants, cars, and horses and a vast array of valiant warriors. The army marched with the banners of the bow and the twin fish floating in the air till they were defeated and dispersed by the young prince, your brother. May our great king, our emperor, prosper. A woman new to the city who used to wander about consumed with the disease, "elephant-hunger" has entered the prison-house, and, praising your Majesty's good name, feeds from a begging bowl which she carries in her hand, all persons to their uttermost satisfaction. May it please your Majesty, she is still there.' The king ordered her being fetched, when she appeared with the salutation that the great king's mercy may prosper. The king desired to know who she was and what sort of a begging bowl it was that she carried in her hand. Manimēkhalai replied: 'I am the daughter of a Vidyādhara and have been wandering in the city in disguise. May the rains never fail, may the earth not cease in prosperity, may the great king know no evil. This begging bowl was given to me by a goddess in the travellers' hall of the city. This had the power to cure even the disease "elephant-hunger" and is an unfailing life-giver to human beings.' 'What can I do for you, good lady,' asked the king. 'May the king live long,' she replied, 'only destroy the prison-house, and erect there, in its stead, with kindness of heart, tenements useful for those that follow the path of *Dharma*.' The king ordered accordingly.

BOOK XX

By order of the king, and through the kindness of the beautiful damsel, Manimēkhalai, what was a cruel house of punishment was transformed into a house of charity. Like those of evil deeds, who, after undergoing suffer-

ings due, take their birth where the good life is possible, the premises of the State prison were now occupied by a shrine for the teacher of the truth, residential rooms for those that practise charity, halls for cooking and dining, provided with everything required for living and security. Udayakumāra heard of all that took place resulting in this transformation. He still held to his resolution to take possession of Maṇimēkhalai when she should be out of the hall of guests, and then learn from her directly the secret of her art and whatever of wisdom she may have to impart to him while she should be in his chariot. With his mind thus set, in spite of the fact that the wise might disapprove and the king might get angry, he reached the guests' house where Maṇimēkhalai used to be distributing food. About that time, the Vidyādhara Kāchana, husband of Kāyaśaṅḍikai noted that the day of redemption for his wife had already arrived, and, seeing that his wife did not yet return to him, he started in search of her. Having looked in vain for her in all the likely places of the vast city, he at last found her in the act of feeding those that were hungry. He approached her, and assuming the familiarity of the husband to the wife, asked with a sense of grateful relief whether the one vessel from which she was providing food for such a vast number was a miraculous bowl that some God, out of pity for her, presented to her to get rid of her great suffering. Even though she was in the guise of Kāyaśaṅḍikai, Maṇimēkhalai, without exhibiting any affectionate response that he expected, passed on to where Udayakumāra was, and, pointing to him a woman of extreme old age, who apparently was a woman of beauty in her days, exhorted him that that was the inevitable condition all beautiful women should come to ultimately. This human body, however beautifully it may be made

by the form of the flesh, by dress, jewellery, flowers and unguents, it is all a delusion created by people of old. Kānchana seeing the intimacy of her attitude and conversation to Udayakumāra took it that she was in love with the prince and had therefore abandoned him. Angry that Udayakumāra should have been the cause of her estrangement, and resolving to make sure, he entered the hall, like a poisonous cobra its hole. Udayakumāra on the contrary, his affection for Maṇimēkhalai not abated by all that was said, did not give up his pursuit of love to her, feeling certain that it was she that had assumed the form of Kāyaśaṅḍikai and had caused misunderstanding in the Vidyādhara Kānchana. He resolved therefore to return to the hall at dead of night to probe more into the matter and assure himself whether he was right. Still overborne with his love to her and being guided by that feeling alone to the neglect of all other cautious considerations, he left his palace at dead of night, like a tiger going out for its prey and entered the hall as he projected. The Vidyādhara who was there already, feeling sure that the prince had come there to visit his wife Kāyaśaṅḍikai secretly, like an angry cobra coming out to attack with outspread hood, drew his sword and cut the prince in two. Having done this, he rushed up to Kāyaśaṅḍikai to rise up into the air with her when the statuette on the pillar exclaimed: 'Vidyādhara, approach not, approach not. She is Maṇimēkhalai in disguise as Kāyaśaṅḍikai. Listen to what had happened to the latter. Having got rid of her unquenchable hunger, on rising up in the air towards her home, not knowing the fact that those that go by the air avoid crossing over that part of the Vindhya where is the shrine of the Goddess Vindhyaśāśini, she floated across over the shrine. Goddess Durga, angry that this insult

should have been offered to her, drew her in by the shadow and made a meal of her as has always been usual. Be not vexed with what you have done to this prince. It is his past deeds that have resulted in this. Yet you must bear the consequences of the evil deed although done in ignorance.' Sad at heart at the turn that events took, Kānchana flew across the air homewards towards Kailāsa.

BOOK XXI

Maṇimēkhalai who was lying asleep in the front hall of Champāpati's temple to the west, woke up in fear, and knowing what the Vidyādhara did, what befell the prince and what the divine statuette had said, gave up her disguise and assumed her real form. 'When in our previous birth, you died of the cobra *Dhrishṭi Viśha*, I entered the fire along with you; when last I saw you in the pleasure garden in this city, goddess Maṇimēkhalā carried me away to Maṇipallavam, seeing that my mind was attracted to you. There by means of the miraculous Buddha-seat at Maṇipallavam the goddess gave me knowledge of our previous births and relationship. As I understood your relationship to me, I cherished affection for you even in this life. I wished to exhort you from the evils of life by pointing out the inevitable cycle of births and deaths, and of the consequences of good and bad deeds. I assumed the form of *Kāyaśaṅḍikai* to keep you from doing evil. My evil fate it is that you should have thus fallen by the sword of the Vidyādhara.' So saying she approached the dead body of the prince. The statuette on the pillar again forbade her from approaching and told her: 'It is not in the previous life alone that you both were husband and wife. Such has been your relationship for innumerable lives

before. You have the knowledge to get rid of this cycle of birth and death. Be not vexed with this occurrence and give yourself up to sorrow for his death.' Manimēkhalai, somewhat encouraged by the words of the god, enquired if that was the god that people used to say was there in the hall, who told everybody the truth of things. 'If that be you, I make reverence unto you. If you do know, as I take it you do, what it was that brought about the death of my husband by the poisonous cobra in the previous birth and the sword of the Vidyādhara in this, pray let me know what it was.' The god replied: 'When on the banks of the river *Kāyanīkharai* both you and your husband Rāhuḷa entertained the Rishi Bhrāmadharma who was on his round of preaching wisdom to people and who made it a point of his teaching to convey information regarding the coming of the Buddha, both of you together invited the *Rishi* for breakfast. Your husband gave orders to the cook to get breakfast ready early the next morning. The cook delayed somewhat owing to circumstances beyond his control and in fear of consequences slipped and fell, dropping the cooking vessel itself. Even in spite of his good intentions your husband cut him in two for the fault of having delayed the breakfast. It is as a direct consequence of this that Udayakumāra suffered death in the previous birth and in this, in the manner in which it occurred. Be sure that the consequences of a man's deeds are inevitable. Those that say "god will protect you from the evil consequences of your deeds", are people that speak in ignorance. Even though your husband did the cruel deed in anxiety to do good, the result of the evil deed has not left him. When the consequences of the evil deed are in operation, it may still be possible to do good that will save one in the next life. The king hearing

of the death of the prince from the *Rishis* resident in Chakravālakōṭṭa will throw you into prison, and the crowned queen knowing this will take you out of the prison and keep you under her control. The prayer of your mother Mādhavi and the intercession of the sage Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ will ultimately gain for you release. After that you will reach Śāvaham, and there meeting its ruler, Āputra, will come back to Maṇipallavam. Aputra will learn there, by the sight of the Buddha-seat, his anterior history from Tīva-Tīlakai, and will return to his country. You will then assume the guise of a mendicant and go to the city of Vanji to learn from teachers of various religious persuasions their teaching. You may hold to the truth firmly that the result of deeds is inevitable and those that die must necessarily be born again. So far is your story. If you wish to know mine, I am of the gods. My name is Tuvadikan, Maya, the architect has carved in this old pillar a form exactly like mine. I never go out of it.' Maṇimēkhalai then begged him to tell her her further history carrying it forward to her death. The god told her: 'You will come to learn at Vanji that the city of Kānchi suffered from famine owing to failure of rain, and that your mother Mādhavi, her companion Sutamati, and the teacher Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ were all three gone to that city and were awaiting your arrival. You would then proceed to Kānchi and provide the starving people with food and save them from death. You would perform similarly many another miracle in that city. Ultimately you will let Aṛavaṇa Aḍigaḷ know all that you have heard from the teachers of religion at Vanji. He will then teach you what *tapas* really is and *dharma*, and what the nature of the consequential phenomena are. He would also point out to you how to get rid of the

consequences of action. By these means he would enlighten you to get rid of the darkness of evil and of the attainment of the permanent state of *Nirvāṇa*. Thus teaching the *dharma*, he would continue to live with immeasurable *viddhī* (miraculous power) till the Buddha should appear on earth. Passing through many lives, he would always be teaching the *dharma*. As a result of his teaching, you will follow the good path through the rest of your life doing many good deeds. After death, here at Kāñchī, you will be born many times again as a man in Uttara (North) Magadha. In each one of these births, you will invariably follow the path of *dharma*, and, attaining to the position of the first disciple of the Buddha, reach *Nirvāṇa* ultimately. Further you may note that as a result of good conduct and acts of charity of one of your ancestors, Goddess Mañimēkhalā saved him from imminent death in the sea. That self-same goddess, because of the merit that you acquired by feeding the *Risāi Sādusākkaran*, carried you away from the pleasure garden to the island of Mañipaliavam, and made it possible for you to see the Buddha-seat.' Having heard all this Mañimēkhalai attained to peace of mind, and the day broke in all its glorious effulgence.

BOOK XXII

The day having dawned early worshippers at the temple of Champāpati found the prince there cut in two, and informed the holy ones in residence at the Chakra-vālakōṭṭam. They naturally enquired of Mañimēkhalai if she knew anything about it, and she recounted all that had taken place. Leaving her and the remains of the prince hidden in a place apart, they went to the palace and sent word to the king of their arrival. Obtaining audience, one of them, after the usual salutation, said, 'It

is not at this time alone that such sad occurrences have happened. Many have suffered cruel death due to them by giving way to the impulses of guilty love to women of inexorable chastity and constancy. By way of illustration, we may mention one or two. When Paraśurāma had taken it upon himself to uproot the race of the Kshatriyas, Goddess Durga warned Kāntan, the ruling Chola at the time, that he should not go to war against him. As a result of the warning, the king wished to go away from the capital and live in hiding till the danger should have passed. He, therefore, looked out for some one who could be entrusted with the administration during his absence and who would not be in the same danger to which he was actually exposed. Fixing upon his natural son Kakandan, the son of a courtesan, but withal a very valiant prince, he entrusted him with the administration. He exhorted him to keep watch over the city till he should himself return with the permission of Rishi Agastya. "Since you are not legitimately entitled to rule as a Chola, Paraśurāma will not go to war with you, and, since this city has been placed under your rule in this emergency, the city shall hereafter go by the name Kākandī." Having thus enjoined it upon Kakandan, Kāntan assumed a disguise and went out of the city. Kakandan carried out the instructions of his father and was ruling, from the city, the Chola kingdom. The younger of his two sons was struck with the attractiveness of a Brahman woman Marudī as she was returning alone from her bath in the river Kāvēri. He made overtures of love to her when she was in that unguarded condition. Disconcerted by this unsuspected molestation, she cried out that "in this world chaste wives that could command even the rains to come, would not enter the hearts of others. Somehow to-day, my form has found entry in the

heart of this young man. I have, therefore, become unfit to do the service of preserving the three kinds of fire for my husband the Brahman. What is it that I have done to come to this." So saying, without returning to her house as usual, she walked up the street to the square where was set the statue of the guardian-deity of the city. She then addressed the deity : " I am not aware of having at any time done anything undutiful to my husband. Even so, how could I so easily get into the heart of another? I am not aware of any error on my part that could have brought me to this. I have heard from the wise that you will bind with your rope those of evil deeds, even though they should do them secretly, and, destroying them, would eat them up. Have you become false to your charge as you do not appear to be doing that act of justice now? " So saying, she wept aloud at the foot of the statue of the guardian-deity. The deity appeared to her and said: " You have not understood properly the meaning of that particular passage of the truthful bard,¹ which says that the clouds will rain at command of her who, even though failing to worship God, would take up her day's duties only after worshipping her husband. You are accustomed in life to hear false stories, and have exhibited a turn for the enjoyment of the ludicrous. Further your devotion to Gods and their worship had in it a desire to hear music, to see dances and otherwise enjoy the festivities. Therefore it is the chaste wife that you are, you have not the power to command clouds to rain, and therefore it is that you have failed to burn the hearts of those who cherish evil thoughts of you. If you will but give up the light-hearted enjoyment of the things cited above, you will

¹ Tiruvalluvar, the author of the Tamil Kurai referring to verse 55.

till command the respect due to the chaste wife and her privileges. Since you are not to blame for this act of the prince, my rope will not bind you, and my weapons will not punish you as in the case of women that go the way of their hearts. The law allows seven days' time for the king to punish an offender. Before that limit of time, if he should fail to do so, then it would be my turn to inflict the punishment. You may rest assured that within the seven days' limit king Kakanda hearing of what had happened will decapitate the prince.' As the city declared the prince was cut into two by the king himself when he had heard of the prince's misdeed towards the Brahman woman. That is not all. There was a merchant in good old days in the city, a man of beauty and of wealth, by name Dharmadatta. He had a cousin, the daughter of his maternal uncle, by name Viśākai, a damsel of great beauty. Being cousins they cherished great affection for each other, and conducted themselves as becoming a pair of very affectionate young people. It somehow got abroad in the city that they intended to marry each other in the *gandharva* form, that is, enter into a love marriage, without the procrastinating ceremonies and the obstructive formalities of a regular marriage. This talk of the town reached the ears of Viśākai. Feeling pained at the injustice, she went up to the guests' hall before 'the statue on the pillar' and demanded the statue may get her rid of his calumny. The deity of the statuette announced to the public that she was clear of any guilt, either of intention or of act, and the city was apparently satisfied. She, however, was not, and thought within herself that out for this deity of the statuette the people would still have cherished the false notion regarding her. She therefore resolved, 'I shall marry my cousin in my next

birth, but continue to live all my life in this, unmarried.' Communicating this resolution of hers to her mother, she entered the cloister of virgins. Love-lorn Dharmadatta praised 'the statue of the pillar' for thus saving him from an evil reputation and removed himself from Kāvēripaṭṭinam, and went to Madura. Having there made up his mind not to marry anybody other than Viśākai, he kept the vow and continued a prosperous merchant acquiring great wealth. He rose up to the dignity of receiving titles and insignia from the monarch thus becoming a titled dignitary of sixty years. A Brahman pointed out to him, that, being unmarried and therefore without a son, all his good deeds and great wealth would be of no avail, to gain him Heaven. 'It is time that you returned to your own native city and did something to provide for your future.' Having heard of his return to Kāvēripaṭṭinam, Viśākai gave up the cloister and coming up to him, told him that he had grown up to be sixty, and her hair had begun to turn gray. Their beauty was all gone, and her love itself had cooled. 'I keep to my resolve not to marry in this life, but shall certainly be your wife in the next. Youth does not last, beauty does not last, growing great in wealth does not last either; nor do children give Heaven. The only thing that goes with us is the great good that we can do in this life.' So saying, she exhorted him to utilize his wealth in acts of charity. Dharmadatta with the approval of Viśākai thereafter applied his wealth to acts of beneficence.

When Viśākai was returning with others through the royal streets of Puhār after her visit to the guests' hall, the elder of the two princes smitten with her charming looks wished to make her his own. In order to do this effectively and publicly he raised his hand up to his head to take out a garland of flowers that he was wearing round

his hair to drop it on her neck and thus publicly commit her as it were. By the ineffable chastity of Viśākai, however, the hands that he raised would not come down again. Having heard of this, the father was very angry at this misconduct of his son, and punished him in the same manner as he had punished the other. The king in some surprise pointed out to the sage that he began by saying that it was not only at this time that such things took place. 'If so,' he said, 'does such evil conduct occur at this time. Have the kindness to let me know if such has come to your notice.' The sage replied: 'In this sea-girt earth, five things have been condemned by the really wise. Among these, drink, untruth, theft and murder can be brought under control, but, worst of all and very difficult to get rid of, was passion. Those that got rid of passion are rightly taken to have got rid of the others. Hence it is that really penitent ones first give up that. O, great king, those that have not given it up are people who have ensured suffering in hell. So having heard of the calamitous death of her lover Kovalan, Mādhavi his mistress gave up life, and entered the cloister of Buddhist hermits. Her daughter Maṇimēkhalai, at the approach of youth, gave up life at the very beginning and going from house to house, the small as well as the great, had taken upon herself the role of a mendicant nun. She took up her residence in the public hall of the city. Notwithstanding this manner of her life, the prince kept following her like a shadow, instigated to that purpose by his extreme love to her. As he was thus pursuing her, Maṇimēkhalai assumed the form of the Vidyādhara woman Kāyaśaṅdikai to get rid of his importunity. Even in that form he did not give her peace, when Vidyādhara Kānchana, the husband of Kāyaśaṅdikai taking her really for his wife and regarding him as an

importunate corruptor of his wife, cut him in two at dead of night in the guests' hall.' Having heard this the king, without the slightest expression of sorrow for the death of his son, issued instructions to the commander-in-chief, 'the Vidyādhara deserves my thanks for having done to the erring prince what I should have done to him. The rigid observances of *Riskis* and the chastity of good women will have no chance of existence if they do not receive efficient protection from the king. Before other kings get to know that my unfortunate son was guilty of such an act, coming as I do of the family of him who drove his car over the body of his son, because of a neglectful act of his, order the cremation of the dead body. Let Mañimēkhalai also be kept in prison for protection.' The orders were accordingly carried out.

BOOK XXIII

Under the auspices of the king there lived in the city a very old woman who had the privilege of instructing the king, the prince, as well as the ladies of the royal household in what was good, what was approved of the learned, and of offering consolation at the occurrence of sad events. Her name was Vāsantavai. She went to the queen and without letting her give way to sorrow, made the usual salutations and said:—'Kings met their death in winning victories, in protecting their subjects and in annexing the kingdoms of inimically disposed neighbours; and, if perchance they died of age without falling in battle like warriors, they werē given a hero's death by their body being laid on a bed of sacrificial grass (*Poa cynosuroides*) and cut in two, as though they fell in battle. I cannot fetch a tongue to say that monarchs of this land died a natural death by reaching ripe old age. To say so would be to disgrace the dynasty. Without

falling in defending his kingdom, without falling in taking over other's kingdoms, how can I describe the way that your son fell by the sword? Show, therefore, no sorrow in the presence of the sovereign, your husband.' Overpowered as the queen was with sorrow, she hid it in her heart, and appearing as though unaffected, she resolved to make Maṇimēkhalai pay the penalty for her having been the cause of her son's death. She managed one day to persuade the king that the prison house was not a suitable place of residence for the pretty *dīkshuṣi* Maṇimēkhalai. The king in reply said that she might arrange to keep her anywhere else if she could keep her in security. The queen undertook to keep her with herself and thus took charge of her. Having got possession of her in this manner she resolved to make her insane, and to that end fumigated her with poison gas in vain. Maṇimēkhalai remained clear in spite of the treatment. The queen set upon her a wild young man to ravish her and make it public afterwards. Maṇimēkhalai saved herself from this by transforming herself into a man at his approach. Understanding that the queen meant more than actually met his eye, the desperate young man left the city and went away rather than expose himself to the danger. Having failed in these, she gave it out that Maṇimēkhalai was ill and put her under treatment by confining her in a hot room. Seeing that this treatment did not affect Maṇimēkhalai the queen was in great fear that she was attempting to injure a woman of miraculous power, and protested that she was led into doing these evil deeds by the maternal impulses of sorrow for her late son, and begged that Maṇimēkhalai might pardon her for her evil intention to her, as she was beside herself in her bereavement. Maṇimēkhalai said in reply 'when in the previous birth

my husband, prince Rāhuḷa, died of the poison of a cobra and when I ascended the funeral pyre with him, where were you all weeping for him? You are doing amiss. Do you weep for your son's body or do you weep for his life? If you weep for the body who was it that ordered it to be burnt? If you weep for the life, it is impossible for you to know where it has gone. If you really are sorry for that life, it follows as a natural consequence that you should wear yourself out in sorrow for all living beings. Let that remain. Please understand what it is that brought about the death of your son? His death by the sword of the Vidyādhara is but the direct consequence of his having cut his own cook in two for a slight remissness in the discharge of his duty. It is this deed of his that brought on his death once by the look of the poisonous cobra, and again by the sword of the Vidyādhara '1. She then followed it up by telling the queen of all that had happened ever since she got into the garden outside the city. She then continued, 'All the evil that you attempted to do to me, I was able to save myself from by the possession of miraculous power. Therefore give up the useless sorrow to which you have given way to the extent of doing evil deeds. Have you not heard the story of the wife of an artisan, who because of misrule in the kingdom and because her husband gave her up, went away to a distant place to set herself up to live by hiring herself out for the enjoyment of others indiscriminately. Her own child whom she had left behind having been brought up by a Brahman was among her lovers and gave up his life when he learned of the fact. A hunter who chased a deer big with young was reduced to painful sorrow when he saw the young one jump out from the ripped open entrails of the deer. You have known people who,

being drunk, come to certain death by falling upon the tusks of fighting elephants. Similarly you have seen the evil fate that overtakes life by falsehood or theft. Hence it becomes plain that those that wish to live in this world must give up these vices which bring on evil consequences only. Otherwise all that we learn is of no use. To give to those that suffer from poverty, to feed those that suffer from hunger, to be kind to those that suffer is the only conduct suitable to those who wish to lead a good life in this world.' Thus saying Maṇimēkhalai poured this water of wisdom into the ear of the queen extinguishing the fire of sorrow, that, fed by the fuel of her own heart, was burning up the queen's mind. The queen, her mind being clarified by this good teaching, fell prostrate before Maṇimēkhalai. Maṇimēkhalai in her turn prostrated before her and pointed out that which the queen did was not right, as obeisance from a mother-in-law to the daughter-in-law was improper, and, what was worse, that from the crowned queen to a subject.

BOOK XXIV

Old Chitrāpati, at whose instigation the prince came to the sad end of falling by the sword of the Vidyādhara, having heard of what had happened, was in great alarm as to consequences. Anxious however to get Maṇimēkhalai released from the prison, she went to the palace, and, falling at the feet of the queen said: 'Ever since the 121 dancing women appeared in this city, the suffering to which I had been subjected nobody could have experienced. That Mādhavi should have renounced life and entered a Buddhist *vihāra* because of the death of her lover, who paid her wages of love every day; that her daughter Maṇimēkhalai who wandered from house

to house with a begging-bowl in her hand and taken alms, are unbecoming of the life of a dancing women, and could provoke only laughter and derision in the community. Mañimēkhalai's presence in the city has been the cause of destruction to the prince already. But that is not all. There is another possible calamity that can befall the city through her. In the delightful part adjoining the salt pans where many a sand-dune lay scattered in the pleasant grove, Killi of the high and brilliant crown one day long ago was taking his pleasure. To his great surprise, he saw in a sequestered part of it, fragrant with blossoming flowers, a beauty unparalleled, all by herself alone. The king did not know who it was that could come there in that condition, and forgetting himself, yielded to her charms attacked as he was with all the five arrows¹ of Cupid at once. The season was pleasant, the scene was delightful, and the young lady enchanting in her beauty. He yielded himself to her whole-heartedly, and even after he spent a month with her she never so much as let him know who she was. At the end of the month, however, she left him all of a sudden unknown to him. Disconcerted by her disappearance the victorious monarch caused her to be searched for everywhere; when there appeared a Buddhist *Chāraṇa* who had the power of plunging in the earth, of flying in the air, and of walking on water. The king after having offered the usual respectful salutation, enquired of him whether he had known anything of the dear one that had disappeared all of a sudden, and was importunate to know from the sage her whereabouts. The sage replied :

¹ According to Indian notions Cupid is shown as a bowman, carrying a bow of sugarcane from which he shoots arrows of flowers—the five fragrant ones that appear in early spring.

" Though I have not seen her, I know all about her, O King, as I have knowledge of the past. The charming damsel is no other than Piḷivaḷai, the daughter of Vāśamayilai, and her husband Vaḷaivapan, the valiant ruler of Nāga Nāḍu. On the day of her birth it was predicted that she would become the mother of a son by union with a ruler of the solar dynasty of kings. The child will come here in due course, but no more the mother. Do not, therefore, give way to useless sorrow. But take note of this. There is a curse upon this city that it would be swallowed up by the sea on the day that the annual festival of Indra should be forgotten. This is the vow of the goddess Maṇimēkhalā; there is no escaping it, as it is a curse of Indra. Remembering therefore the destruction of the city then when the time comes, and, of yours now, if you give way to useless sorrow, save the city from being destroyed by the sea by taking care never to forget the celebration of the festival of Indra." So saying, the *Sāraṇa* (Tam. : for Chāraṇa) left. From that day onwards this city was never free from anxiety for the safety of the city. If the damsel who bears her name should be in distress for any reason, it is just possible that the goddess does appear. I am in constant fear of that.' Chitrāpati concluded her speech with the salutation due. The queen ordered that Maṇimēkhalai be brought from the prison to her own residence, and told Chitrāpati, ' Maṇimēkhalai will not go to you, nor will she enter your house, as she gave up both, because your life involves the practice of taking drink, speaking untruth, indulging in unrestrained love, killing living beings, and indulging in stealthy thoughts, evils that the wise ones have shunned as unworthy. Therefore she would prefer to be with me.'

As this colloquy was taking place at the palace, Mādhavi, having heard of what had fallen her daughter, her own mind greatly perturbed, her whole body shaken like the flowering twig of a tree in a wild wind, and having consulted Sutamati, fell prostrate before the sage Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ as the only saviour, and came along with him to the queen. At sight of the sage, the queen, the body of attendants, Chitrāpati and Manimēkhalaī, all of them, went forward to receive the venerable one with due salutation. The sage blessed them all that they might gain wisdom. The good queen showed him a suitable seat, and after washing his feet, and offering him the hospitality due, said :— ' Venerable Sir, that you should have come with the faltering steps of age, could be due only to our good fortune. While it is undoubtedly true that your tongue has remained steady all the while, may this body of yours, though it has suffered very much from the ravages of age, keep on for many a year to come.' ' Good queen,' said the sage in reply, ' though born in this body as a result of good deeds, I am still rather like the setting sun. It is but in the course of nature that we hear of birth and growth, of disease and death. If people but understand the real character of the causes and conditions of existence, namely the twelve *nidānas*, (1) ignorance, (2) action of the mind, (3) consciousness, (4) name and form, (5) the organs of sense, (6) contact or feeling, (7) sensation, (8) thirst, (9) attachment, (10) becoming or existence, (11) birth, (12) decay and death, they will know ultimate happiness. If they do not understand it correctly, they are doomed to suffer in hell. By ignorance is to be understood the failure to understand what was stated above, and subjecting oneself to believing that which is heard from others. Among the three

worlds, this world of life is limitless, and living beings in this world fall into six classes, human beings, divine beings, the Brahmas, the Nāgas, the world of lower creatures, and that of evil spirits. As a result of good and bad deeds, beings come into existence in the form of embryo in one or other of these classes, and when the deeds work themselves out, they feel either happiness or the reverse. Evil deeds consist in killing, stealing and giving way to passion, these three showing themselves in the body. Lying, evil-speaking, harsh words and idle words, these four show themselves in speech. Desire, anger and intolerance show themselves in the mind. These ten are the deeds of evil, and, as their consequences are evil, the wise ones shun them. If these are not avoided carefully, the result is being born as an animal or evil spirit or an inhabitant of Hell, and suffer that which gives agony of mind. Good deeds consist in the avoidance of the ten evils detailed above, the adopting of the five prescribed lines of conduct and making gifts of charity as the best action in life. Those that do so are born either as divine beings or as human beings or among the Brahmas, and enjoy the result of their good action. Those of you that are attendants upon the queen, listen with attention to this faultless good *Dharma*; you Maṇimēkhalai that know your previous birth already, if you will go to me after learning the teachings of other religions, I shall be glad to explain to you more of this.' So saying the venerable one got up to leave when Maṇimēkhalai made a profound obeisance and exhorted the queen, her attendants and Chitrāpati to bear in mind the teachings of the venerable one and save this city. 'If I should continue to remain in the city, people would still talk of me as having been death to the prince. Therefore I shall proceed to the

kingdom of Āputra and therefrom to Maṇipallavam where I shall again offer worship at the Buddha-seat and then proceed to Vanji. There I shall spend some time in doing deeds of charity in devotion to the chaste one Kaṇṇaki. Do not be anxious as to what would happen to me, my friends.' Having said this and made her profound obeisance to the company, she started up in the air like a stream of molten gold, as the sun was sinking below the horizon. Going to the Chakravāḷakōṭṭam, she circumambulated three times the guests' hall, the temple of Champāpati, and the statue on the pillar and passed by way of air to where 'the descendant of Indra' (Āputra) was holding rule. Getting down in a grove of flowering trees, she, with due reverence, enquired of a hermit the name of the place and that of the ruler of the locality. She was told that the city was Nāgapura, and its ruler Puṇyarāja, the son of Bhūmichandra. He further offered the information that 'since the birth of this ruler, rains have never failed, earth and trees have always yielded plenty, and living beings have had no taste of wasting diseases.'

BOOK XXV

In the meanwhile King Puṇyarāja himself with his queen and following entered the grove and paid his respects to the Dharma Srāvaka. He listened to the exposition by the latter of the nature of *Dharma* and its opposite, of that which is eternal and those that are not, sorrow and its causes, the passing of life after death and the place which it reaches, the causes and conditions of existence, how to get rid of these and the nature of the teacher (Buddha), with great attention. Noticing in the company a young woman of unparalleled beauty, and, judging by her look and the begging bowl in her hand,

that she was one of those on whom Cupid had no influence, he enquired who the rare being was. In reply to the enquiry, the king's chamberlain said: 'In the whole of India (Jambudvīpa) there is not another like this young lady. I learned all about her when, for securing the friendship of king Kiṣṭhi, I sailed across to Kāvēripattinam, a city which has the river flowing on one side. I did explain to your Majesty on my return what I had myself learned from sage Aravana Aḍigaḷ in regard to her birth, and he recounted it as one who had knowledge of it. This is the same young lady who has come here from Kāvēripattinam.' Maṇimēkhalai, hearing this said, 'You have forgotten that it was your begging-bowl that has come to my hand, perhaps of your great wealth and prosperity now in this life of yours. It may be natural that you have forgotten that previous life; but how is it that you have forgotten this very life in which you came to birth of a cow. It is impossible for you to learn, you will not understand the nature of birth that binds us to our existence here, unless you circumambulate thrice the Buddha-seat in the island of Maṇipallavam. Oh, king, please go over there.' So addressing the king, she rose into the air and, before the setting of the sun, she came down to the earth on the island of Maṇipallavam, and saw there, after going round the little island, the Buddha-seat. Walking round it by the right and prostrating before it, she understood all that took place in her previous existence. Maṇimēkhalai recounted, while in this act of worship of the seat, what the sage Śādhu Śakkara taught when the king of Gāndhāra took leave of him on the banks of the Kāyamkarai. The sage taught his followers to avoid evil deeds which inevitably would give them birth among animals, the people of the nether world and evil spirits. He pointed

out that, if they should do so, they would take their birth among the gods, or men or among the Brahmas. On attaining such birth, they should do good deeds only, without remissness. The enlightened one who had learnt the truth of things without delusion or falsehood will take birth in the world for saving it. It is only those that have the good fortune to hear his teaching from him that can get rid of birth. Therefore you exhorted 'before inevitable death comes to you pursue the way of charity by leading a good life.' When however my husband and myself, having heard this teaching of yours and made a profound obeisance to you, you spoke to us only words boding evil. May I know why before the advent of the enlightened one this miraculous seat was placed here by Indra for him? Why should this exalted seat of the enlightened one let me know my previous birth? To this the guardian deity of the island said in reply: 'This seat will accept nobody other than the fully enlightened one; Indra will not worship it. Therefore Indra commanded that the seat of good might let those that worship it know their previous birth till the enlightened one should occupy it. Therefore it is that the seat exhibits to those that worship it their previous lives clearly.' So said the deity that day, and I feel as though she is saying it to me now.' So saying, she went round the seat and prostrated before it.

While she was thus engaged in Maṇipallavam, the king returned from the hermitage of the sage to the palace. Learning from his mother Amarasundarī the actual nature of this birth of his, and how he came to be the occupant of the throne of Śāvakam, he became very much humiliated with sorrow at what happened to him in the previous birth when his mother left him by the road-side in comparison with what his distinguished

position in the present life was. He observed that much the best thing for him to do would be to renounce life giving up all his present splendour; when kings awaited his time to see him; when he had to gather round him good men and true; when he had to spend more of his time in seeing lovely artists dance or in hearing musicians sing; when, instead of giving up love when women showed themselves irresponsive, he had to make protestations of love in various ways to them, all the while being a slave of passion. He congratulated himself that this teaching which the holy Śrāvaka first taught him was then coming to fruit by means of Maṇimēkhalai. On hearing these reflections from the king, the chief minister, Janamitra, seeing that the king's mind was undergoing a transformation, said: 'Remember, O great monarch! that before my former sovereign and yours, obtained you for a son by favour of the holy one, this land of ours had suffered for twelve years from failure of rain, and of famine of such severity in consequence, that the very mothers would sooner eat their children to appease their own hunger than feed them, and in such dire distress you appeared as a welcome rain-cloud in the worst of summer. Since then never have rains failed, nor land its fertility; living beings have never known hunger. If you should give up rule and retire, all of your subjects will weep as a child at the death of the mother. If, for the sake of life in a higher world, you choose to give up this, living beings here will reach their end and you will be held responsible for the calamity. This is not the teaching of Him, the first one, who unmindful of his own life, made it his duty to protect living beings. You are apparently labouring under some delusion.' Hearing this, the king, not being able to resist the desire to go and worship the Buddha-seat at Maṇipallavam, begged his

minister to bear the responsibility for a month, of protecting his kingdom and conducting its administration. So saying he ordered sailors to get ready ships at the harbour and embarked. The convoy had an uninterrupted voyage till it reached Maṇipallavam. Maṇimēkhalai seeing that that was the fleet that brought the king, took the king round and showed him the miraculous Buddha-seat. The seat showed to the king, as if in a clear mirror, his anterior history. The king proclaimed with joy, 'I have learned all of my previous birth; I have rid myself of all that was evil. Oh, the Goddess of Learning at southern Madura, the home of Tamil, was it not you that offered me the inexhaustible bowl when at dead of night and in pouring rain, I was in great sorrow at not being able to give food to those that sought it of me; and was it not you, the Divine One! that destroyed my birth? Whether I should be born among the gods or in the Brahma world, I shall never give up the maintenance and protection of living beings.' So saying, he went south-east along with Maṇimēkhalai, and the two rested for a while on the bank of the tank Gōmukhi. There then appeared before them the Goddess of the Isle and addressed the king in the following words: 'Oh, king, who relieved the pangs of hunger, those that had forgotten you when last you came here, returned here afterwards in search of you; knowing that you had died they gave up their life in the manner that you yourself did. These are the bones of the nine Śeṭṭis that died thus, and these, of their servants who maintained by them in life, paid their debt to their masters by loyalty in death. Your bones are covered with sand under the Punnai (Sans. Punnāga, Alexandrian Laurel, *Calophyllum mophyllum*) tree. By giving up your life, you have made yourself responsible for the lives of those who gave

it up for yourself. Please consider whether you are not responsible for their death.' So saying she turned round to Maṇimēkhalai and explained to her how the city of her birth Kāvēripaṭṭinam was swallowed up by the sea. ' Pīlivaḷai the daughter of the king of Nāga Nāḍu, when she had borne a son for the king of the solar race, was worshipping the Buddha-seat when there arrived the ship of Kambala Setti. Finding out who he was, she handed over the child to him with the message that the child was the Chola king's. Immensely pleased the merchant took charge of the child and sailed away with it homewards. In the deep darkness of the night, the ship got wrecked near the shores, and nobody knew what had happened to the baby. Learning from such of them as escaped that the child was among those whose whereabouts were not known, king-Kiḷḷi (Vaḍivēl-Kiḷḷi) set about searching here, there and everywhere, and, in his anxiety, forgot that the time had arrived for the celebration of the great Indra festival. Goddess Maṇimēkhalā, as the guardian deity, invoked the curse that the city be destroyed by the sea. Hence the destruction of Kāvēripaṭṭinam. The king went away, like Indra when the whole of his prosperity was also swallowed up by the sea, all alone. The sage Aṟavaṇa Aḍigaḷ and your mother and others went away in safety to Vanji. If you should feel sorry to hear of the curse of the Goddess Maṇimēkhalā, the guardian of the sea, you will hear the consoling information, that she was the cause of the saving of the life of one of your ancestors who was about to be drowned in a shipwreck, and who lived, in consequence to do many acts of charity and earn the reputation of being the most charitable man at the time. You will hear of this from Aṟavaṇa Aḍigaḷ.' So saying the Goddess of the Isle disappeared. Overcome with

grief, the king with Maṇimēkhalai dug up his bones that lay buried and discovered the bones all in position notwithstanding the fact the flesh and the sinews that bound them together had been eaten up. He constructed over them a sarcophagus of white mortar preserving the form of the body. The king gave way to sorrow at the sight of the form when Maṇimēkhalai rose into the air and telling the king: 'What are you doing? I brought you here from your own kingdom in order to let you know your previous birth and thereby enable you to continue the rule with charity in your great island and the islets in the sea between. If kings themselves adopt the rule of charity, what is there to keep under control? If you should ask what is the supreme form of charity, bear this carefully in mind that it is the maintenance of all living creatures with food and clothing and places to live in safety.' The king said in reply: 'Be it in my kingdom or in that of others, I shall adopt the path of charity as described by you. I can however ill afford to let you go away from me inasmuch as you brought me here and enlightened me as to the nature of my previous birth, and gave me, as it were a re-birth. Oh, I cannot part from you.' 'O king, do not give way to sorrow weakly. Your kingdom will be calling for you because of your absence. Take ship and return. For my part I shall go to Vanji.' So saying Maṇimēkhalai flew across in the air.

BOOK XXVI

Flying across through the air Maṇimēkhalai reached Vanji, and wishing to offer worship to the image both of her chaste mother Kaṇṇaki and her father Kōvalan, she reached the temple erected in honour of the former. Standing before the image, with her head bowed in

reverence, she praised the deity in the following terms :— ‘ Instead of paying the debt of a chaste wife by either dying with the husband, or putting an end to your life on hearing of the husband's death, you took upon yourself the duty of vindicating your chastity.’ She prayed with tearful eyes that the chaste wife may have the kindness to explain this unusual procedure to her. The unparalleled goddess of chastity replied to her : ‘ When not being able to suffer the calamity that befell my husband, I caused the destruction of Madura by fire, the great Goddess of the city, Madhurāpatī, appeared before me and assured me that that was the result of our deeds in a previous birth. “ Two princes, cousins by birth and ruling respectively in Simhapura and Kapila in the fertile country of Kalinga, fell to fighting against each other in great hatred. This war between Vasu and Kumāra left the country desolate for six *gavadas* (leagues), and made it impossible for anybody to approach on account of the prevalence of the war. A merchant Sangama by name with his wife, eager after profit, went there to sell jewellery and other articles of sale at Singapuram. In the course of his business, he was arrested by Bharata, a police official of the monarch, and shown up before the monarch as a spy. Under royal orders he was beheaded and his wife bewailing the unfortunate death of her husband, put an end to her own life by throwing herself from the top of a hill. It is the curse that she invoked at the moment of her death that has now resulted in the mishap to your husband.” The deeds done in a previous existence will inevitably result in suffering the penalty. Notwithstanding the truth of this, I brought about the destruction of the city by fire. As a result of good deeds already done we have reached the heaven of the gods for the time. We have the consciousness that we shall have

to pay the penalty for this bad deed in the future. If we cease to be in heaven, we are sure to be born on earth once again, thus working out the result of our deeds till such time when in the Magadha country of unfailing rain, in that bright city of Kapila, there should appear Buddha of limitless perfection. He will there attain to enlightenment under the Bōdhi tree, and proceed out of mercy to living beings to teach the Four Truths, the twelve causes and conditions, the means of destroying these causes and conditions, and thus enable people to give up that which is evil all through this universe of existence. As a result of our having worshipped at the seven *viharas* of Indra at Kāvēripaṭṭinam, we shall not at the time be born in a life of suffering, and will then listen to his teaching with attention. The wish to renounce life will then dawn on us. We shall then cease to be born on earth. Even so we shall for a long time be the means of bringing about the fruition of their good deeds to many people. O, dear one, you set out at this old city to learn, from the votaries of the different systems of religion, their various systems and, when it appears to you as it will, that none of these contains the truth, you will then follow the teaching of "the Pitakas of the Great One". This is what is going to happen.' Having said this, she gave Maṇimēkhalai to understand that, being the young woman that she was, nobody would teach her the highest truths of religion, and therefore she exhorted her to assume another form more suitable for learning these truths. Maṇimēkhalai accordingly assumed the form of an old hermit by making use of the *mantra* which Goddess Maṇimēkhalā had taught her. In this guise she went to the temples, to the platforms, to the halls, to the gardens, to the tanks: wherever those devoted to penance, those who by

discipline had attained to the control of their passions, those who by great learning had attained to the knowledge of the right path, all round the fortification of the city. The ruling sovereign of this city, the great Chêra Śenguttuvan, having reduced all the land to the same condition as that of his own hill country, had marched at the head of his army up to the banks of the Ganges, crossing over to its northern bank by means of boats, defeated many kings, including Kanaka and Vijaya; and, bringing a stone from the Himalayas carried on the heads of the defeated kings, celebrated the binding of the fillet of victory by wearing the garland of *Vâhasi*. This great capital continued to be her residence till, by the ripening of the causes, she was ready to receive the teaching of the Four great Truths.

BOOK XXVII

Setting about on her mission to the city of Vanji, she went to the assemblage of the teachers of the different persuasions, and addressing the leader of the votaries of the path of the *Vâda*, asked him to let her know the ultimate truth as he understood it. Discoursing on the instruments of knowledge as recognized by his school, he pointed out that three teachers were recognized as of authority among them, namely, Vêdavyâsa, Kṛtakôṣi and the faultless Jaimini. These three have recognized instruments of knowledge to be ten, eight and six respectively. / These are (1) direct perception (*Pratyaksha*), (2) Inference (*Anumâna*), (3) similitude (*Ūpamâ*), (4) authority (*Āgama*), (5) inferential assumption (*Artihâpatti*), (6) appropriateness (*Iyabhu* or *Soabhava*), (7) tradition (*Aitihya*), (8) non-existence or negation (*Abhâva*), (9) inference by elimination or by correlation (*Mitchi* or

Oñāu, Sans. : *Pāratīśha*) and (10) occurrence (*Undāneyi* or *Uñāneyi*, San. : *Sambhava*).

Of these, (1) *Kāchi*, direct perception, is of five kinds, according as they are perceived by the particular sense organ, namely, sensation of the colour by the eyes, sound by the ear, smell by the nose, taste by the tongue, and touch by the body. By means of these is experienced pleasure or pain. Contact of these with the life principle (*Prāṇa*, or *Uyir* of the text), the means of communication of these (*vāyil*), and the mind that experiences these (*manas*), operating without interruption lead to understanding without exclusion, without error and without doubt, of place, of form, of genus, of quality, of action with due reference to light (clearness of understanding?), sense and place.

(2) *Karudal* (*anumāna*) is the inference of that which is unseen from that which is seen or felt. It is of three kinds, namely, (1) the common (*Podu*; Sans. : *Sāmānya*), (2) proceeding from the result to the cause, (*Ecchan*; or Sans. : *Sākhavat*) and (3) from the cause to the result (*Mudal*; or Sans. : *Pārvavat*). It is common inference when, though two circumstances may not be connected inevitably with each other, the occurrence of the one leads to the inference of the other, as in the case of the inference of the existence of an elephant in a forest when one hears a sound like the trumpeting of an elephant. In inferring from the sight of freshes in a river, rain at the source of it, is inference of the cause from the result. When we predict rain from the sight of the clouds, we are inferring the result from a cause. Thus inference is knowledge that we gain of that which is not present; and is applicable to the past, present and future.

(3) The third means of knowledge *Upamāna* has reference to understanding by comparison by means of

similitude. (4) *Āgama* is understanding by authority as when we assume the existence of heaven and hell from the writings of those of authority. (5) *Arthāpatti* is understanding by association, as when a shepherd's village is said to be on the Ganges, we understand that it is situate on the banks of the river. (6) *Iyabhu* that which is appropriate to the actual circumstances as when a man on the back of an elephant wants 'the stick', one understands the goad. (7) *Aitiham*, accepted tradition, as in the case of a ghost existing in a tree. (8) *Abhāvam* is merely the assertion of that which does not exist in a place as non-existent there. (9) *Mitchi* is understanding by correlation as when it is said that Rama won in the battle, one understands the defeat of Rāvaṇa. (10) *Uḥanerī* (lit. course of nature) is what usually happens as when an iron piece moves, we infer the existence of a magnet.

Eight are the *pramāṇa-abhasas*, those that resemble instruments of knowledge, or can be regarded as such; (1) *Sūttunarvu*, knowledge by direct contact by which we learn the existence of all that exists; (2) *Tiryak-Kōḍal*, mistaken conception such as taking the mother of pearl for silver; (3) *Aiyam*, doubt, remaining unsettled whether that which appears before the eye is a stump of wood or a man; (4) *Tirādu-Telidal*, deciding without conviction, as in mistaking a stump of wood for a man; (5) *Kaṇḍu-ṇarāmai*, not understanding even on seeing, such as not understanding a creature to be a tiger even after seeing it prowling near; (6) *Il-vaḷakku*, asserting as existent that which does not exist, as in speaking of the horns of a rabbit understandable only by the use of the expression, and not by actual existence of the thing connoted by the word; (7) *Uṇarudadai-Uṇardal* feeling that which is plainly felt by experience, such as attempting to prove that fire is destructive of mist, and (8) *Ninaiṭṭu*.

perception by assumption, such as taking a couple to be one's father and mother on the statement of others. Six are the systems that are founded on the basis of these instruments of knowledge ; (1) Lōkāyata, (2) Bauddha, (3) Sāṅkhya, (4) Nayyāyika, (5) Vaiśēshika, and (6) Mīmāṃsa. The teachers of these six systems respectively are, (1) Brhaspati, (2) Jina, (3) Kapila, (4) Akshapāda, (5), Kāṇāda, and (6) Jaimini. Truth is ascertained by means of *Pratyaksha*, (2) *Anumāna*, (3) *Satta* (Sans. *Sāhda* otherwise *Āgama*), (4) *Upamāna*, (5) *Arthāpatti* and (6) *Abhāva*. These are the instruments of knowledge accepted as such ' at the present time '.

Passing on from him, she went to the *Saivaśāstris*. In response to her enquiry that he might explain his system, he stated the two lights (the sun and the moon), the doer and the five elements constitute the basis from out of which human beings are made by combination of life and body. He who does this is constituted of the Kālas ; his nature it is to create beings as an act of play, and he destroys them and thus gets rid of their sufferings ; and He, besides whom there is none else, such a one is my God '. The *Brahmaśāstris* told her that the whole of the universe is the outcome of one egg brought forth by the supreme being, Brahma. A teacher who had eagerly studied the *purāṇa* of *Vishnu* (he of the colour of the sea) asserted that Nārāyaṇa was the protector of all. The *Vēdaśāstris* averred that the Vēda, otherwise called *Āraṇya*, the unborn source of knowledge, has neither beginning nor end. *Kalpa* constitutes its hands, *Chandas* its feet, *En* (*Jyotiṣha* or astronomy) its eyes, *Nirukta* its ears, *Śikṣha* its nose and *Vyākaraṇa* its face. ' The path taught in the Vēda is the path of life.' Maṇimēkhalai felt that the teachings of these would not conform either to truth itself as taught in learned books, or as practised by the knowing.

She then addressed the venerable one, the expounder of 'the book' of the Ājīvakas, and asked him to state what the governing deity was according to him and what the authoritative work of his teaching. The Ājīvaka teacher replied: 'That one whose knowledge is limitless and who is seen immanent always and in all things of the vast and limitless variety of things that exist, is 'our supreme teacher.' The subject matter of the treatise dealing with the Ājīvakas is of five things, namely, life and the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air in indivisible atoms. These when they combine could be felt and seen, but when broken up, they could not be seen. The elements, earth, water, fire and air, these four gather together as a hill, tree or body; or disintegrate and spread themselves out as the constituent atoms. That which perceives these phenomena is what is called life. Earth is in the form of a solid, water exhibits the quality of coolness and is fluid; fire sends up its flame and causes the sensation of heat; air moves to and fro. Thus is constituted the nature of these elements. These in their atomic condition, without a beginning, may assume another nature by change of form, but cannot be destroyed. There is nothing that comes into existence anew and enters into another. The atom will not split into two, nor will it expand in that same form. These will however move, will flow and will rise. They will combine into a hill; they will break up into each its own particular form of atoms. They may come together in such density as to assume the form of solids like diamond; they will assume the form of a hallow bamboo; they will constitute the seed which sprouts out and grows. Thus the elements, as the full moon, when they spread out together over the whole earth and assume the forms of the various *bhūtas*, remain combined

in the proportion of the whole, or three quarters, or half, or a quarter, but neither more nor less, and get named according as the one or the other predominates. Unless they combine in this manner, they will not attain to the forms of the firm earth, or fluid water, or the warming fire, or the moving wind. One atom could be seen only by those who have the divine eye of knowledge; others cannot see them. In the shape of combined atoms constituting *bhūtas* they can be seen; just as in the dusk of an evening one may not see a single hair, though one could easily discern a bundle of it. These atoms in their combination are born in black, or dark blue, or green, or red, or golden, or pure white. These are the six forms in which these elements take birth, in combination. These are in the rising order of excellence, and it is by being born pure white that these attain to cessation of birth (*vidu*). Those who do not wish to suffer will reach this end. This is the nature of the path of righteousness. The false path, on the contrary, is a circle of birth, death and suffering, of taking birth in the place appointed, of suffering sorrow and happiness in the great majority of cases. Getting rid of these, of being born and of dying, come to a being in the womb. Happiness and suffering and the result of these may be described as atoms also. It is a previous fate that makes for the suffering to follow. This is the essence of the teaching of the treatise of Markali.¹ Maṇimēkhalai regarding this as a contradictory statement of ill-applied words, passed on to the Nirgrantha.

¹ Markali, it is obvious, is Markali Gōrāla, the founder of the sect of Ājīvakas. But any treatise written by him has not so far been noticed to my knowledge. Here apparently is an accepted work of authority by this teacher. That work according to the Nālakēṣi Tiraṅṅa is called *Nesakudir*, translated into Tamil, *Ovadaśāśīr*. According to the same authority, the teaching of the Ājīvakas had great vogue in a place called Saṃśāṅḍa.

She asked the Nirgrantha, as she did the others to expound truly 'who the deity that he worshipped was and what the teaching of the authoritative works of his sect; how that teaching takes effect, what it is that binds them to existence and how release can be obtained from this bondage.' He replied; 'Our deity is that one who is worshipped by the Indras. The teaching that he vouchsafed to us consists of the following six sections:—

(1) Dharmāstikāya, (2) Adharmāstikāya, (3) Kāla, (4) Ākāśa, (5) Jīva, (6) the Paramāṇus. Good deeds and bad deeds and the bondage (*bandha*) resulting therefrom together with release (*vidha*) from this bondage, constitute the excellent teaching. A thing may exist in its own nature, or change it and assume that of another with which it is associated. So doing it shows itself impermanent and permanent; thus exhibiting at one moment the three conditions of appearance, existence and destruction, the three indivisible states. That a *margosa* seed sprouts and grows into a tree makes the seed eternal, but that the seed no longer exists in the tree makes it non-eternal. So also when green peas are boiled and made into a pastry, the nature of the peas is not destroyed and yet it ceases to be peas. The cause of the change is in *Dharmāstikāya* (principle of movement) which exists everywhere and enables movement in things. Similarly the related principle of stationariness is equally eternal and all-pervading and enables things to be in a statical condition. Time measures things by the short span of a second as well as the almost immeasurable *Kalpa*. *Ākāśa* gives the space for all things to be in. When *jīva* or life combines with the body or matter, it is capable of enjoying taste, etc. The irreducible atom may form part of a body or be something else out of it. It is *jīva*

in combination with body that does good or does evil. The result of these deeds is bondage; the suppression of the causes and the consequent bondage arising therefrom, constitutes release (*Nirvāṇa*).

The Sāṅkhya philosopher expounded that the Primary Element (*Mūla Prakṛti*) forms the matrix in which all things appear. It has no activity of its own and is common to all. It is formed of the three qualities, and is difficult to conceive. From this primary element (*Mūla Prakṛti*) arises *Mahān* or *Buddhi* (great); from this springs *ākāśa* (space); from *ākāśa* arises *vāyu* (air); from air arises fire, *agni* (Sans. *Agni*); from this again comes water (*appu*, Sans. *Āpah*); from water arises earth. From a combination of all these springs mind (*manas*). In the mind springs the notion of self *ahankāra* (or individuation). Similarly from *ākāśa* springs sound heard by the ear; from *vāyu* the sense of touch felt by the skin; from *agni* arises the sense of sight felt by the eyes; from out of water taste experienced by the tongue; from earth springs the sense of smell experienced by the nose. These find expression by means of the physical organs; speech by the tongue, touch by the hand, movement by the feet, evacuation by *pāyu* (excretal organs) and generation by *upasthā* (generative organs). Thus arising by transformation of the *bhūtas* recited above, come into existence hills, trees, etc. These again get merged in their sources in a process of involution as they come into existence by a process of evolution. In the process of involution all these become one again and pervade all space and exist for eternity.

Purusha (subject) on the contrary, is easy to conceive, without being the three qualities (*guṇas*), incapable of being grasped by the sense organs (*indriyas*) without being the matrix in which other things appear, being none-the-

less that which could be felt by all those things, being a unity all-pervading and eternal, will show itself as that which is conceived as eternal. Things understood by the senses are twenty-five. Of these the five elements are earth, water, fire, air and ether; five are the organs, the body, the mouth, the eyes, the nose and the ear. Taste, sight, touch, sound and smell, these are the five subtle elements, the tongue, the feet, the hands, the excretory organs, and the generating organs constitute the organs of action. Then follow mind (*manas*), intelligence (*buddhi*), subjectivation (*ahaukāram*), feeling (*chittam*) and life, otherwise called *ātma*. These constitute the twenty-five entities (*dravyas*).

Having heard this clear exposition, Maṇimēkhalai passed on to the Vaiśeṣhika, and asked him to proceed with his argument. Substance, qualities, action, commonness, speciality and collectivity, these constitute the six divisions. Of these the first has the attributes of the second and the third, and is the cause of all things. These substances, or matter, fall into nine divisions, earth, water, fire, air, space, the directions, time, soul and mind. Of these, earth is possessed of the five qualities, of sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell. The other four (water, fire, air and space) have qualities, each one less, in the order in which they are given above. Sound, touch, sight, smell, taste, largeness, smallness, hardness, softness, rightness, thinness, capacity to take shape, capacity to take sight, these constitute the qualities of matter. Matter, quality and capacity for action are common to all forms of matter. Since change of form and stationariness are common qualities of all matter, death and existence constitute also the essence of matter. Attributes, division of matter and collection of matter, qualities and that which has qualities, these

are the main features of existing things,' concluded the Vaiśeṣhika teacher.

She addressed herself last of all to the Bhūtavādi. He said: 'Just as when the flower of *tādūki* (*Atti*, *Bauhinia racemosa*) and jaggery (crude sugar) with other things are mixed fermentation springs into existence, so when the elements combine, there springs a consciousness of feeling. When they break up, this consciousness will also break up and disappear just as the sound ceases when a drum is taken out into its parts. Any one of these elements, when it is in life and has this consciousness, and when it has neither of these, springs into existence from out of the same element. This is the true course of things. Other details of the teaching that I may have to expound, and the *śāstras* that I may have to explain are the same as those of the Lōkāyatas. Among the *Pramāṇas*, Pratyaksha is the one admissible, even Anumāna is to be rejected. That which exists in the present, and that which we enjoy in this present life, are the only two states of existence; that there is another life and the enjoyment of the result of our deeds in it, are both of them false.' Having thus heard the teachings of all the systems, she thought: 'Though these be none of them acceptable, I shall not answer any of these. Does anybody know that I have knowledge of my previous birth.' So saying she laughed in scorn at the imperfections of the Bhūtavādi's argument in particular. She further observed 'that the minds of people change when one gets possessed, or when one is in a state of dreaming. There can be no doubt about this. Do you not recognize your father and mother only by inference? Who on this earth can understand this otherwise? Without understanding the ultimate truth, it would be impossible without a doubt to know the truth of things.' While still in her

disguise, she gave this reply to the Bhūtavādi, having learnt already the five systems of thought, the five, namely (1) *Vaidikavāda*, taking into it the first five sections, and (2) Jaina, including 6 and 7 following, and (3), (4), (5) the Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣhika and Bhūtavāda including Lōkāyata, of the ten systems expounded in this chapter.

BOOK XXVIII

There in the city of Vaaji she searched for Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ and her mother and companion, and, passing through the outer city into the fort and the various streets occupied by the different classes of citizens, she reached the place where those that travel through the air get down to land. She still preserved her disguise, and entered the *vihāra* of the Bauddhas as beautiful as the Aindra-vihāra at Kāvēripaṭṭinam where the residents listened to the exposition of the teachings of the Buddha. Finding there the father of Kōvalan among the holy ones, she made her obeisance to him in due form and recounted to him how she came into possession of the miraculous bowl, how by means of that she became acquainted with the king of Sāvaham who was 'ruling the earth' in great prosperity, how she taught him his previous birth by showing him the Buddha-seat in Maṇipallavam, and how in the course of these transactions the city of Pubār was swallowed up by the sea. Learning that, on account of this calamity, her mother and the sage Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ had left for Vaaji, she journeyed to that city sending the king of Sāvaham back to his kingdom. Arriving at Vaaji, she said that, in her new form, she heard the teachings of the various other persuasions from men most competent to expound them. Rejecting them all as not right, she wished to hear

the teaching of the Buddha which was superior to them all, and came in search of Aṣavaṇa Adigaḷ. Having said this, she told him that it was her good fortune that brought her to the presence of him who had assumed the holy garb of a Buddhist mendicant. He said in reply: 'Listen, dear one, having heard of the calamity that befell both your father and mother and the consequent destruction of Madura, I resolved to give up the life of a householder which was but a delusion, since the time had come for me to adopt the life of a Buddhist mendicant. Feeling convinced that this body and all the wealth that I had acquired through life were alike unstable, I took up this life and resolved to adopt the path of the *Dharma*. Having assumed such a life how I happened to come to this city, I shall recount now. Once on a former occasion when the great Chēra king, the ruler of the Kutṭuvar, who planted his emblem of the bow on the Himalayas with the ladies of the household entered this grove and remained here in the pleasure for recreation, a few *Dharmachāraṇas* who, having worshipped the hill Samanoḷi in the island of Lanka and, passing round in circumambulation, made up their minds to get down to earth as the time for setting the king on the good path had come. Seeing them on this rock, he offered worship to them as a result of previous good deeds, and, washing their feet in due form, offered to them food prepared of "the four kinds and the six flavours". Having done this, he praised their condescension and offered them worship with due hospitality along with his whole court. On that occasion these holy ones expounded to him the sufferings of birth and the joys of ceasing to be born, and thus implanted into his mind the *Four Truths* of the first teacher of the *Dharma*. Then the ninth ancestor of

Kōvalan, your father, being an intimate friend of the Chēra king had also the benefit of the instruction as a result of the accumulated merit of his good deeds. Distributing among the needy all the ancestral wealth that he inherited and all that he himself had added to it, he erected for the Sugata (Buddha) this Chaitya of brilliant white stucco with its turrets reaching to the skies. Since this was erected in order that those that live in this world might visit it and destroy the evil attaching to them, I came here to offer worship. Hearing from the holy ones here that Kāvēripaṭṭinam was likely to be swallowed up by the sea, I made up my mind to stay here alone. Further your father who had lost his life as a result of evil deeds, would appear as a god as a result of good deeds in past existence. Enjoying the result of all previous good deeds in that life, he would at the end of this life be born along with his wife in the holy city of Kapila (Kapilavāstu) as he had the benefit of the Buddha's teaching previously. Listening to the teaching of the Buddha in that city, he will attain to the end of living (Nirvāpa). This I had heard from those who know the past, present and future, and understood the drift of it. I also shall hear that teaching on that day along with your father. Further since you had learnt your past from Tuvadikan, the statuette on the pillar, I had listened to the teaching of Aravaṇa Aḍigeḷ expounding the path of good life. He is the cause of good to you, as is also the city of Kānchī. On the day that he left for Kānchī, your mother and her companion Sutamati also left with him. More than this, listen beautiful one, Kānchī of golden battlements has lost all her beauty since the country dependent thereon had been suffering from a severe famine owing to failure of rain. Even the holy mendicant ones there had none to give them alms, and

have arrived here. You carry the balm for hunger, and therefore you should appear in that country, and like seasonal rain, you must revive the languishing country and its inhabitants.' Thus concluded the holy one. Manimēkhalai with a profound obeisance to him, rose into the air with the bowl in her hand to the west of the city, and moving along the north, reached the city of Kānchī, which looked like the city of Indra himself descended to the earth, and which, losing its fertility, looked poor like the thus impoverished city of heaven itself. With a melting heart for the sufferings of the city, she flew round the city in circumambulation, and, descending in the middle of it, worshipped the Chaitya which was erected for the Bodhi tree and the Buddha himself, the former of which was made of gold, both stem and branches, and of emerald leaves. She passed on to the south-west into a grove full of flowering trees. The chief of the palace guard went to the king and intimated to him that the daughter of Kōvalan, the eminently holy and the unparalleled one in the whole of Jambudvīpa, had arrived at the city, and, with the inexhaustible food-providing bowl in her hand, was just then in the *Dharma Vana*. Her appearance being quite as welcome as that of welcome rain, the king with his 'assemblies of ministers', feeling gratified that what the statuette on the pillar had said had already turned true, offering worship and praising her, bowed to her from a distance and went to the grove where she was. Addressing her, he said: 'Either because my rule had deflected from the path of righteousness, or because of errors in the performance of austerities by those whose duty it was to do them, or because of women falling away from the path of chastity, the whole of my country suffers from want of rain. Not knowing how it came about, I was

in great perplexity when a goddess appeared before me and said:—"Give up grief. As a result of your good deeds in the past, there will appear a damsel with a begging bowl in her hand. Fed from that inexhaustible bowl the whole living world will revive. As a result of her grace, rains will pour in plenty at the command of Indra, and many other miracles will take place in this town. Even when rains fail, the country will still have an abundance of water. In the great streets, construct tanks and plant gardens, so that they may appear with the tanks constructed of old, as if the great Maṇipallavam itself had come here." So saying she disappeared.' He pointed out to Maṇimēkhalai where exactly he actually carried out the instructions of the goddess. Maṇimēkhalai entered the grove, and, pleased with its appointments and appearance, she got constructed a Buddha seat just like that which she saw in Maṇipallavam. She also got a temple constructed for Tīvatīlakai and the goddess Maṇimēkhalā, and arranged for the celebration of recurring festivals through the king. Having arranged for all these, she performed the actual worship, and placing the begging bowl on the Buddha-seat, she invited all living beings suffering from hunger to come in. Then there came crowds of people speaking 'the eighteen languages'; the blind, the deaf, the maimed, the helpless, the dumb, the diseased, those engaged in the performance of penance, those suffering from hunger, those suffering from extreme poverty, these and many hundreds of thousands of animals, all came crowding in. To all of them, she supplied food so inexhaustibly that it was only the hands of those that received it that felt exhausted. They all returned after satisfying, to the full, their hunger, praising the young lady, who appeared as if through the result of having fed

a very holy person in previous existence, and thereby brought prosperity to the land, as an abundance of water, good land, timely rain, change of seasons, the necessary instruments of cultivation, seeds sown properly and yield returning in plenty, would. At this time, there came to the grove Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ with her mother and her companion Sutamati. She prostrated before them, and, washing their feet, saw them seated suitably to their holiness, and provided them with delicious food and drink. She served to them afterwards betel and camphor, and prayed that what she long desired may turn fruitful and true. So saying, she discarded her disguise and made a profound obeisance again.

CHAPTER XXIX

After bestowing his blessing upon the young lady who had made her obeisance to him in due form, Saint Aravaṇa said to her: 'Piliṅgai the daughter of the king of Nāga Nāḍu, made over her tender baby, born to Neḍu-vēl-Kiḷḷi, to Kambaḷa Śeṭṭi whose single ship touched the island on its way to India. Taking the baby from her, with the respect due to its royal origin, Kambaḷa Śeṭṭi set sail from there on his homeward journey. On that day, at the darkest part of the night and very close to the shore, the boat capsized. Not seeing the child after the accident the Śeṭṭi duly reported the loss of the baby to the king, who, in his anxiety and occupation in directing the search of the baby, forgot the festival of Indra. Indra, in his turn, commanded, through goddess Maṇimēkhalā that the city of Puhār be swallowed up by the sea. An ancestor of your father generations ago suffered shipwreck and was lost in the sea, much like a golden needle in a rich carpet of gold, and was struggling for seven days continuously without

losing life altogether. Understanding this by the quiver in his white carpet, Indra commanded the goddess to rescue, from suffering death in the sea, that one who was to become a Buddha. She carried him out of the sea in order that the *Paramitā*¹ might receive fulfilment, that the *Dharma Chakra* may keep revolving. Hearing from the knowing *Chāraṇas* (wanderers through the air) that that was her habitual function, your father gave you her name. Your renunciation was that very day intimated to him in a dream with all the clearness of reality. Since through her the city had been overwhelmed, your mothers and myself retired to Kānchi for your sake. Having heard this Maṇimēkhalai said in reply, after making a profound obeisance, 'even so said Tivatīlakai, who worships the golden seat of the Buddha, to her.'

'In accordance therewith, I assumed another disguise in that fair city (Vanji), and heard the varied teaching of the sects, each system expounded according to its own authoritative works (*Nāli Sūtra*). I took none of them really to heart as they were not acceptable, and carried them just as I did the disguise I put on. May the holy one therefore instruct me in the truth.' Aravaṇa Aḍiga] assented and expounded the teaching of Buddhism as follows :—

'The first teacher is Jinēndra; his instruments of knowledge (*Aḥvāi*) are but two, namely, faultless perception (*Prattiyam* or *Pratyaksha*) and inference (*Karuttu* or *Anumāna*). Knowledge acquired by direct perception

¹ The Perfections, generally ten but the number is sometimes given as eight and even six. These ten are (1) *Dāna* (charity), (2) *Sīla* (Purity of conduct), (3) *Kṣānti* (Patience), (4) *Vīrya* (Strenuousness), (5) *Dhyāna* (Meditation), (6) *Pragñā* (Intelligence), (7) *Uśāya* (Employment of right means), (8) *Prayichāna* (Resoluteness), (9) *Bala* (Strength) and (10) *Gñāna* (Knowledge).

is taken to be *Śuṭṭamarva* (*Pratyakṣha*, perception). Name (*Nāma*), class (*Jāti*), quality (*Guṇa*), and action (*Kriyā*), are excluded from this as they are obtainable in inference (*Anumāna*) as well. Inference by cause or consequence, and common (*Sāmānya*) inference are liable to error. That which is free from error is inference from result as from smoke, fire. All the other *Pramāṇas*¹ inasmuch as they are capable of being included in *Karuttu* may be treated as *Anumāna*. Other means of knowledge are the following five, namely:—(1) *Pakkam* (Sans. : *Pakṣa*, proposition, also called *Pratignā*); (2) *Hetu* (reason); (3) *Tiṭṭantam* (Sans. *Drishṭānta*, example, also *Udāharantā*); (4) *Upanaya* (application); and (5) *Nigamaṇa* (conclusion). Of these *Pakkam* consists in saying that this *hill has fire in it*. When you state, it is so *because it smokes*, you are stating the reason. If you add *just like a kitchen*, you are giving an example. *To say that the hill also smokes* is to state the application (*Upanaya*). If it has smoke *it must have fire* is coming to a conclusion.

That which has no fire can have no smoke, like water, is the contrary concomitant of the proposition, and is negative application. Thus it serves as application by contrariety—negative concomitance. When the real reason (*Hetu*) is based on identity (*Svabhāva*), the proposition or subject takes the form, sound is non-eternal. When we urge, because it is artificial, we state the attribute of the subject (*Pakṣa dharmā*). 'Whatever is made is non-eternal like a pot,' is a similar case (*Sapakṣa*), with the example added. Whatever is not eternal and not capable of being made like ether is the

¹ In the absence of any specific recital of these in this context these must refer to the six said 'to be prevalent at the present time,' in Book 27 above.

counter case (*Vipakṣha* with example) and gives the concomitance of contrariety. In negative *pramāṇa* the statement that in this open space there is no pot constitutes the subject. 'Because it is not seen', is the attribute of the subject. 'As they do not exist, we have not seen the horns of a rabbit', is a similar example of that method. When we say 'whatever exists will be seen like a myrabolan in the open hand' is a similar but counter-statement. It is in this way that what is urged as reason establishes facts.

If you ask what it is that smoke (as reason) establishes, the existence of smoke proves the existence of fire by the positive concomitance, where there is smoke there is always fire, and the negative concomitance there is no smoke where there is no fire. If so, when one sees before him smoke, the darkness proceeding straight from it, or going up in spiral, as this is due to fire, when you see something dark and smoky overhead you must infer the existence of fire. If co-existence thus establishes facts, then when one who had formerly seen an ass and a woman at one place and at one time, sees an ass at another time, he should infer the existence of a woman then and there. No. This will not do.

If the negative concomitance will prove that there is no smoke where there is no fire, one who did not see in the mane of an ass the tail of a fox because he saw no tail of a dog, could rarely infer the existence of a dog's tail in another place where he saw the tail of a fox. Therefore even that is inadmissible. *Upanaya* (application) and *nigamya* (conclusion), connected with the *drishṭānta* (example) as they are, may be regarded as included in it.

Pakṣa (proposition), *hetu* (reason), *drishṭānta* (example) are of two kinds, valid and invalid. Among

these, the valid proposition is that which has included in it (1) the explicit subject possessed of attributes, and (2) the changes that the plainly discernible attribute of the conclusion undergoes when found elsewhere. For example, to say that sound is either eternal or non-eternal is a valid proposition. In this the subject possessed of attributes is *Sabda*, *Sādhya-dharma* (attribute of the conclusion) is its being either eternal or non-eternal. The reason (*hetu*) is of three kinds; (1) being attributive to the subject; (2) becoming attributable to a similar subject and (3) becoming non-attributable to the opposite.

If *sapaksha* (similarity of character) is to be established, the attribute must, as stated in the proposition (*pakṣa*), be ascribable generally (*poduvakai* or *sāmānya*). Sound is non-eternal like a pot. If its *vipaksha*, contrary concomitance, is to be stated, whatever is not non-eternal is not made like ether (*ākāśa*). The fact of being and the act of appearing as a result of the making, being respectively attributable to the subject (*pakṣa*) and the example (*sapaksha*), and not so attributable to the contrary or negative concomitant, becomes the valid reason for predication of non-eternality to sound.

Valid *drishānta* (example) is of two kinds:—*Sādharmya* (similar character) and *Vaidharmya* (different character). A *Sādharmya* example is, sound is non-eternal like a pot when they exist together. *Vaidharmya* example consists in the non-existence of the reason when the conclusion does not exist. These constitute valid means of proof.

Fallacious *pakṣa* (proposition), *hetu* (reason) and *eduttukāṭṭu* (*drishānta*s or example) are the following:—Fallacious propositions are of nine kinds: (1) *Pratyakṣa vīruddham*, (2) *Anumāna vīruddham*, (3) *Suvachana vīruddham*, (4) *Lōka vīruddham*, (5) *Āgama vīruddham*,

(6) *Aprasiddha viśeshyam*, (7) *Aprasiddha viśeshyam*, (8) *Aprasiddha ubhayaṃ*, (9) *Aprasiddha sambandham*. Of these (1) the first contradicts direct experience as in 'sound cannot be heard by the ear'. (2) *Avamāna viruddham* consists in making contrary inference as in describing a non-eternal pot as eternal. (3) *Suvachana viruddham* consists in contradictory speech as in describing one's own mother as a barren woman. (4) *Loka viruddham* contradicts general experience as in saying that the moon is not the moon. (5) *Āgama viruddham* consists in making statements contradictory to accepted books of authority as when the non-eternalist Vaiśeṣhika calls eternal that which is non-eternal. (6) *Aprasiddha viśeshyam* consists in not understanding that which is provable by the opponent, as when a Buddha tells the eternalist Sāṅkhya that sound is destructible. (7) *Aprasiddha viśeshyam* consists in a statement where the proposition is not capable of predication to the opponent, as when a Sāṅkhya states to a Buddha, who does not believe in the existence of a soul, that the soul is capable of understanding. (8) *Aprasiddha ubhayaṃ* consists in a statement which to the opponent is unacceptable either as a proposition or as the conclusion; as when a Vaiśeṣhika tells a Buddha (who believes neither in happiness nor in soul), that, for happiness and all else connected with it, the source of origin is the soul. (9) *Aprasiddha sambandham* consists in proving that which is already accepted by the opponent, as when a Buddha is told that sound is non-eternal—a statement which does not require to be proved to him.

Similarly Hētuppoli or fallacious middle term is of three kinds:—

(1) *Asiddham* or unproved;

(2) *Anaikāntikam* or uncertain, when the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by the one party only,

and

(3) *Viruddham* or contradictory, as when the truth of the middle term is open to question.

Of these the first *Asiddham* is of four forms, namely :—

(1) *Ubhayāsiddham*

(2) *Amyathāsiddham*

(3) *Siddhāsiddham*

and

(4) *Āśrayāsiddham*.

Of these four, the *first* is where the predicate or the middle term is not acceptable as true to both the parties, as when it is said,

that sound is a eternal
because it is seen.

(2) *Amyathāsiddham* is where the middle term is not recognized by the opposing party, as when it is said that :

Sound is a product of evolution
And therefore non-eternal.

It seems unproved to the Sāṅkhya who does not admit that sound is a product of evolution, but is merely a reflex of that which is in the mind ; as in the example :

Sound is a product of evolution
Therefore it is not eternal.

The fact of evolution being no more than the expression of the speaker's understanding, it will not be acceptable as a reason to the Sāṅkhya.

(3) *Siddha-asiddham* consists in the reason or the middle term being doubtful in drawing a conclusion, as

when that which appears before one may be taken to be either vapour or mist, it is actually taken to be smoke, and from that, the conclusion is drawn that there must be fire behind.

(4) *Āśraya-siddham* is to prove to the opponent the non-existence of the *Dharmin* or the middle term as when one states that

Ether (or *ākāśa*) is a substance
Because it has the quality of sound,

the conclusion is unproved to him who believes that ether is not a substance.

Anaikāntikam similarly is of six forms :—

- (1) *Sādhitṛaya* ;
- (2) *Asādhitṛaya* ;
- (3) *Sapakṣaikadīśāvīruddha Vipakṣavyāpi* ;
- (4) *Vipakṣaika dēśāvīruddha Sapakṣavyāpi* ;
- (5) *Uāpīyīkadīśāvīruddha* and
- (6) *Virudhā Vyabhichāri*.—

Of these, *Sādhitṛaya* consists in the common *hetu* or middle term being uncertain, both in the *Sapakṣa* and in the *Vipakṣa* (a similar and the counter case), as in the example :—

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is cognizable.

The quality of cognizability is a common quality of things eternal and things non-eternal. It is cognizable to be non-eternal as in the case of a pot, a product ; it is cognizable to be eternal as in the case of ether.

(2) *Asādhitṛaya* is that in which the *hetu* or the reason which is contemplated is non-existent either in the similar case or in the counter-case, as in the example :

Sound is eternal
Because it is audible.

The reason of audibility, if it exists in the minor term, does not exist in the *Sapakṣa* or *Vipakṣa* or the exceptional. In other words, it is not general enough, and therefore it becomes doubtful and uncertain.

(3) *Sapakṣaikadēśaviruddhāvīpakṣavyāpi* consists in the *hētu* or the reason or the middle term abiding in some of the things homogeneous with and in all of the things heterogeneous with the major term, as when it is said :

Sound is the product of effort
Because it is non-eternal.

Here the reason or the middle term while it exists in lightning and ether (*ākāśa*) both of which are not products of effort, it abides in lightning, but is not seen in *ākāśa*, and therefore it is non-eternal. Since it resembles the pot it may get destroyed and therefore become a product of effort, or whether it will get destroyed as in the case of lightning and will not be the product of effort. Thus it becomes open to doubt.

(4) *Vīpakṣaikadēśaviruddhī-sapakṣavyāpi* consists in the *hētu* or the middle term while it abides in a part of things heterogeneous, it abides in all things homogeneous with it, as when it is said :

Sound is the product of effort
Because it is non-eternal.

The reason or the middle term non-eternal exists in *ākāśa* and lightning which are heterogeneous with being the product, while it shows itself in lightning and does not in *ākāśa*. In the *sapakṣa* as in the case of the pot, it abides in all things. Therefore it becomes doubtful whether being non-eternal as in lightning, it will not show itself as a product, or being non-eternal as a pot it will still appear as a product of effort.

(5) *Upayahatāsviruddhi* consists in the reason or the middle term abiding in some of the homogeneous and some of the heterogeneous things from the major term as when it is said :

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal.

In this example the middle term non-corporeality on the side of eternal is found in *śūnyā* and in the minute atoms which are homogeneous with things eternal, and make them incorporeal. Similarly in the case of things heterogeneous with those that are eternal as a pot or happiness. This incorporeality abides in happiness and does not in a pot. Therefore whether the middle term abides only in some of the things it cannot be treated as *anaiśāntikam* as it leads to the doubt whether things incorporeal are eternal like *śūnyā* or non-eternal like happiness.

(6) *Viruddhavyabhichāri* consists in the middle term not being distinctly the reason, for the thesis supports even that which is contradictory to the thesis, as in the example :

Sound is eternal
Because it is the product of effort.

While this may be regarded as valid in so far as it applies to the pot, etc., which are homogeneous as being products of effort, sound is eternal because it is audible as is the character of sound, is also equally valid. Since the validity is equally good for both the thesis and its contradictory, it ceases to be *Aikāntika* (peculiar).

Viruddha is of four kinds, namely :—

(1) *Dharmasvarūpa Viparīta Sādhanam* : where in the statement of the *Pakṣa* or *Dharmīn*, the major term is contradictory to the *Sādhanā* or the middle term ;

(2) *Dharmavilēsha-viparīta Sādhanam* : where the *Dharmavilēsha* or the attribute or the predicate implied in the major term is contradictory to the middle term, *Sādhanam* ;

(3) *Dharmasvarūpa-viparīta Sādhanam* : where the form of the minor term is contradictory to the *Sādhanam* or the middle term ; and

(4) *Dharmavilēsha-viparīta Sādhanam* : when the predicate implied in the minor term is contradictory to the *Sādhanam* or the middle term.

Of these the first is found when in the *hētu*, the middle term, the major term is faulty, as in the example :—

Sound is eternal
Because it is a product.

In this the character of being a product implies that sound is non-eternal. Therefore the *hētu* or reason of being a product establishes the non-eternality which is contradictory to the eternality stated in the middle term. Hence the contradiction between the two.

(2) The second consists in the reason or the *hētu* offered being contradictory to the attribute implied in the major term, *Sādhyadharmā* ; for example :—

The eyes and other instruments of sense are for the
service of something else.
Because they are composed of particles
Like bed, seat, etc.

Of these the *hētu* or the middle term 'being composed of particles (like bed, seat, etc., which are of service to someone else) make the eye and other organs of sense also serviceable to someone else. This someone else like the occupant of a bed or seat is made one distinct from the eye and other organs of sense, and thus the soul ; a thing without organs is made into a thing with organs. This is contradictory to the actual attributes of the major term, which is *Ātman* here, and not

body merely; thus it makes the soul which is without any sense organs possessed of organs, and constitutes a contradiction between the major term and the middle term.

(3) The third consists in the *Āḥtu* or the middle term by itself contradicting the form of the minor term, as in the example :—

Bhava (existence) is substance, but not action, nor has it quality.

Whatever substance has both quality and is capable of action is different like the character of *sāmānya* (generality).

The *āḥtu* or the middle term which illustrates that substance, quality and character being combined in it, *Uppai* (*Bhava* or existence) is stated to be something distinct. This is *sāmānya* (*padu*) which gives the reason for the existence of the three. This *Uppai* (*Bhava* or existence) not being found in the *Sādḥya* or the major term and the *Dṛishṭānta* or example, but not containing the attributes of *Sāmānya* or the generality nor any other attribute what is stated to exist in the *Dharmin* or the minor term, is made to be non-existent, and thus becomes contradictory.

The fourth consists in the establishment of the non-existence of the attributes in the *Dharmin* or the minor term. In the example given above, the *Bhava* or existence is the doing and the quality of the doer. Since this is contradicted, it may also be taken as contradicting that which is predicated in the middle term.

FALLACIOUS EXAMPLE

These are what are called *Dhrisṭāntābhāsa* or examples containing fallacies. It was already stated that *Dhrisṭānta* is of two kinds, namely, *Sādḥarṇya* and

Vaidharmya (or homogeneous and heterogeneous). Of these the former is of five kinds :—

- (1) *Sādhanadharmavikalam* or imperfect middle ;
- (2) *Sādhyadharmavikalam*, defective major term ;
- (3) *Ubhayadharmavikalam*, defective major and middle ;
- (4) *Ananucayam*, non-concomitance, and
- (5) *Viparīta-anucayam* (contradictory concomitance)

Similarly heterogeneous example is also of five kinds, namely :—

- (1) *Sādhyā-avyāvṛtī* (not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term) ;
- (2) *Sādhanā-avyāvṛtī* (not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term) ;
- (3) *Ubhayā-avyāvṛtī* (heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term) ;
- (4) *Avyavṛtīrākha* (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term) ;
- (5) *Viparītavyavṛtīrākha* (a heterogeneous example showing the absence of an inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term).

(1) Of these *Sādhanadharmavikalam* consists in the example exhibiting a defective middle term, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because whatever has no corporeal form is eternal
Therefore what is seen is *paramāṇu* (indivisible atom).

In this the example *paramāṇu* being eternal and at the same time corporeal contains to the full the character of the major term, but is defective in not being possessed

of the character of the *Sādhyaadharmā*, or the middle term.

(2) *Sādhyaadharmavikalāṃ*; in the example offered the character of the major term is defective, as in

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-corporeal is eternal, as *Buddhi*
(intelligence).

In the example *Buddhi* (intelligence) which is brought in as an illustration being non-corporeal and therefore being non-eternal at the same time, shows to the full the non-corporeality, which is the character of the *Sādhya* or the middle term, being defective in eternality, which is the predicate of the major.

(3) *Ubhayaadharmavikalāṃ*; in the example given both the major and the middle are found defective. This is of two kinds, *Sat* and *Asat*. Example of *Sat* is, in a thing that exists that which is predicated shows both a defective major and a defective middle, as in the example.

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-corporeal is eternal like a pot.

Here the pot, which is brought in as an example being a product, does not partake of the character of the eternal as predicated in the major, nor of the character of non-corporeality predicated in the middle; thus it shows itself to be defective both in respect of the major and in respect of the middle. *Asatubhayaadharmavikalāṃ* shows a similar double defect in a thing non-existent, as in the example

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is corporeal is non-eternal like *ākāśa* (ether).

In this the example *Ākāśa* does not partake of the character of non-eternality predicated in the major, nor the corporeality predicated in the middle, to him who states that *Ākāśa* is non-existent. On the other hand, to one who believes in *Ākāśa* being existent, it is eternal, and non-corporeal. Therefore to him also it is defective both in respect of the major and in respect of the middle.

(4) *Anauvayam* (non-concomitance in example) consists in the middle and the major, without stating the connection between the two, exhibiting the real character of both, as in the example,

Sound is not eternal
Because it is a product
A pot is a product and non-eternal.

In this example the general concomitance that 'whatever is a product is not eternal' not being stated, the concomitance between the major and the middle is not made clear.

(5) *Viparita-anvayam* (the contradictory concomitance). This consists in establishing concomitance merely by the concomitance of the example with that which is predicated in the major term, as in the example,

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is a product
Whatever is not eternal is a product.

In saying so, concomitance fails, because the universal statement whatever is a product is not eternal, is not stated, and therefore it fails in as much as the major is not drawn as a conclusion from the middle; on the contrary, the statement of universal concomitance is made from the major term. The defect consists in this; what is predicated in the major may be more extensive than that which is stated in the middle term, as in whatever is not eternal is a product,

(1) *Sādhyā-avyāvṛtti* consists in the example being incompatible with that which is predicated in the middle while it is not so with what is predicated in the major ; as in the example :—

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not non-corporeal
as *Paramāṇu*.

In this example, the *paramāṇu* which is brought in as an example, being eternal and corporeal as well, it is incompatible with the non-corporeality predicated in the middle, while it is compatible with the eternality predicated in the major.

(2) *Sādhanā-avyāvṛtti* consists in the example being incompatible with what is predicated in the major while it is not so with that which is predicated in the middle ; as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is not eternal is also not non-corporeal,
like *Karma*.

Here the heterogeneous example *Karma*, while it is non-corporeal, is at the same time not eternal. Therefore it is incompatible with the eternality predicated in the major and is compatible with the non-corporeality predicated in the middle.

(3) In *Ubhaya-avyāvṛtti* the heterogeneous example brought in for illustration while being incompatible with what is predicated in the middle term and the major is of two kinds :—

(i) *Ubhaya-avyāvṛtti* in that which exists and (ii) *Ubhaya-avyāvṛtti* in that which does not. The former is a heterogeneous example in things that exist which do

not show incompatibility with the predicate of the major and the middle, as in the example :—

Sound is eternal
Because it is non-corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not non-corporeal
like *Ākāśa*.

In this *Ākāśa* that is brought in as a heterogeneous example is eternal and non-corporeal to him that believes in its being a substance. Therefore the eternality predicated in the major and the non-corporeality predicated in the middle are both of them not incompatible. But to him that does not believe in its being a substance, in the example,

Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is also not corporeal like
Ākāśa.

In this, to him that says that *Ākāśa* is not a substance, as it is itself non-existent, the non-eternality in the major and the corporeality in the middle are both neither compatible nor incompatible.

(4) *Avyatirākha* where that which is predicated in the major being non-existent, the non-existence of that which is predicated in the middle is not stated, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is a product
Whatever is non-eternal, it is also not a non-product.

Without making an explicit statement as the above when one asserts that in a pot, both the character of being a product and of the non-eternality exist, it is *Viparīta-avyatirākha* in heterogeneous example. *Viparītaavyati-*

vāda consists in a statement of non-compatibility in illogical order, as in the example,

Sound is eternal
Because it is corporeal.

In this instead of stating that wherever eternity does not exist there corporeality also does not exist, but stating instead, that wherever there is not corporeality there eternity also does not exist. In this way of stating it, there is an incompatibility of *Vyatirākha*.

By the fallacious reasoning, which has been thus expounded, understand clearly the character of fallacious inference, and by applying this method, make sure of whatever you know to be correct knowledge.

BOOK XXX

Mañimēkhalai who had already learnt all that had happened in her previous birth, after having taken upon herself the duty of giving gifts and walking in the path of right conduct, worshipped three several times the triple jewel of Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, and placed herself exclusively under the protection of *Buddha Dharma*. Aravaṇa Adigaḷ who was to expound to her the righteous path of the *Dharma* said : ' At the time when the world should be full of beings poor in understanding, the Buddha, at the earnest entreaty of all the celestial beings of the *Tushitaloka*,¹ each in his turn, appeared leaving that heaven of joy empty ; then he sat at the foot of the *Bodhi-tree*, and, conquering the enemy *Māra*, became a hero. The good teaching of the ' Four Truths ' which the beautiful hero imparted, after having pulled up by the root the three faults, were taught with ineffable beneficence in the past by innumerable other Buddhas. These

¹ The Heaven of unalloyed bliss.

truths provide the means of crossing the ocean of existence by destroying the twelve *Nidānas*. These latter appear one from the other in order as cause and effect, and being capable of reappearance as consequent upon that which is before it, assume the form of a never-ending circle. When in this order of cause and consequence the first ceases to exist, the next follows in cessation; when it comes into existence, that which follows it does so inevitably. So these are properly described as a chain of causes and conditions. They may equally well be regarded as substance and attribute. Thus arranged these twelve *Nidānas* fall into four divisions, showing three joints. Appearance in birth or rebirth is of three kinds (human, heavenly or of the nether world), and is of three divisions in time, past, present and future. These also produce the faults, deeds and their consequences, and are impermanent and cause only sorrow. When one gets to understand this character of these *Nidānas*, he knows what will assure him the permanence of release (*Nirvāṇa*).

Further it becomes the means for the cultivation of the Four Truths, and is constituted of the five *Skandhas*. It is capable of being argued in the six forms beginning with the 'assertion of truth'. It results in the 'four' forms of excellence. It is open to question in four ways and being capable of respective answers in four ways similarly. It is without origin and without end. It is a series of continuous becoming without ever reaching final destruction. It neither does, nor can it be described as being done. It is neither self nor is it possessed by another self. It is nothing that is gone, nothing that is to come. It cannot be brought to an end, nor is it to end itself. It is itself the result of the deed, birth and cessation. Such is the nature of the twelve causes and condi-

tions beginning with ignorance, and called the *Nidānas*. These twelve are :—

- (1) Ignorance (*Pēdamai*, Sans. *Avidyā*).
- (2) Action (*Śeykai*, Sans. *Karma*).
- (3) Consciousness (*Uṇarvu*, Sans. *Vigñāna*).
- (4) Name and form (*Aru-uru*, Sans. *Nāmarūpa*).
- (5) Six organs of sense (*Vāṭil*, Sans. *Ṣaḍāyatana*).
- (6) Contact (*Ūru*, Sans. *Sparśa*).
- (7) Sensation (*Nuḥarvu*, Sans. *Vēdaṇā*).
- (8) Thirst or craving (*Vūḷkai*, Sans. *Trishṇā*).
- (9) Attachment (*Pa ru*, Sans. *Upādāna*).
- (10) Becoming or existence (*Pavam*, Sans. *Bhava*).
- (11) Birth (*Toṇam*, Sans. *Jāti*).
- (12) The result of the action, old age and death (*Vinaip-payan*, Sans. *Jarāmaramaṇam*).

If people understand the twelve-fold nature of the chain of cause and effect, they then understand the supreme truth and will enjoy permanent bliss. If they do not, they are indentured to suffer in the depths of hell.¹

¹ The following exposition of the *Nidānas* based on the Pāli texts and the *Maddhyamaṅgikāya* by the latest writer on the Doctrine of Buddha, Dr. George Gmelin, may be compared with the exposition given in the *Māṅgikhalai* :—

¹ Now we only need to run through the whole formula in its totality.

² In dependence on ignorance—*avijjā*, arises the processer—that is the organic processer, especially those of senses, *saṅkhāra*.

³ In dependence on the processes (of life, especially on the activities of the senses), arises consciousness, *viḅhāna*.

⁴ In dependence on consciousness, arises the corporeal organism—*nāma-rūpa*.

⁵ In dependence on the corporeal organism, arise the six organs of sense—*ṣaḍāyatana*.

⁶ In dependence on the six organs of sense, arises contact—*phassa*.

⁷ In dependence on contact, arises sensation—*vedāna*.

⁸ In dependence on sensation, arises thirst—*taṇhā*.

⁹ In dependence on thirst, arises grasping—*upādāna*.

¹⁰ In dependence on grasping, arises becoming—*bhava*.

¹¹ In dependence on becoming, arises birth—*jāti*.

(1) Ignorance consists in not understanding what was explained above, in being liable to delusion and in believing in what one hears to the neglect of that which one is able to see for himself, as believing in the existence of the horns of a rabbit because someone else says they do exist.

(2) (In the three worlds, the world of life is illimitable, and living beings in it are of six classes. They are men, gods, Brahmas, the inhabitants of hell, the crowd of animals and spirits. According to good deeds and bad, life takes its birth in one or other of these. Ever since it assumes the form of embryo, the result of these deeds will show themselves either in the happiness of mind or in anxiety of suffering. Of these evil deeds—killing, theft and evil desire show themselves as evils springing in the body. Lying, speaking ill of others, harsh words and useless talk, these four show themselves as evils of speech. Desire, anger and illusion are three deeds of evil that arise in the mind. These ten

* In dependence on birth arises old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair.

" Thus comes out the arising of this entire sum of suffering."

The *Buddha* in it wishes to show the relation of the single links in a purely abstract manner, in the way in which they condition themselves internally and in themselves, that is, as follows:—Old age and death, sorrow, with a corporeal organism, as a six senses machine. Such an organism must be born, therefore it presupposes *birth*. But birth is nothing, but a special case of *becoming*. Every becoming is conditioned by a *grasping* and grasping is conditioned by the *thirst* for becoming (*bhāvanīyā*). Such thirst can appear only, where *sensation* is. But sensation is the consequence of *contact* between the senses and an object; therefore it presupposes *organs of sense*. Organs of sense, of course, presupposes a *corporeal organism* for their supporter. Such an organism unquestionably can only exist, even only develop, if *consciousness* is added to it. But consciousness is only known to us as the result of the *organic processes*, especially of the activities of the senses. But these are only set going, where *ignorance* exists as to the *purposelessnessness* of their results.'

(*The Doctrine of Buddha* by George Grimm, pp. 285-86)

the wise would avoid. If they should fail to do so, they would be born as animals or spirits or beings of the nether world, and make themselves liable to extreme anxiety of mind and suffering. Good men¹ on the contrary, would avoid these ten, and assuming the good discipline (*Śīlam*) and taking upon themselves to do deeds of charity (*Dānam*), will be born in the three higher classes of beings, such as the *Dēvas* (gods), men or Brahmas, and live a life of enjoyment of happiness as a result of good deeds. ²

(3) Consciousness (*Uparva*) consists in feeling like one in sleep, without the feeling leading to any action, or to any satisfaction.

(4) Name and form (*Arū-ru*) consists in that which has the feeling described above, and constituting life and body.

(5) Organs of sense (*Vāyī*) are, on examination, those that carry consciousness to the mind (*Vignāna* or *Ullāsa*).

(6) Contact (*Ūru*) consists in *Vignāna* and the organs of sense experiencing touch with other things (*vēru pulanga*).

(7) Sensation (*Nuharva*) consists in the mind or *Vignāna* enjoying that of which it has become conscious.

(8) Thirst or craving (*Vāthar*) consists in not feeling satisfied with that which is thus enjoyed.

(9) Attachment (*Parva*) consists in the desire for enjoyment impelling one into action.

¹ The *Śīlas*, according to the Buddhists, are five or ten. They are:— (1) not killing, (2) not lying, (3) not stealing, (4) no evil desire, (5) non-acceptance of gifts. These are the five principal ones. Not assuming high seats or beds, not wearing tinguets or rich garments, not touching gold and silver, etc., not enjoying music, dancing, etc., eating before sun-rise. These are subsidiary and not obligatory on all.

(10) Becoming (*Pavam*) consists in the collection of deeds indicating the consequence to which each leads.

(11) Birth (*Tōural*) consists in the result of deeds leading to the conscious taking of birth in one or other of the six forms of birth in the inevitable chain of cause and effect.

(12) Disease (*Piṅi*) consists in the suffering of the body by a change from its natural condition in consequence of the result of deeds. Old age (*Mappu*) consists in the loosening of the body as one draws nearer and nearer to the end. Death (*Sakkādu*) ultimately consists in the human body, composed of life and body, disappearing as the setting sun.

From ignorance arises action; from action springs consciousness; from consciousness comes ideas of name and form; from name and form spring the organs of sense; through organs of sense contact becomes possible; contact results in sensation or experience; experience produces desire; from desire springs attachment; from attachment comes into existence collection of deeds; as a result of this collective deed arise other various forms of birth; birth inevitably brings along with it age, disease and death, and the consequent anxiety and the feeling of incapacity to get rid of it. This never-ending suffering is the ultimate result. In such a never-ending circle of experience, when ignorance ceases, action will cease; with action consciousness will cease; with consciousness notions of name and form will cease; with the cessation of name and form, organs of sense will cease; with the cessation of the organs of sense, contact will cease; contact ceasing, sensation or experience will cease; with sensation or experience desire will cease; desire ceasing to exist, there will be

no attachment ; without attachment, there is no accumulation of deeds ; without the accumulated mass of deed, there will be no becoming ; with the cessation of becoming, there will be no birth, no disease, no age, no death, and in consequence, no anxiety and no helplessness. Thus this never-ending series of suffering will be destroyed.

Of these twelve *nidānas*, the first two ignorance and action are regarded as belonging to the first section. All those that follow spring from these two. The following five, namely, name and form, organs of sense, contact and experience, these five, as springing from the former two, are regarded as constituting the second division. Thirst, attachment, and the collection of deeds constitute the third division as they result as evil in the enjoyment of the previous five, and, in consequence, as action resulting therefrom. It is from the folly of desire and consequent attachment that becoming arises. The fourth division includes birth, disease, age and death, since these four are experienced as a result of birth.

Action is the cause of birth and consciousness springs out of it. Where these two meet they mark the first conjunction. Where sensation and craving meet, it marks the second conjunction. The third junction comes in where the accumulation of deeds results in birth. Thus are marked the three points of junction in this chain of twelve causes and conditions.

The three forms of birth are those of men, gods and animals. These result from the consciousness in previous birth as a result of the conformations springing out of ignorance. This happens either from the delusion that this kind of birth is actually cessation of birth, or the taking of birth in a new form without the consciousness,

or the new birth coming with consciousness and the new form existing together. The three times are the past, present and future. Of these the past includes ignorance and action. To the present refer consciousness, name and form, the organs of sense, contact, sensation, thirst or craving, the becoming and birth. To the future belong birth, disease, age and death. The resulting anxiety and helplessness are evils that spring out of the previous series of present action.

Desire, attachment and ignorance, these and the birth resulting therefrom, constitute action in the present and cause future birth. Consciousness, name and form, organs of sense, contact, sensation or experience, birth, age, disease, and death, these are the consequential experience in life, both present and future. These are full of evil, of deeds and of consequences resulting from these deeds, and thus constitute suffering. Being such, they are all impermanent. While the nature of release (*Vijā*) consists in the understanding that there is nothing like soul in anything existing.¹ Consciousness, name and form, the organs of sense, contact, sensation, birth, disease, age and death, with the resulting anxiety and helplessness, these constitute disease. For this disease the causes are ignorance, action, desire, attachment and the collection of deeds. For suffering and birth, attachment is the cause; for bliss and cessation of birth, non-attachment is the cause. Words that embody this idea constitute the 'Four Truths', namely, suffering, the

¹ This it must be noted refers to *śūnya* or individual self, not *Ātman*, the Universal self. This is an improvement introduced by the Satyasiddhi School of Buddhism, according to Chinese authority, by Huiwangman, the chief disciple of Kumāra *śabdha*; vide Yamakami Sogen's *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 378.

cause of suffering, removal of suffering, and the way to remove suffering.

There are four kinds of questions and answers:—

(1) To give a deliberate reply; (2) to separate the component parts of an issue and answer these separately; (3) to answer by a counter question; and (4) to keep silence in answer to a question.

To a question whether a thing that comes into existence will also go out of existence, if the answer is 'it will' it is to give a deliberate reply.

To a question whether a dead man will be born again or no, the enquiry whether in life he was without attachment or no, is to answer by separating the issues involved, and giving separate answers to it.

To a question whether it is the seed that is first or the palm-tree, the enquiry which seed and which particular tree, is answer by a counter question.

To a question whether 'the sky flower' is new or old, silence is the best answer; this is one way of getting round an inconvenient question.

Bondage and release result from the *Skandhas* (aggregates of things). There is no agent outside entitled to bring them into contact. For the *Skandhas* and their manifestations as described above, the cause is the group of three evils; desire, anger and illusion. Examined separately and understand that everything is impermanent, full of suffering, without a soul and unclean; thus treating it, give up desire. Realizing that friendliness, kindness, and (joy at the well-being of creatures) constitutes the best attitude of mind, give up anger. By the practice of hearing (*śruti*), meditation (*chintana*), experiencing in mind (*bhāvana*) and realizing in vision (*darśana*), deliberate, realize and give up all illusion. In these four ways get rid of the darkness of mind.

In these auspicious words, free from inconsistency Aravaṇa Aḍigaḷ exhibited the illuminating lamp of knowledge. Mañimēkhalai, having assumed the habit of an ascetic *tāpasi* and having heard the excellent exposition of the *Dharma*, devoted herself to penance in order that she may get rid of the bondage of birth.



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